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Abstract
In the future, the performance of the railway system must be improved to accommodate
increasing passenger volumes and service quality demands. Track switches are a vital part
of the rail infrastructure, enabling traffic to take different routes. All modern switch designs
have evolved from a design first patented in 1832. However, switches present single points
of failure, require frequent and costly maintenance interventions, and restrict network ca-
pacity. Fault tolerance is the practice of preventing subsystem faults propagating to whole-
system failures. Existing switches are not considered fault tolerant. This thesis describes the
development and potential performance of fault-tolerant railway track switching solutions.
The work first presents a requirements definition and evaluation framework which can be
used to select candidate designs from a range of novel switching solutions. A candidate de-
sign with the potential to exceed the performance of existing designs is selected. This design
is then modelled to ascertain its practical feasibility alongside potential reliability, availabil-
ity, maintainability and capacity performance. The design and construction of a laboratory
scale demonstrator of the design is described. The modelling results show that the perfor-
mance of the fault tolerant design may exceed that of traditional switches. Reliability and
availability performance increases significantly, whilst capacity gains are present but more
marginal without the associated relaxation of rules regarding junction control. However,
the work also identifies significant areas of future work before such an approach could be
adopted in practice.
"If the modern railway industry is to be successful it must continuously im-
prove the safety, reliability and whole life cost efficiency of its operations. The
performance of switches and crossings is central to a high performing railway.
The quality of switch and crossing installation and maintenance is therefore at
the heart of our railway system. Nowhere can a permanent way engineer or
skilled maintainer contribute more to the success of the railway industry than in
these activities."
Prof. Andrew McNaughton. Former Chief Engineer, Railtrack.
Rob Boulger. Former President, Permanent Way Institution.
June, 2002
from ‘British Railway Track, vol. 5’ (Cope and Ellis, 2001).
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A note on terminology
There is some disagreement in literature as to the meanings of ‘points’, ‘turnout’, ‘track
switch’ and ‘junction’; compounded by terms having subtly different meanings in British
and American English. Definitions as used in this thesis are clarified below.
Much terminology in the rail sphere is used with inconsistent meaning; especially be-
tween signalling and permanent way disciplines. For rail related terms with multiple mean-
ings, signalling definitions have been used herein, as per the IRSE Glossary (IRSE, 2011).
Track specific terms are defined in the Permanent Way Institution’s ‘Track Terminology’
(Ellis, 2001), and fault tolerant terminology in IFAC SAFEPROCESS definitions (Blanke
et al., 2006; Iserman and Balle, 1997). Most terms are defined within the work, but more
detail is provided in Ellis’ Encyclopaedia (Ellis, 2006). Regarding switches specifically:
Points Traditionally refers to the pair of movable rails themselves, hence its normal form is
plural. The movable rails were traditionally controlled with a human-operated lever,
with force transmission through rodding. With the addition of more modern auto-
mated drive arrangements, ‘points’ has sometimes been taken by extension to refer to
the whole remote mechanical arrangement of movable rails, drive, closure panel and
common crossing. It is sometimes accepted in everyday dialogue to mean this, yet
some technical documents disagree. For these reasons, in this thesis, the use of the
word ‘points’ is avoided.
Turnout almost exclusively refers to a diverging track arrangement, including switch rails,
closure panel and common crossing. In essence, the term ‘turnout’ refers to track
assets but not signalling assets. However, in some cases, the term is also taken to in-
clude the drive arrangement. Herein, ‘turnout’ relates to a whole arrangement of track
elements - movable rails, closure panel, and common crossing - without consideration
of the motive power arrangement.
Junction generally refers to a node at which two or more routes intersect. This may mean
a single track switch, but could include any number.
Track switch often abbreviated ‘switch’, is the preferred term in American English, but
unlike ‘points’, generally includes reference to the motive power as well as some or
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all track elements. The term has seen extensive usage in British English, albeit var-
iously to refer to switch rails alone, all track components, or all track components
and motive components. In this thesis, this term will be used to refer to the movable
track elements (including their related supporting elements), and motive power ele-
ments, of a single track divergence - but not ancillary track components such as the
common crossing. Hence the term ‘switches and crossings’ could be interchangeable
with ‘turnouts’.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Evolution of the track switch
An early Victorian railway engineer would be simultaneously familiar and astonished if pre-
sented with a modern railway system. Elements such as tunnels, viaducts, traction, rolling
stock, signalling and telecommunications all still play a role, yet all have changed over time
to be almost unrecognisable from early days. Even the cross section of the rails themselves
– usually now continuously welded - has evolved with much research and experience. How-
ever, the track switches would appear broadly similar. The mode of operation, in some cases,
may have moved from human muscle and levers to remote electric or hydraulic machines,
but a modern railway track switch takes a general form which is essentially unchanged since
first patented by Charles Fox in 1832 (Fox, 1904), and illustrated in Figure 1.1.
In rail, development is driven by business and operational needs. The historical trend has
been to run more frequent, faster, or higher-capacity services, whilst necessarily controlling
costs, performance, and safety to societally acceptable levels. This is reflected in the parallel
historical trend of the gradual evolution of components, with an occasional step-change as
radical new technologies are introduced. An example of the former is the ever-evolving dis-
cipline of signalling and train control; and of the latter the move from steam to diesel then
electric traction. Until now, as evidenced by the similarity of state-of-the-art switch designs
to Victorian types, switches have generally followed the former pattern. Gradual improve-
ments to switch design have seen axle loads and traffic speeds increase. Such changes are
detailed in industry design and maintenance manuals (Morgan, 2009). Powered operation
has allowed the number of switches which can be controlled from a single signal box –
and the distance of those switches from the box – to be many times that of mechanical
arrangements (Hadaway, 1950).
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1.2 Problem statement
With the current trend towards communication-based train control, track switches and level
crossings may soon represent the only remaining ‘active’ (i.e. requiring power and physical
movement to perform function), ‘mission-critical’ (i.e. correct system function is required
in order for the railway to operate successfully) fixed-assets on the rail infrastructure. Track
switches, if unchanged from the present day, will then form the performance limiting ele-
ments of the railway network in most instances. A step change in their performance will be
necessary in order that the switches do not prevent other assets - and therefore the network
as a whole - reaching full performance potential.
Indeed, as of 2012, literature identifies locations on the British mainline network where
switch and junction design is the limiting factor on train capacity (Ison et al., 2012; Network
Rail, 2011a). However, performance limitation may be true whether the chosen measure of
‘performance’ is reliability, availability, maintainability, capacity, cost or quality of service.
It is therefore both relevant and timely to investigate opportunities for the re-engineering
of track switches; not only to bring about the same step changes in performance seen from
other assets over the preceding two centuries, but also to prevent them limiting the perfor-
mance of other elements of the modern rail transport system.
1.3 Railway track switching
1.3.1 Current practice
Rail transport networks operating more than a single line are dependent upon the ability to
change routes for traffic. Switches serve this purpose, allowing the permanent way to merge
and diverge. There have been various designs to achieve this aim through history. However,
Fox’s design is now the worldwide industry standard, illustrated in Figure 2.1. Herein, this
shall be referred to as the ‘traditional’ switch layout. This design consists of a ‘common
crossing’, two ‘switch blades’ able to slide laterally between two ‘stock rails’; with all
components resting upon a suitable supporting structure, typically ballast with sleepers and
bearers, or concrete slab.
Motion of the blades is achieved by human-powered rods and levers, or by POE (Points
Operating Equipment) of hydraulic, pneumatic or electric type. There are various designs of
POE which are located either between the running rails, at the line side, or a combination of
both. Switch blades are prevented from unwanted motion by a mechanical locking arrange-
ment generally combined into the POE. In 2011 there were 21,602 track switches on the
British Mainline network (Network Rail, 2016), and many more in depots and on metros.
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Figure 1.1 A Switch Panel ready for installation as part of remodelling works on the Rom-
ney, Hythe and Dymchurch Railway, Kent, England. Though 381mm gauge, all essential
components have been scaled down faithfully. Credit: Author
1.3.2 Design for safety considerations
Like most rail engineering, switch design and operation has evolved over time with safety
as the priority. This is a societal necessity - many accidents and deaths have been caused
by poor switch design, malfunction, and associated interlocking and signalling practices. L.
T. C. Rolt’s ‘Red for Danger’ (Rolt, 1982) provides a history of British railway disasters,
explaining why many modern interlocking controls exist. Two primary historical switch
safety developments were the FPL (Facing Point Lock) and interlocked protecting signal.
FPL prevents the switch rails moving under a train, and the vehicle ‘splitting the points’
- different wheelsets of a train being guided down separate routes, usually with disastrous
results. Splitting the points has occurred as recently as February 2007 at Greyrigg (RAIB,
2011), killing one; and in May 2002 at Potters Bar, killing seven and injuring 76 (RSSB,
1.3 Railway track switching 4
Figure 1.2 The aftermath of the Greyrigg (Left) and Potters Bar (Right) derailments. Source:
(Left) RAIB (RAIB, 2011, p. 6), (Right) BBC News.
2005). The aftermaths of these incidents are illustrated in Figure 1.2.
This safety risk is identified by governmental and regulatory bodies. In Britain, methods
of switch control and operation are specified by the government through a group of docu-
ments referred to as the ‘ROGS’ (Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety)
Regulations 2006) (ORR, 2006). These requirements are further cascaded through a series
of Railway Group Standards covering design, operation and maintenance, latterly issued by
the Office of Rail Regulation (Genner, 1997; Hayter, 2000, 2011).
1.3.3 Performance limitations
Prioritising safety has not necessarily been to the detriment of cost, reliability, maintainabil-
ity, or capacity. However, it is the case that improving non-safety performance may have
been side-lined. Existing designs do not feature fault tolerance. In Britain, it is only in
the 21st century, as part of Network Rail’s ‘Intelligent Infrastructure’ programme (Section
2.2.5.2), that condition monitoring data is being collected. Signallers operating the network
have no knowledge about these critical assets beyond whether they are ‘Normal’, ‘Reverse’,
or ‘Somewhere in-between’.
When fully operational, switches limit network performance (Chapter 2). However, the
impact upon network performance from switch failures is also detrimental. A switch which
cannot correctly operate to set the route presents a potential derailment risk and cannot be
traversed by a vehicle. The vehicle must wait at a danger signal until the switch is fixed
or alternative arrangements are made. Alternative arrangements can involve staff flagging
trains on at walking pace with the switches clamped in position. Diversionary routes are
scarce, trains queue until the problem can be rectified. This leads to significant immedi-
ate delay, and further ‘knock-on’ delay or cancellations as the junction timetable becomes
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perturbed (Section 2.4.3.1).
Clearly, in this instance, a level of fault tolerance may be able to improve network perfor-
mance. If subsystem faults did not directly cause system failures, then trains could continue
to traverse the switch and service could continue, ideally in full operation but perhaps in a
degraded mode. Emergency repair could be carried out in quieter periods, freeing up ca-
pacity and removing the necessity of having emergency maintenance teams on standby. If
switch reliability achieved a much higher level, the safety margins surrounding junctions
could perhaps be relaxed, allowing a higher fraction of plain line capacity to be utilised. An
ultimate extension of this would be that the junction behaved as plain line, meaning minimal
plain line headways could be carried through junctions, and equivalent plain line capacity
achieved across the network.
1.4 Fault tolerance
A fault is a defect occurring in hardware or software, within a given system boundary.
Faults can result in the undesirable or unexpected behaviour of the system. When a system
is unable to complete an action or command as expected, it is said to have failed. Depending
upon the purpose of the failed system, this failure may cascade to interfacing systems such
that a wider system, or system of systems, is unable to complete a required task. The
consequences of failures in engineering systems can include loss of revenue, further damage
to the system itself, and ultimately, in safety-critical systems, loss of life.
A fault tolerant system is able to prevent faults developing into failures through design.
Fault tolerance is important in safety-critical engineering, such as in trains, aircraft, bridges,
cars and nuclear power (Isermann, 2006). Without fault tolerance, many designs could
not function to the standard required by their regulatory environment. A prime example is
aircraft flight control surfaces, which would typically have triplex or quadruplex actuation
systems to retain control of the aircraft in the case of multiple faults.
Fault tolerance can also have benefits for non-safety critical systems. When correctly
implemented, fault tolerance can increase operational availability and/or ease maintainabil-
ity. For instance, plant in large power stations is typically over-specified when compared
to rated generating capacity, such that one turbine/generator set can be taken offline for re-
pairs without compromising output. Fault tolerance can reduce operational, maintenance
and whole-life costs. Fault tolerance has been adopted by the rail industry in other areas
(Section 2.3).
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1.5 Project Background
The work in this thesis follows the author’s work upon the REPOINT1 and REPOINT II2
Projects. This thesis forms a contribution to the projects at large, and does not aim to address
all research questions posed by fault tolerant track switching.
REPOINT was an EPSRC (Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council) and
RSSB (Rail Safety and Standards Board) funded project which ran from March 2011 to May
2013, as one response to a call related to removing the constraints caused by nodes (stations
and junctions) upon the GB rail network. The project was instigated by Prof. Roger Dixon
(Principal Investigator) and Prof. Roger Goodall (Co-Investigator). The project was inspired
by other industries, particularly aerospace and nuclear, to examine whether the redundancy
concepts which are readily accepted in other safety critical environments could be applied
to track switching. The literature review (Chapter 2) establishes that fault-tolerant railway
track switching has not been investigated before. This work poses a number of research
objectives, expanding upon the research question originally posed by the REPOINT Project:
Could a fundamental re-think of railway track switching ease some of the
current route-setting constraints to provide higher capacity, and provide a sig-
nificant reduction in operational unreliability arising from points failures?
1.6 Aim and Objectives
The aim of this thesis is as follows:
To investigate the opportunity to engineer fault tolerance into railway track
switching, and its potential to improve performance.
Figure 1.3 presents a research map which identifies the key areas of work in the remain-
der of this thesis, and how they link together to meet each objective and therefore this aim,
and the outputs related to each objective, whether paper or chapter.
The five objectives presented in Figure 1.3 follow from the aim, and broadly correspond
to the work presented in Chapters 3-7, which are discussed in turn in the next section.
Numbered tasks in the figure refer to individual and independent modelling tasks in Chapters
4 through 7.
1REPOINT Project: United Kingdom EPSRC and the United Kingdom RSSB grant number EP/I010823/1,
for the project titled ‘REPOINT: Redundantly engineered points for enhanced reliability and capacity of rail-
way track switching’
2EIT (Enabling Innovation Team) and RSSB grant number RSSB/12/EIT/1647 for construction of a labo-
ratory demonstrator of REPOINT concepts.
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1.7 Thesis overview and outline methodology
The thesis aim and objectives identified in Section 1.6 are achieved in the following work
and chapters:
1.7.1 Existing practice & literature survey
A survey of relevant literature and background information is provided in Chapter 2. The
literature review is divided into three sections. The first section explores existing track
switching practice, including operational and maintenance aspects, drawing heavily from
industrial design and maintenance literature. The second section explores the concept of
fault tolerance, including state-of-the-art practice in other fields, drawing more heavily upon
academic literature. The third section explores how the performance of track switches can
be measured and modelled, drawing from both industrial data sources and academic studies.
1.7.2 Evaluating novel track switch designs
Chapter 3 explores options for novel solutions to the track switching problem which may al-
low for fault tolerance. The chapter firstly establishes a set of functional and non-functional
requirements for track switching solutions by analysing the system interfaces. The method-
ology adopted to generate a range of possible solutions is to assemble a cross-industry focus
group. A selection of novel solutions are compared to the requirements, to establish which
ideas may outperform traditional designs. Traditional switching solutions used as bench-
marks in Chapters 5 and 6 are also compared to the requirement set.
1.7.3 The ‘Repoint’ switching concept
The top ranking idea from Chapter 3 is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. This idea
is termed the ‘Repoint’ solution. The functional elements of the design are described in
detail, including how fault tolerance and maintainability could be designed in. This chap-
ter includes modelling of rail behaviour to ensure the concept is practically feasible. The
methodology used is to derive models from first principles and parametrise for a series of
typical switch sizes.
1.7.4 Modelling reliability, maintainability and availability performance
Chapter 5 establishes Reliability, Maintainability and Availability performance. The perfor-
mance of traditional switches is first benchmarked using field data. Relevant human factors
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issues are also examined. Performance is established through a combination of published
literature, analysis of data provided by industry, interviews with rail industry professionals,
and modelling based upon these sources. The modelling methodology adopted is to fit ap-
propriate failure distributions to key subsystems of existing systems through analysing field
data. These models are then extended using an RBD approach to make projections of the
possible performance of fault-tolerant systems featuring multi-channel redundancy.
1.7.5 Modelling capacity performance
Chapter 6 establishes the network capacity performance of track switching. The perfor-
mance of traditional switches is first benchmarked using established industry methods for
capacity calculation. Fault-tolerant switches are then modelled in the same way to establish
the potential capacity benefits.
1.7.6 Mechanical design and development of a concept demonstrator
Chapter 7 describes the modelling, development and construction of a Repoint concept
demonstrator. Firstly, the concept is modelled dynamically to establish kinematics, dy-
namic and static loadings, and to size the actuator and motor drive. The architecture and
detail design of the demonstrator is then described.
1.7.7 Conclusions and further work
The final chapter draws conclusions from the work presented in the preceding seven chap-
ters. It also includes suggestions for work which can build upon the investigation and find-
ings in this thesis.
1.8 Contributions
As the concept of fault-tolerant track switching has not been explored before, there is much
originality in the research that is associated with it. Specific contributions are highlighted in
the introduction to each chapter, but are summarised as follows:
Contribution to systems science. Contributions in identification and evaluation of the
functional and non-functional requirements of track switching solutions. Primarily pre-
sented in Chapter 3, this thesis contains a decomposition of the fundamental requirements
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for track switching solutions. Also established is a framework for the evaluation of alter-
native track switching designs and performance, which could be utilised in other situations,
e.g. metro or overseas.
Contributions to the risk and reliability field. Namely, contributions related to the
understanding of the reliability of existing switch machines and the possible effects of em-
bedding subsystem redundancy. Chapter 5 models the effects of various schemes using
subsystem redundancy in order to improve the ‘classic’ reliability and availability of the
switching system. This exercise is performed with data relating to real-world reliability of
switch installations.
Contributions to rail network performance modelling. Namely, contributions in
modelling the performance of fault tolerant track switching. As established in the literature
review in Chapter 2, ‘performance’ is a wide ranging term, and herein capacity, reliability,
availability and maintainability are considered the main indicators. This modelling is ex-
plored in Chapters 5 and 6.
Contributions to railway engineering. Including permanent-way design, signalling
principles and maintenance principles. Namely, contributions in mechanisms enabling fault-
tolerant approaches in railway track switching, and the modelling and model validation of
such. Chapter 4 explores a novel design of track switch, but specifically the enabler, which
is the ‘passive locking’ movement and associated mechanical arrangement. This contribu-
tion forms one patented element of the research.
1.8.1 Publications
1.8.1.1 Journal papers:
1. Bemment, SD, Ebinger, E, Goodall, RM, Ward, CP and Dixon, R (2016) ‘Rethinking rail track switches
for fault tolerance and enhanced performance’, Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers,
Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit.3 (Bemment et al., 2016)
2. Bemment, SD, Goodall, RM, Dixon, R and Ward, CP (2017) ‘Improving the reliability and availability
of railway track switching by analysing historical failure data and introducing functionally redundant
subsystems’, Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid
Transit. (Bemment et al., 2018)
3This paper was awarded the 2018 William Alexander Agnew Meritorious Award/Clarence Noel Goodall
Award by the Institution of Mechanical Engineers for a meritorious paper on the subject of Railway Engineer-
ing.
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3. Bemment, SD, Harrison, T, Goodall, RM, Ward, CP and Dixon, R (2017) ‘Extending emergency repair
response times for railway track switches through multi-channel redundancy of functional subsystems’,
International Journal of Railway Technology (Bemment et al., 2017b)
Verbatim copies of journal papers are included in Appendix A.
1.8.1.2 Conference and proceedings papers:
1. Bemment, S, Dixon, R, and Goodall, R (2012). ‘An evaluation of redundancy concepts for fault tolerant
railway track switching’ Proceedings of 8th IFAC SAFEPROCESS Symposium, IFAC Proceedings
2012, pp.763-769, DOI: 10.3182/20120829-3-MX-2028.00295. (Bemment et al., 2012b)
2. Bemment, S, Dixon, R, and Goodall, R (2012). ‘Redundantly Engineered Points (REPOINT) for En-
hanced Reliability and Capacity of Railway Track Switching’, Proceedings of the 1st Annual RRUKA
Conference, November 2012. (Bemment et al., 2012a)
3. Bemment, S, Dixon, R, Goodall, R, and Brown, S (2013). ‘Redundantly engineered track switching
for enhanced railway nodal capacity’, Proceedings of ACATTA 2013 – Advances in Control and Au-
tomation Theory for Transportation Applications, in IFAC Proceedings Volumes (IFAC-PapersOnline),
pp.25-30. Istanbul, Turkey, September 2013. (Bemment et al., 2013b)
4. Goodall, R, Bemment, S et al (2013). ‘The Future of Train Control Systems’, Proceedings of Institution
of Railway Signal Engineers.(Goodall et al., 2013)
5. Bemment, S, Dixon, R, and Goodall, R (2013). ‘REPOINT – Redundantly Engineered Points for En-
hanced Reliability and Capacity of Railway Track Switching’, Proceedings of the 10th World Congress
on Railway Research, Sydney, Australia, November 2013. (Bemment et al., 2013a)
6. Wright, N, Bemment, S, Ward, CP, Dixon, R, and Goodall, RM (2014). ‘The Performance and Con-
trol Requirements of a REPOINT Track Switch.’ In Pombo, J (ed) Railways 2014: The Second In-
ternational Conference on Railway Technology: Research, Development and Maintenance, Ajaccio,
Corsica, France. DOI: 10.4203/ccp.104.215. April 2014.(Wright et al., 2014b)
7. Wright, N, Bemment, S, Ward, C and Dixon, R (2014). ‘A Model of a REPOINT Track Switch for
Control’, In United-Kingdom-Automatic-Control-Council (UKACC) 10th International Conference on
Control (CONTROL), Loughborough, UNITED KINGDOM, pp.549-554, June 2014. (Wright et al.,
2014a)
8. Bemment, SD, Dixon, R, Goodall, RM, Ward, CP and Wright, N (2015). ‘Design, Construction and
Operation of a Repoint Laboratory Demonstrator’, in the proceedings of the 1st IMechE Stephenson
Conference, The Institution of Mechanical Engineers, London, April 2015. (Bemment et al., 2015a)
9. Bemment, S, Goodall, R, Ebinger, E, Ward, C, and Dixon, R (2015). ‘Extending maintenance intervals
of track switches utilising multi-channel redundancy of actuation and sensing’, in proceedings of the
International Symposium on Speed-up and Sustainable Technology for Railway and Maglev Systems,
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1.8.2 Patents
• Patent GB2516706A, ‘Railway Points’ (GB Patent: Loughborough University, 2013a)
• Patent GB2516707A, ‘Railway Points Operating Apparatus’ (GB Patent: Loughborough University,
2013b)
• Patent GB2516712A, ‘Railway Track Crossing’ (GB Patent: Loughborough University, 2013c)
The full text of the patents is included in Appendix B.
Chapter 2
Existing practice & literature survey
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is threefold: to establish the state-of-the-art of the academic
field(s) in question; to establish existing industry practice; and, by extension, to establish the
academic originality of the work herein. From the title of this thesis, the work encompasses
three major topics:
1. Track Switching: Existing practice, what are the different subsystem functions, and
how does the system interact with other systems (including humans)? How does
switching limit performance? What is the state of the art in track switch engineering?
2. Fault Tolerance: What is fault tolerance, how is it applied, what are the state of the art
methods and techniques, and how have they been applied in rail or other industries?
3. Performance: What are the current metrics and methods used to evaluate network
performance? What is the existing performance, and how can changes in performance
be quantified? Why is it necessary to improve performance?
2.2 Existing track switching practice and technology
Though similar worldwide, some differences exist in switch design and operation, even
within a single jurisdiction. British practice is referred to in this section, unless explicitly
specified otherwise. ‘General’ practice is discussed, as there are exceptions throughout.
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2.2.1 Division of responsibility
Rail transport is a complex system with many interactions and dependencies. The design,
maintenance and operation of such a system is split between teams specialising in different
disciplines. Switches fall at the interface of several disciplines. Most track elements are
considered the realm of Permanent Way engineering. Most control and actuation elements
are considered Signalling engineering; if distant from the controller/signaller there may also
be Telecommunications engineering. The substructure is considered Civil engineering. If
present, traction electrical elements are of Electric and Power engineering. Daily operation
of the switch falls to the Signaller, a role distinct from the signalling engineer. The following
description of existing practice will follow these divisions.
2.2.2 Permanent way elements
2.2.2.1 Single turnout arrangement
Figure 2.1 shows a single turnout panel: a structure composed of components, pre-fabricated
off-site and transported in sections by road or rail. A turnout consists of 2 stock rails, 2
switch rails and a common crossing, fastened by clips, bolts and/or chairs to supporting
bearers of wood, steel or concrete, themselves supported by a substructure of ballast or
concrete. The stock rails are securely fixed, whilst the free ends of the switch rails can
to slide upon supporting cast iron chairs, their movement limited by the attached stretcher
bars and the lock and drive provided by the POE (Points Operating Equipment), described
separately below. The switch rails are planed down along their length to mate up to the stock
rails when closed. Figure 2.2 shows the detail of these permanent way elements. Further
details of switch blade planing are provided in (Esveld, 2001, p. 334); general process and
formulae used to specify the geometric layout of the rails is found in (Esveld, 2001, p. 344-
347); and the GB-specific (Network Rail, 2010a). Designs are generally of infrastructure-
operator standard specification.
Higher line speeds require shallower divergence angles, which in turn require longer
switches. Designs therefore differ between a typical station throat and mainline installation
- short, small clearances with many overlapping features in the former, and long, spaced
out designs in the latter. Where the routes cross, a common crossing provides a gap for the
flangeway of each wheelset to pass the inner running rail of the opposite route, and vice
versa. The design of crossings is such that there is a region of wheelset travel where that
wheelset is unguided laterally; this issue grows worse with faster crossings of shallower
angles and correspondingly longer gaps. To keep the wheelset guided through this portion
of track, a check rail is provided, which guides the wheelset by acting upon the flange-back
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of the wheel opposite the crossing.
Details of most GB designs are listed in industry manuals for switch design and mainte-
nance, (Morgan, 2009) and (Cope and Ellis, 2001) respectively, published by the PWI (Per-
manent Way Institution). Standard British designs are detailed in a series of RE/PW (Rail-
way Engineering Permanent Way) drawings (Simmons and Ventry, 2001) - RE/PW/800 to
RE/PW/807 for UIC54B rail, RE/PW/600 to RE/PW/603 for BS113a rail and RE/PW/905
to RE/PW/912 for CEN60 rail section. The drawings are proprietary, but access was granted
as part of this work. The RE/PW switches are identified by a letter, between A-H, which
indicates the turnout speed and therefore length. There are ‘vertical’ (V) and ‘inclined’ (I)
designs. V-designs have rails mounted vertically, with a rail twist on entry and exit, to sim-
plify the machining of components. I-designs continue the 1 in 20 inboard inclination of the
rails through the switch panel, improving ride dynamics at the expense of manufacturing
complexity.
The sleepers and bearers are supported by the track substructure, which in Britain, is
almost universally ballast and sub-ballast on layers of local soil or clay. The sleepers, ballast
and substructure are designed as a whole-system to offer the correct stiffness and support
to the vehicles. Consistent support is important; local irregularities can change the stress
distribution leading to sub-optimal ride dynamics and stress concentrations. This often true
at S&C, where mechanised maintenance can be more difficult, and track components such
as extra rails and extended bearers on which to mount actuation elements can change the
system stiffness and stability considerably.
2.2.2.2 Lesser utilised switch types
There are several other, lesser-utilised switch types. Literature does not provide any exam-
ples of these switches currently in use upon mainline networks, and only limited use in other
situations (e.g. depots). Turntables can be used to switch between many tracks radiating
from a central origin. They are able to rotate vehicles 180°, but can only switch short ele-
ments of a train (Raymond et al., 1937). ‘2-Throw’, ‘3-Throw’ switches, of use in confined
spaces, are several (2- or 3-) switches overlaid upon each other such that the switch blades
of each share the same slide plates, i.e. their moveable length covers the same length of
track. They are generally low-speed solutions. Track Substitution Switches are common
in non-standard track forms: funicular rail, monorails and roller coasters. They substitute
an entire section of track with others, as in Figure 3.4. They are large and complex, but are
the only viable solution for some track forms. Loose-heel Short switches have a hinge at
the heel of the movable rail section, unlike most types where the switch rail itself bends,
particularly used when the switch is very short, and described in (Morgan, 2009). Trap and
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Figure 2.1 General arrangement of the permanent way elements of a track switch. This
turnout is considered ‘Left-hand’ (diverging route to the left). Numbered elements as fol-
lows: (1) Lineside type POE; (2) Drive rod and drive stretcher; (3) Detection rods; (4)
Switch rail toes; (5) Stretcher bars; (6) Switch rails ; (7) Stock rails ; (8) Common crossing
(of given angle); (9) Check Rails; (10 - optional) Back Drive Arrangement.
Catch Points exist to derail vehicles in an emergency. They are generally found where a
siding or stabling line joins a mainline - it is often safer to derail a runaway vehicle than let
it encroach upon a running line. (IRSE, 2001).
2.2.2.3 Junction layouts
Junctions consist of one or more switches, the simplest being a single turnout in a single
track route. A Crossover allows a vehicle on one running line to swap to an adjacent run-
ning line and consists of two switches. Crossovers can be facing and trailing, the direction
selected for operational reasons. Trailing crossovers are inherently safer as they require a
vehicle to stop and reverse before it is able to access the adjacent line (Pope, 1975). A
scissors crossover consists of two crossovers superimposed. Crossovers on several lines ar-
ranged adjacent to each other are known as a ladder. These are sometimes fitted on running
lines far from stations or junctions.
There are several other basic junction layouts, which can be seen in Figures 2.3 and 2.4,
reproduced from (Esveld, 2001, p. 340-341). Crucially, any of these layouts will still be
operated by the same designs of POE, with a single POE element for each pair of movable
rails, referred to as an ‘end’.
A junction between two routes, each of multiple running lines, would typically consist
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of many switches allowing traffic to pass from any utilised route to any other. The traffic
which will be using the routes needs to be known at the track design stage in order for this
to be achieved (Pope, 1975). There is generally only a single signalled route through the
junction from each arrival point to each destination, even if the permanent way is arranged
to allow more. Conversely, even though the permanent way may be arranged to allow a
route, the signalling system may not allow such.
2.2.2.4 Complex layouts
The most complex layouts occur at depots or terminal stations which serve several major
routes. Provision will be such that vehicles from each route have enough platform space
during normal operation. In practice this requires routes from most entry points to most
platforms, necessitating complex layouts. Due to space restrictions, several solutions to
provide additional switching flexibility exist, including single and double slips (Figure 2.3).
Switches are often placed almost adjacent to each other; track layout is closely tied to the
timetable; literature is rich with examples of optimisation of complex layouts, alongside
timetable design, explored further in Section 2.4.1.
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Figure 2.3 Commonly utilised junction types, reproduced from (Esveld, 2001, p. 340).
Figure 2.4 Commonly utilised Crossover types, reproduced from (Esveld, 2001, p. 342).
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2.2.3 Interaction with rolling stock
2.2.3.1 Facing moves, trailing moves and ‘Trailing the points’
There are two distinct vehicle moves through a switch, as labelled in Figure 2.1. A facing
move is where the routes diverge, and a trailing move where they converge. Most switch
designs allow both, though designs for a single move exist. These are distinct from‘trailing
the points’, which is the act of making a trailing move through the switch when the switch
blades are set for the opposite route. This can lead to damage to the POE, and/or blades, and
possible derailment. To reduce the probability of derailment, most mechanisms are fitted
with breakable links which allow the blades to unlock and move under a given load. For
British mainline, this is detailed in a standard (Simmons and Ventry, 2001), which requires
the POE to allow a run-through by yielding at a force of not less than 35kN, also requiring it
to withstand a total lateral force of 88kN. Recent modelling work has established that 50kN
may be a more suitable yield force for resilience (Colantuono et al., 2016).
2.2.3.2 Ride dynamics and vehicle-track interaction
The design of plain line - gradient, cant, and radius of turn - is, where possible, optimised for
the traffic upon it (Esveld, 2001, p. 35-170). Modern railway track design keeps interrup-
tions to the running rails to a minimum by using continuously welded rail, to minimise the
dynamic disturbance, increased wear and maintenance at rail joints. However, at switches
and crossings, these design priorities must be relaxed for three reasons:
1. Where a fixed crossing is employed, there is necessarily a disjoint in the track.
2. Switches present a divergence of routes; both routes cannot maintain optimum align-
ment throughout given geometric restrictions (e.g. crossing rails must be equal height).
3. It is not possible to machine an infinitely thin switch blade, therefore some aspect of
the ‘perfect’ alignment for one or both routes must be sacrificed to ensure the switch
can be manufactured.
The dynamics of rolling stock through switches and crossings is a busy area of academic
study. (ORR, 2014, p. 8) establishes that the vehicle ride dynamics through S&C is not as
consistent as the surrounding plain line - at the switch toes, because of the extended POE
bearers, through the turnout portion, and due to wheel impacts at the common crossing.
These elements are explored in a review paper (Bezin, 2016), which also states that over
20% of the planned GB maintenance and renewals budget for 2014-19 is taken by S&C
despite the fact switches only represent around 3% of the network. Interactions in this area
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have been extensively modelled - throughout the entire switch, for instance, in (Nicklisch
et al., 2010), which establishes that extreme gauge widening, alongside the use of more elas-
tic rail mountings, can improve ride dynamics. (Andersson and Dahlberg, 1998; Coleman,
2014; Sun et al., 2010) provide different methodologies for modelling the discontinuity at
the crossing, variously using multi-body simulation and finite element analysis. (Andersson
and Dahlberg, 1998) in particular establishes a tripling of dynamic loads under high-speed
scenarios due to crossing wheel impacts. (dos Santos and Barbosa, 2015) carries out a range
of field tests to validate models of traffic flow through switches in order to establish optimum
vehicle speeds.
Mechanised track maintenance through S&C is complicated by the additional rails and
linkages, meaning tasks such as tamping must sometimes be completed manually. These
factors lead to a higher degradation rate of track and ancillary elements, which further
compounds maintenance and reliability issues. A direct link between the annual usage
(in million gross tonnes) and degradation of the track alignment through the turnout has
been established (Jönsson et al., 2014). A mathematical relationship (2-Parameter Weibull)
is also established in (Rama and Andrews, 2013), however, this relates number of switch
operations and component degradation; a link with track utilisation can only be inferred.
2.2.4 Signalling elements
Railway signalling is a wide-ranging discipline with much literature, and its own profes-
sional body, the IRSE (Institution of Railway Signal Engineers). Discussion herein is lim-
ited to general signalling principles at junctions. The purpose of a signalling system is
twofold; to prevent vehicles from colliding, and to allow vehicles to take different paths as
required. The first purpose - valid at junctions and plain line sections - is ultimately provided
through the ‘interlocking’ (Marshall, 1961; Stratton, 1988; Such, 1956), which physically
prevents the operating human or computer system issuing a command which could cause
two vehicles to collide. The second purpose is achieved through the operation of switches.
Signalling arrangements at nodes are, therefore, more complex than anywhere else upon a
network. IRSE publications provide an excellent overview of the signalling system (IRSE,
2001; Leach, 1991).
2.2.4.1 Locking
Once the switch blades are in position, they are locked in place to prevent unauthorised
movement. This is achieved with a mechanical linkage. In Britain, locking is required by
law for passenger trains making facing moves (Genner, 1997). However, locking is almost
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universally applied; most POE designs have an integrated locking function. There is a force
requirement to overcome the lock for reasons described in Section 2.2.3.1.
2.2.4.2 Operation Cycle
The principles of powered point operation were established in the early 20th century (Had-
away, 1950). The principles have more recently been combined into a industry standards,
notably GKRT0062 (Genner, 1997), and those listed in 2.2.6. The turnout is commanded
to be in a position - labelled ‘normal’ or ‘reverse’ - at all times by the interlocking. Should
the required position change, the command signal from the interlocking will change. This
triggers a sequence of events in the line-side control circuitry and POE, no matter which
motive power source is utilised:
1. The signalling system breaks detection of the current position, allowing the actuator
to move.
2. The actuator firstly unlocks the switch blades, allowing them to move freely.
3. The actuator moves both switch blades to their commanded position.
4. The blades reach their commanded position, and the actuator ceases to move them.
5. The actuator re-engages the locking mechanism.
6. Detection is made for both switch blades and the lock, the actuator is isolated.
A timing element built into the control system isolates the POE if detection is not made
after around 8 seconds, to prevent damage to the machine. Should detection be lost, the
POE will immediately try to move the blades and lock to the commanded position once
more. Typically, all relays and control equipment for a switch will be arranged together
in an apparatus case at line-side. The turnout is considered unsafe without full detection,
even though both switch rails may be locked in the correct position (Hadaway, 1950). Most
points operation machines offer combined actuation, locking and detection through single
combined motion mechanisms.
2.2.4.3 Detection
Detection proves that the elements of the turnout are in the commanded position. The posi-
tion of 3 individual components is detected (Hadaway, 1950): the closed switch rail against
the stock rail; the open switch rail open far enough to allow a wheel flange to pass through;
and the lock in place. When the detected position of all elements is as the commanded po-
sition the switch is said to be ‘in correspondence’, otherwise, it is ‘out of correspondence’.
There is a short period of ‘out of correspondence’ when the move command is issued as the
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blades are in a different position to that requested. Without full detection, the interlocking
will prevent the signaller setting a route through the turnout (Genner, 1997; Such, 1956).
As well as detection as defined above, the signalling system is also responsible for de-
tecting the position of trains; ‘train detection’. This is provided variously by track circuits
or axle counters. As a general rule, if a train is detected on approach to a switch, or indeed
if a route is set over the switch, then a mechanism in the interlocking prevents that switch
moving until the train is seen clear. i.e. the system prevents the Signaller from inadvertently
moving the points in front of, or under, a train.
2.2.4.4 Actuation evolution
Historically, most switches were located near signal boxes. Levers in the box operated rod-
ding, transmitting motion to the switch blades. This type still exist on the British mainline
(see Table 2.1), mostly on quieter rural lines or depot entrances (Such, 1956). The advent of
power signalling, allowed location of turnouts much further from signal boxes (IRSE, 2001;
Leach, 1991), necessitating remotely operated systems to provide actuation, locking and
detection. Several designs of POE have been developed, utilising either electrical, hydraulic
or pneumatic mechanisms (Marshall, 1961). POE is fed from signalling power supplies of
various specifications - AC, DC and pneumatic. At large junctions, power supplies are de-
signed to accommodate many POE installations drawing current at once, even though this
is rarely the case (Mitchell, 1958).
2.2.4.5 Powered actuator types
Information in this section is taken from (IAD Rail Systems, 2001; Leach, 1991; Morgan,
2009; Network Rail, 2016).
Pneumatic Not dealt with further herein, the mainline has a small count of pneumatic
POE; they are considered obsolete with all scheduled to be replaced (Network Rail, 2015).
Classic electro-mechanical Typically the HW1000/HW2000 and M63 shown in Figure
2.5. Developed in the 1920s-1970s, with incremental improvement since. All consist of a
large, brushed motor and a custom gearbox driving a linkage bar to transmit linear drive to
the switch rails. The HW types use a crank and pin arrangement to translate rotational move-
ment into linear; the M63 a ballscrew. Locking is provided by a separate mechanism, a pin
sliding into a locking rod. Drive and detection rods prevent mechanised track maintenance.
Classic electro-hydraulic The clamplock-type actuator is a 1960’s British Rail design.
The arrangement consists of a pair of actuating rams between the rails, linked to clamps
which pass up and around each stock rail in the closed position, positively locking the rail in
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place (Figure 2.5). A power pack, located up to 10m from the actuators, provides hydraulic
drive and a manual pumping facility. POE is located between sleepers, fully exposed to the
railway environment and preventing mechanised track maintenance.
Modern electro-mechanical In the 1990s - 2000s, Railtrack/Network Rail helped de-
velop next-generation POE, the High-Performance Switch Actuator (Figure 2.6) (IAD Rail
Systems, 2001). Drive is provided by a brushless DC motor and sealed gearbox with elec-
tromechanical lock. Detection is through a pair of LVDTs. The design is an in-bearer solu-
tion, allowing mechanised maintenance (see Section 2.2.3.2). However, in 2005, mainline
installations were put on hold due to significant reliability issues, which is still the case in
2017 (Network Rail, 2015, 2016). Other manufacturers offer similar products not currently
in GB mainline use.
Modern electro-hydraulic In the 1980s and 1990s, the Clamplock design was devel-
oped to be mounted inside a bearer as the in-bearer clamplock (IBCL), and further to have a
hydraulic backdrive arrangement (Hy-drive Mk1 and Mk2). These designs share the clam-
plock mechanism, but allow mechanised track maintenance, (see Section 2.2.3.2). They are
the current preferred installations for new build and renewals upon GB mainline (Network
Rail, 2015).
Route Electro-Hydraul. Electro-Mech. Mech. Other Total
Clamplock Hy-Drive M63 HW Other HPSS
Anglia 826 3 0 696 0 0 207 0 1732
South East 673 8 0 1520 43 27 446 79 2796
Wessex 336 10 31 725 22 61 206 2 1393
London North East, Midlands 2062 4 115 1679 30 101 403 60 4454
London North West (South) 620 6 0 898 1 203 214 38 1980
London North West (North) 1040 5 549 344 102 28 470 21 2559
Scotland 769 7 0 645 21 95 338 176 2051
Wales 322 9 0 364 8 25 384 4 1116
Western 597 11 318 514 40 42 525 2 2049
National 7245 63 1013 7385 267 582 3193 382 20130
Proportion 36.0% 0.3% 5.0% 36.7% 1.3% 2.9% 15.9% 1.9%
Table 2.1 Population of POE types in administrative regions of the GB rail network. ‘Clam-
plock’ includes ICBL. Variations are due to devolved purchasing. Sources: (Network Rail,
2015, 2016).
2.2.4.6 Signalling for train control
Signalling prevents trains coming into collision through allocating ‘blocks’, each block can
only be occupied by one train at any time (Pope, 1975). In fixed block signalling, semaphore
or colour-light signals convey to the driver how far ahead the line is clear. Semaphores are
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Figure 2.5 (A) Mk2 Clamplock cross-section. (B) Mk1 and (C) Mk2 Hydrive installations.
(D, left) Cross-section and (D, right) fitted arrangement of the HW1000/2000 machine. (E)
General arrangement of M63 machine. Source (All) Network Rail (Network Rail, 2016).
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Figure 2.6 Internal arrangement of the ‘HPSA’ in-bearer switch machine. Source: IAD
(IAD Rail Systems, 2001).
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not dealt with further herein, the principles involved are equivalent to colour light signalling
(Champion, 1957). More modern systems such as ETCS (European Train Control System)
allow blocks to either be virtual, or move along the track with the vehicle (Stanley, 2011). In
some moving-block and colour-light systems retrofitted with ‘DAS’ (Driver Advisory Sys-
tem), an allowable or recommended speed is also conveyed directly to the driver. Through
junctions, implementation becomes more complex. The signalling system must convey that
the line is clear, and also set and lock out a route to ensure no conflicting moves. Junction
signals have further purpose: to protect trains converging; and to provide diverging direc-
tional indications. Additional safety provisions are also stipulated in design rules, e.g. ‘flank
protection’ - setting adjacent switches to divert SPADs (Signals Passed At Danger) (Marks,
2000). This applies equally to all types of signalling. Moving block signalling systems re-
vert to fixed block systems through junctions, albeit generally with a higher granularity than
traditional fixed block signalling.
Fixed-block signalling practice As moving the switch places it in an ‘out of correspon-
dence’ state, signals to an approaching train must be at danger. Stop signals protecting
junctions have repeaters on approach to enable fast traffic to come to a halt clear of the
junction (Marshall, 1961). In normal operation it is not permitted to have a signal reverting
to a more restrictive aspect in front of a driver, hence moving a switch requires restrictive
aspects well ahead of a train. The action of setting a route therefore represents a significant
capacity constraint (see Section 2.4.1). Published work explores changing signal operation
at junctions to a form of fault tolerant control to relax these restrictions and increase capacity
(Liu et al., 2013).
ERTMS, ETCS and CBTC ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management System) is the
specification for a single Europe-wide rail traffic control system. ETCS is a component of
ERTMS for the individual control of trains, with information presented to the driver in-cab.
It is envisaged that all GB traffc will be controlled under ERTMS in future. The ETCS
specification allowing full moving block operation through junctions is under development
as of 2017. ETCS up to level 2(d) utilises fixed blocks through junctions, though blocks
can be small enough to approximate the ideal of moving block operation (Stanley, 2011).
Crucially, the same limitations established in colour light signalling will apply to ERTMS.
CBTC (Communication Based Train Control), defined in IEEE1474.1 (IEEE, 2004) is akin
to ERTMS, but is utilised upon metro systems with homogeneous traffic.
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2.2.5 Maintenance and operations
2.2.5.1 Fixed-interval interventions
POE maintenance is achieved by fixed-interval interventions. The SMS (Signal Mainte-
nance Specifications) state maintenance requirements at a high level, proscribing general
procedures to be followed to ensure assets are maintained to a functional standard (Network
Rail, 2013b). Actions range from remote visual inspection to full disassembly or replace-
ment under possession. Interventions are recorded in the ‘Ellipse’ database, with entries
made line-side on hand-held consoles. However, Ellipse is not linked to other databases
covered in Section 2.2.5.3. The SMS cites other documents which together define all peri-
odic maintenance:
• Implementation of Signalling Maintenance Specifications mandates the use of the
SMS, and provides a guide to doing this in practice (Network Rail, 2011b).
• The Signal Maintenance and Testing Handbook (SMTH) specifies procedures which
must be undertaken including task breakdowns specific to POE type (Network Rail,
2013c).
• Signalling Responsibilities for S&C Maintenance defines the additional procedures
for S&C inspection and maintenance over and above that detailed in the SMS (Net-
work Rail, 2010b).
• The Signalling Maintenance Task Intervals standard defines maximum and normal
intervals currently applicable to signalling maintenance tasks (Network Rail, 2013a).
2.2.5.2 Reliability-centred maintenance and condition monitoring
Literature explores moving to RCM (Reliability-Centred Maintenance), however, this has
not yet been adopted in the GB. Indeed, POE is used as a textbook candidate for such an
approach, with the caveat that knowledge of asset use and condition is a prerequisite for a
successful RCM programme (Rausand and Vatn, 2008). GB knowledge is either lacking,
or exists in disparate data sources. Condition monitoring of railway assets, in particular
switches, is an area of intense academic activity. Literature recognises switch unreliability
and offers potential fault detection and diagnosis methods - as early as 2003 (Garcia et al.,
2003), later extended to prognosis (wear prediction) in 2007 (Marquez et al., 2007). How-
ever, the solutions require full instrumentation of the POE which would be complex and
expensive in practice. The monetary cost of RCM is explored by the same authors in (Mar-
quez et al., 2008), establishing that whilst RCM can reduce delays, it will reduce cost only
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under a given, optimistic set of circumstances when in parallel with a time-based mainte-
nance regime. Notable further academic contributions to condition monitoring algorithms
are made in (Silmon and Roberts, 2010) and later (Asada and Roberts, 2013). Applicability
of methods from different fields is explored in a review paper (Marquez et al., 2010); how-
ever, this paper also notes that there is a very limited subset of published methods which
have been applied in the field. Post 2007, Network Rail have rolled out II (‘Intelligent In-
frastructure’) RCM, using data-loggers and current sensors to collect basic data about most
POE on the network (McNaughton, 2007). Threshold analysis is used to identify potential
incipient faults. Table 2.3 shows a downward trend in switch failures over the period be-
tween II rollout and present, however this was a period of political change and no causal
link is established in literature.
2.2.5.3 Fault and failure logging and response
There is a set procedure on mainline when a switch fault or failure occurs (Bannister, 2016):
• The fault is reported to control - typically by operations or maintenance staff.
• The fault, and severity, is logged in the FMS (Fault Management System) database.
• If the fault will prevent scheduled train movements, a MOM (Mobile Operations Man-
ager) is dispatched. Sometimes a fault team is dispatched concurrently.
• The MOM manually operates the points, enabling train movements, and can fix cer-
tain simple faults - e.g. blockages - but cannot access the POE mechanism (Fleming,
2015).
• If the fault is still present, a fault team (3- or 4- person) is dispatched to site.
• The fault team fix the fault (if possible).
• The fault team enter further details of the fault and cause into FMS using a handheld
computer, and leave site.
• An off-site team acts to divide responsibility for the fault, associated delay minutes
(see 2.4.3.1), using a database called TRUST (Train Running Under System TOPS
(Total Operations Processing System)).
Network Rail keeps records of all known fault and failure events in the FMS database,
identifying the two with a ‘criticality index’ between 1 and 4. Indices 1 to 3 represent
failures requiring immediate rectification; 4 is a known fault, not developed to a system
failure, which will need rectifying when possible. FMS data is entered by human operators,
often in difficult conditions, and as such there are a significant number of records which
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may be incomplete or considered corrupt. Data accuracy improves after 2009 when free-
text entry was replaced by option selection (Network Rail, 2015). There are no formal
links between FMS, the II database (Section 2.2.5.2), TRUST (Network Rail, 2008, p. 23),
and Ellipse. Cross-referencing failures to corresponding incurred delay minutes is therefore
prohibitively time consuming.
2.2.6 System requirements and standards
All equipment fitted to the GB infrastructure is covered by standards, which cascade safety
and functional requirements. Table 2.2 lists the main standards which apply to Switches.
Top-level Railway Group Standards are maintained by the ORR or RSSB; lower-level stan-
dards are proprietary to each rail operator. Standards are generally written with knowledge
of existing technological solutions and their potential performance and behaviour. Literature
does not present a set of the basic functional requirements of a track switch.
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Standard Owner Description
‘ROGS’ ORR The Railways and Other Guided
Transport Systems (Safety) Regula-
tions 2006 (ORR, 2006)
ORR and HSE HMRI:- Railway Safety Princi-
ples and Guidance part 2 section
D: Guidance on Signalling (HSE,
2005)
RGS-GK-RT0062 RSSB Control Of Points (Genner, 1997)
RGS-GI-RT7004 RSSB Requirements for the Design, Op-
eration and Maintenance of Points
(Hayter, 2000)
RGS-GC-RT5021 RSSB Track System Requirements
(Hayter, 2011)
RGS-RT-0064 RSSB Provision of Overlaps, Flank Pro-
tection and Trapping (Marks, 2000)
RGS-GK-RT0210 RSSB Asset Management for the Safety
of Signalling and Operational
Telecommunications Systems
(Fleming, 2000)
GE-RT8000 RSSB Rule Book (Master Manual) (Flem-
ing, 2015)
RT-SRS-2001 Network Rail Requirements for Powered Point
Operating Equipment (Simmons
and Ventry, 2001)
NR-L2-TRK-2049 Network Rail Track Design Handbook (Network
Rail, 2010a)
Table 2.2 List of Railway standards directly applicable to track switching (See also Section
2.2.5.1)
2.2.7 Conclusions
This section has presented current practice related to track switches. Switches fall at the
interface of many traditional railway engineering disciplines. The literature is rich with in-
formation; much is held in industrial documents. There is also much academic literature, but
published work is concentrated upon several relatively small areas of the system - notably
dynamic interaction with rolling stock and condition monitoring of existing designs. Litera-
ture does not present a set of the basic functional requirements of a track switch. There is no
academic literature regarding fault tolerant switches, indicating the research area is novel.
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2.3 Fault tolerance
2.3.1 Faults, failures and fault tolerance
A fault is a defect in a system. This could be in hardware or software, located in the phys-
ical plant itself, or in the controlling elements, power supplies, actuators, sensors or mech-
anisms. For systems including humans, the fault could be in the human element. Faults
result in unexpected, and often undesirable, system behaviour. If a fault renders the system
unable to complete an expected action, the system is said to have failed (Isermann, 2006;
White and Miles, 1996). This is illustrated in Figure 2.7. Nominal system behaviour, bn,
is central in a region of acceptable system behaviour; surrounded by a bound representing
uncertainties which may occur in the operation of the system, plant, or controller. Faults, b f ,
may change system behaviour. A range of faulty system behaviours lie within an acceptable
operation region, the system is tolerant to these particular faults. However, if a faulty system
behaviour lies outside this region, the system has failed. A fault tolerant system is able to
achieve adequate system behaviour in the presence of faults. Fault tolerance is important
in safety-critical systems such as aircraft, trains and road vehicles, but also in non safety-
critical systems - e.g. machine tools and production robots - where increased reliability and
availability can increase operation times, reduce maintenance and life-cycle costs (Davies,
2009). The ability to maintain functionality when portions of a system are faulty is referred
to as ‘graceful degradation’; or ‘degraded mode’ operation, if the system remains functional
with reduced capacity (Davies et al., 2014).
Figure 2.7 Behaviour of nominal, faulty and failed systems. Source: (Davies, 2009, p. 12).
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2.3.2 Fault tolerant system design
The most effective means of achieving fault tolerance is through systematic analysis and in-
tegrated design - most easily achieved with new designs, however, retro-fitting fault tolerant
elements to existing designs is possible (NASA, 1995). An understanding of the system’s
structure and function, and the reliability of its components, should be developed and anal-
ysed to determine vulnerable areas, and how fault tolerance could be provided. Figure 2.8
illustrates the fault tolerant design process.
Processes used to identify failure modes include ‘bottom-up’ approaches - FMECA
(Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis) and/or FTA (Fault Tree Analysis). The
techniques are complementary methods, applied retrospectively or at the design phase,
which enable all possible failure modes of a system to be established, and to establish the
combinatorial range of faults which can lead to each failure (Andrews and Moss, 2002).
Alternatively, if systems are in service, in the ‘top-down’ approach data is collected and
reliability modelled to identify failure modes and, through further analysis, possible causes
or design issues (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004) (Section 2.4.3). Both processes can be it-
erative - over time as new faults are discovered, or through components, subsystems and
whole systems. Information from these processes can be used to inform actions to reduce
the probability of individual subsystem/component faults developing to failures. There are
several ways in which the reliability of a system can be improved, each with an associated
set of penalties, benefits and prerequisites. Some are classified as fault-tolerant approaches.
Not all methods can be applied in every situation, but some can be applied simultaneously
and are complementary. The most common recognised methods, documented in (Blanke
et al., 2006; Hecht, 2004; Isermann, 2006; Modarres et al., 2009; NASA, 1995), are listed
here and detailed in context.
1. Increasing individual subsystem/component reliability
2. Condition monitoring for failure prevention
3. The introduction of redundancy
4. The introduction of fail-safe mechanisms
5. Incorporation of fault-tolerant control strategies
2.3.3 Increasing individual subsystem or component reliability
This is often the lowest cost and simplest method. Whilst not fault tolerance, this is a critical
aspect of fault tolerant design. Improving single component or subsystem reliability can im-
prove system reliability, especially if an element is identified as under-performing. It should
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Figure 2.8 Flow diagram for fault tolerant design process Source: (NASA, 1995).
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be applied to any remaining SPOF (Single Points of Failure). Sometimes, a component
is found to be operating outside original design parameters. It is rare, but not impossible
with modern engineering design techniques, for components to be unfit for purpose. Poten-
tial causes and models for premature component failure have been established (Proschan,
1996). Reliability analysis can reveal which subsystems contribute the greatest level of un-
reliability, and may also determine whether components tend towards early-life or late-life
failures. This can indicate incorrect fitment/out-of-specification components or increased
load or wear respectively (Section 2.4.3). In Figure 2.7, this technique reduces the inci-
dence of bn becoming b f . Some literature regards this process as ‘Fault prevention’, as
in Figure 2.9 (Lee and Anderson, 2012). POE examples include the Clamplock (Section
2.2.4.5) design, which has gone through Mk1, Mk2, IBCL and Hydrive generations, each
one engineering out unreliability; and the stretcher bar - originally ‘swan-neck’, evolving to
the ‘adjustable’ design then tubular.
Figure 2.9 Reliability improvement techniques vs product lifecycle. Source:(Lee and An-
derson, 2012).
2.3.4 Condition monitoring for failure prevention
Whilst not a fault-tolerant approach, CM (Condition Monitoring) can form part of a fault
tolerance strategy, especially if combined with active redundancy. CM required data collec-
tion and processing for fault detection, diagnosis, and prognosis (Isermann, 2006). Advance
knowledge of incipient faults allows interventions before faults become failures, reducing
system failure rates. However, the method requires an understanding of plant behaviour,
appropriate sensors and processors, which carry a cost, weight, maintenance and/or com-
plexity penalty.
CM in a single-channel system has a false-positive rate, increasing maintenance work-
load, or reducing availability through excessive interventions. In a system with redundancy,
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it allows isolation of faulty channels before fault propagation, thus facilitating maintenance.
CM can ease maintenance tasks through allowing better preparation - what spares to trans-
port to site, and at what time (Rao, 1996). There is much literature in the CM field, sev-
eral review papers describe state of the art (Ding, 2008; Isermann and Ballé, 1997). There
is a divergence between model-based and signal-based techniques. Signal-based methods
(including statistical methods) monitor sensor output signals or derivatives for unexpected
deviations, and have some overlap with Statistical Process Control in literature (Mason and
Young, 2002). Model-based methods compare sensor signals to expected values gener-
ated by a mathematical plant model to derive condition (Chen and Patton, 2012; Isermann,
2005). Both have been successfully applied in a range of situations. Much literature exists
examining CM applications to switches, (Section 2.2.5.2).
2.3.5 The introduction of redundancy
Redundancy is defined as the multiplication of system components in order to increase over-
all system reliability or safety (Modarres et al., 2009). It is applied in safety critical systems,
such as nuclear process control and aircraft fly-by-wire or hydraulic systems. If the proba-
bility of single module failure is small, the combined probability of all redundant systems
failing is diminishingly so. The technique is generally only applied in instances where the
penalty (monetary, weight, complexity, maintenance, and/or design difficulty) is offset by
subsequent improvement in system performance. The goal of redundancy is to eliminate
SPOF elements. A review of early work is presented in literature (Yearout et al., 1986).
Redundant subsystems can be represented through the use of RBD’s (Reliability Block Di-
agrams), as in Figure 2.10. RBDs define a system by components or subsystems for which
reliability data is available (Modarres et al., 2009, p. 198). Each RBD block has a given
(constant or time-variant) failure distribution. If a path exists through the diagram from start
to end, through functional blocks only, the system is regarded as functional. RBDs do not
necessarily mimic the physical design of a system. For time-variant failure rates, the RBD
is evaluated over a given ‘mission time’.
Figure 2.10 (Left) Series and (Right) parallel RBDs. Source: (Modarres et al., 2009).
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2.3.5.1 Passive redundancy
Passive redundancy does not require the intervention of an agent. An example is the multi-
plicity of structural members in a steel skyscraper or aircraft; should one member fail, load is
redistributed. It may be the case that the remaining elements sustain a higher load, their fail-
ure rate may then increase. With design, passive redundancy can allow a system to remain
functional whilst the repairs are effected. By definition, passive redundancy requires that ex-
tra capacity is built into the system, which carries design penalties which may be minimised
through optimal design (Murthy and Hussain, 1995). Passive redundancy includes redun-
dancy with consolidated outputs, not requiring reconfiguration because the faulty channel
is over-driven by the fault-free ones. A rail example is BR specification colour light sig-
nalling lamps. The lamps have 2 filaments of different resistances, connected in parallel. In
early-life, the lower resistance filament has a higher current flow and thus greater load. If
it burns out, the higher resistance filament is still bright enough to meet specification. The
reduction in current flow is sensed to indicate the need for a replacement (Cardani, 1958;
Loosemore, 1958). GB switches have several stretcher bars for passive redundancy, though
as several are necessary to accurately restrain the whole switch rail, this is not pure passive
redundancy (Morgan, 2009).
2.3.5.2 Active redundancy
Methods of making reliable computers from unreliable elements is first established in lit-
erature in 1956 (Von Neumann, 1956). Active redundancy relies upon an agent (human
or automated) to sense faults and reconfigure to distribute load to parallel elements. This
may be upon failure of the subsystem or ahead of this, if CM is also employed. Reliability
of switching elements must be taken into account when calculating whole-system perfor-
mance, unless the ‘perfect switching’ model is used (Murthy and Hussain, 1995). In some
examples, load is shared between parallel channels (Dixon et al., 2009). With design, it
can be possible to change out subsystems whilst the system is operational. By definition,
active redundancy requires that extra capacity is built into the system, alongside a con-
troller, which together carry design penalties. A successful and widely adopted rail example
is SSI (Solid State Interlocking) (Cribbens, 1987; Stratton et al., 1988), illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.11. To quote (Cribbens, 1987): To achieve acceptably small probabilities of unsafe
failure, there is no alternative to the use of redundancy techniques. SSI uses a majority
(2-out-of-3) voting system, an approach since used to much success in Aeronautical and
Nuclear industries. Three identical microcomputers, each known as an MPM (interlock-
ing MultiProcessor Module) receive identical inputs, and run identical programmes. Each
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MPM checks its own outputs against those of the other two. Each module has a ‘Security
Fuse’, which, when activated, permanently disconnects the module. Each unit can blow its
own fuse; any two modules can co-operate to trigger the fuse of the third. Each MPM is
designed as a hot-swappable, line replaceable unit to maintain high availability.
Figure 2.11 Architecture of Solid State Interlocking. Source: (Cribbens, 1987).
2.3.6 The introduction of fail-safe mechanisms
A system is ‘fail-safe’ when failures cannot render the system unsafe. Alone, it is not
a fault-tolerant method - faults may still lead to a failure. Alongside redundancy it can
ensure the safe performance of a system, by ensuring any single channel failure does not
render a system unsafe (Steffen et al., 2013). Generally, this is an important consideration
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in high SIL (Safety Integrity Level) systems - see section 2.4.3.2. SIL Levels and fail-safe
concepts are explored in the rail-specific RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability,
Safety) standards (EN50126, 1999; EN61508, 2002). An example of fail-safe design is
coolant valves in nuclear power stations defaulting to full flow in the event of actuator
failure. Whilst plant output may reduce, a dangerous core meltdown has been avoided.
The railway signalling field makes extensive use of fail-safe principles. Track switches
remain safe if power or communications are lost. Relays default to a safe state in the event
of a mechanical fault. Signalling uses the terms ‘right-side’ and ‘wrong-side’ failure. The
system is designed to fail in a certain, safe way; when this occurs it is ‘right-side’. When
the system fails in a way it was not designed to, it is a ‘wrong-side’ failure; the failure can
be safe or dangerous (Palmer, 2012).
2.3.7 Incorporation of fault-tolerant control strategies
FTC (Fault Tolerant Control) describes a control strategy able to perform as required in the
presence of a system fault. This is an active area of research; a number of survey papers
exist (Blanke et al., 2001; Zhang and Jiang, 2003). FTC can actively and automatically
reconfigure to allow for sensor, actuator and processor faults, a form of fault tolerant design.
It is distinct from condition monitoring in that the controller compensates for the fault, rather
than the fault merely being identified. FTC can be combined with CM to provide combined
benefits. FTC is generally less onerous to implement than full active redundancy as it can
make better use of available resources; for example lowering load on a faulty actuator rather
than isolating it. However, it has associated design penalties. FTC may be applied to POE,
however, no examples exist.
2.3.8 Conclusions
This section has presented an overview of state of the art with regards fault tolerant princi-
ples. Fault tolerance is the technique of preventing component faults developing into system
failures. Academic literature is rich with information on various strategies and modelling
methods, especially in the areas of condition monitoring (including of existing switches)
and fault-tolerant control. Examples of fault tolerant design exist in the rail sphere, showing
the industry is open to the technique. However, to date it has not been used in switches.
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2.4 Performance
This section explores how the performance of track switches and networks can be modelled
and quantified. This will focus on five areas; the latter three part of RAMS Performance
(EN50126, 1999):
• Capacity: The measure of volume of traffic the network can handle.
• Switching time and energy use: Time to move the switch between positions and
power required to do so.
• Reliability: A system’s probability of performing a specific function, at a specific
time.
• Availability: The portion of time a system is in a functioning state.
• Maintainability: The ease by which a product or system can be repaired/maintained.
2.4.1 Capacity
2.4.1.1 Network utilisation
The capacity metric is variably the number of passengers, quantity or mass (‘weight lifted’)
of freight, or number of vehicles able to pass a given section of network in a given time.
The British rail industry has been undergoing sustained growth since privatisation. Statis-
tics illustrated in Figure 2.12 show passenger numbers have more than doubled since FY
(Financial Year) 1993-1994 (ORR, 2013). Since FY 1985-1986, the number of passenger
stations has grown by 7% to 2550. Freight measures have marginally increased in the pe-
riod for which data is available, FY 2003-2004 on. However, over the same period, the
route kilometres1 open to traffic has fallen by 6%. The increasing utilisation over a shorten-
ing route length suggests greater capacity is required of each route mile. This demand will
not be spread evenly, literature (Ison et al., 2012), and government (Network Rail, 2011a;
Rail, 2009) documents define routes at maximum capacity.
2.4.1.2 Vehicular, signalling and operational capacity
The measure of capacity used in the signalling and operations fields is that of vehicular
capacity, having a direct influence upon the passenger/freight capacity in Figure 2.12. Ve-
hicular capacity is a measure of how many vehicles a given line, route or node can handle
in a given time, in TPH (Train Paths per Hour). Signalling capacity, in STPH (Signalling
1A measure of the length of open rail corridor, not how many parallel tracks are available along that route.
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Figure 2.12 Increasing demand, declining route-km, and therefore increasing density upon
the GB mainline network. Source: ORR (ORR, 2013)
Train Paths per Hour), defines the theoretical maximum limit if all systems perform per-
fectly. OTPH (Operational Train Paths per Hour) is specified as a fraction (the Capacity
Utilisation Index or CUI) of the STPH, to allow a margin for variability in driving style,
train dispatch times, or adhesion conditions (McNaughton, 2011). The fraction used de-
pends upon the type of railway operations, the highest fractions being 0.85 for a dedicated
suburban metro-type operation, and 0.75 for a high-speed line. The method is specified in
(UIC406, 2004).
2.4.1.3 Calculation of capacity
The TCT (Timetable Compression Technique) in UIC406 is the industry standard for cal-
culating vehicular capacity. Capacity is a function of the signalling system, track gradient,
speed restrictions, mix and pattern of traffic. Capacity is dependent upon rolling stock
specifications, thus a given section of infrastructure can have different capacity values for
different traffic mixes. To evaluate the performance of a single asset, it is therefore nec-
essary to keep all other infrastructure and rolling stock parameters equal; a homogeneous
traffic mix may also provide a more meaningful comparison. To quote (UIC406, 2004):
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“Capacity as such does not exist. Railway infrastructure capacity depends on the way
it is utilised. The basic parameters underpinning capacity are the infrastructure charac-
teristics themselves and these include the signalling system, the transport schedule and
the imposed punctuality (...) it is not possible to determine a theoretical capacity within
the framework of a generally-valid definition and method of calculation.”
TCT involves plotting train trajectories for a planned timetable, including the track
blocks occupied by MA’s (Movement Authority) for each train. The timetable is then com-
pressed in time until all ‘unoccupied time’ is removed, and a resultant STPH figure estab-
lished. Literature is rich with application examples (Landex, 2009; Landex et al., 2006a,b).
At complex junctions, hand calculation is time consuming, thus specialist software such as
Railsys (Bendfeldt et al., 2000) has been developed. Railsys is widely regarded as state-of-
the-art (Armstrong et al., 2011), though a range of capacity simulation tools - macroscopic
and microscopic - are available (Barber et al., 2007).
2.4.1.4 Capacity consumption, service reliability and timetable design
‘Capacity consumption’ is the ratio between scheduled trains per hour and the STPH. Ca-
pacity consumption defines how close to being ‘full’ a particular route or node is. There
is a negative correlation between capacity consumption and service quality (Goodall et al.,
2013). As capacity is consumed, deviations from planned operations have a larger impact
upon other services until, at 100% consumption, no trains are able to run. This justifies
the use of the OTPH value when service planning. Figure 2.13, qualitatively illustrates this
relationship. The ability of a particular timetable to prevent perturbations affecting service
quality, or operational robustness, is referred to as its ‘resilience’. Resilient timetables may
minimise conflicting moves, and have a large amount of spare capacity (i.e. a low CUI),
as per Figure 2.13. However, under-utilisation of capacity is clearly expensive in terms of
infrastructure. Optimisation of the infrastructure and timetable design is a multi-variate and
multi-objective problem beyond the scope of this thesis, but to note that any increase in
capacity brought about by revised track switching practice could lead to a more resilient
timetable and therefore more robust service through this relationship (Goverde and Hansen,
2013).
2.4.1.5 Capacity of nodes upon the network
As nodes (stations, junctions) introduce four capacity restrictions beyond plain line sig-
nalling, they govern the vehicular capacity of a railway system:
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Figure 2.13 The relationship between capacity consumption and service reliability. (A) As
capacity consumption approaches the theoretical limit, service reliability drops to negligible
levels, essentially creating a ‘gridlock’ situation. (B) As capacity consumption approaches
the theoretical limit, average service delay increases in a non-linear fashion. (C) Improving
reliability could improve capacity or a trade-off adopted. Source: (Goodall et al., 2013).
Mainline braking / acceleration allowance:- Turnout routes are generally rated for
a lower speed than mainline (see 2.2.2.1), therefore diverging trains must brake on the
mainline (Pope, 1975). Similarly, converging routes require trains to accelerate upon the
mainline. Changing speeds require longer track occupation times than constant, leading to
longer headways and lower capacity. A turnout route rated for mainline speeds eliminates
this restriction.
Switch actuation time:- Switches require time to operate (Sections 2.2.4.2 and 2.4.2),
which is added to the headway of each train, reducing capacity. To eliminate this restriction,
switches must move instantaneously or remain safe throughout their move - neither is pos-
sible in existing designs. A reduced switching time can directly result in a reduced headway
and therefore improved capacity.
Conflicting moves:- A conflicting move is where a train crosses the path of another
(IRSE, 2001; Leach, 1991). They are common in space-limited metro operations and at
station throats. Conflicting moves can be eliminated by fully grade separating junctions,
which is expensive and not always practical. The impact of conflicting moves can be reduced
with intelligent timetabling and track layout, and there is much ongoing research in this field,
(Goodall et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2013).
Junction margins:- Additional timetable margins which accommodate perturbations
(Section 2.4.1.2); namely variations in the arrival time of trains. Networks with many con-
flicting moves and changes in speed require greater junction margins. They can be pre-
scribed at timetable design time, either as additional mandated time between trains or delib-
erate gaps - ‘firebreaks’ - in the timetable, or by the selection of a lower CUI.
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Capacity losses from switch actuation time and mainline braking and acceleration al-
lowances are directly influenced by track switch performance. Junction margins are in-
fluenced by the reliability of the infrastructure and rolling stock. Conflicting moves can
be minimised at timetable design time, but are a trade-off with other infrastructure limi-
tations. Co-optimisation of track layout, signalling, and timetabling around stations is an
area of much academic study. Markov chain methods to ensure station layouts robustness
with regards timetable perturbation have been demonstrated (Odijk, 1999), but the problem
of scheduling in large stations is too complex to solve by standard combinatorial or inte-
ger programming methods (Carey and Carville, 2003), with solution time exponential in
the number of trains (Kroon et al., 1997). Modelling software, therefore, normally takes a
Monte-Carlo approach (Bendfeldt et al., 2000).
2.4.1.6 Case studies
Section 2.4.1.3 establishes there is no universal definition of capacity. The approach com-
monly taken in literature is to select case study locations to establish the capacity change
possible from defined infrastructure changes. Examples include work on fault tolerant sig-
nalling (Liu et al., 2013), and work defining both route (Landex, 2009) and nodal (Arm-
strong and Preston, 2011; Armstrong et al., 2015) capacity. This study will adopt the same
strategy, selecting a range of case study nodes.
2.4.2 Switching time and energy use
Actuation time is a trade-off against power supply requirements. Supplies are sized at de-
sign time for the population of powered equipment. Standards specify 1000W steady state
and 1500W inrush for POE - the joint highest power consumption alongside level cross-
ing actuators (Network Rail, 2006; Simmons, 2001). Power supply is a large contributor
to monetary cost, more so if train-based signalling solutions (Section 2.2.4.6) render other
line-side assets superfluous. ‘Type D’ circuit breakers are used, allowing 4 seconds inrush;
sustained over-current will lead to a points failure (BS EN 60947, 1996; Network Rail,
2006). Data from II (Section 2.2.5.2) indicates that whilst the inrush current specification is
often exceeded, steady state is rarely so (McNaughton, 2007).
Whilst it may be possible to upgrade power supplies for novel designs, work herein as-
sumes that the supply is fixed to to enable a fair performance comparison. Two performance
metrics need calculating to establish design feasibility: that a concept can operate from the
given supply; and how quickly the concept can switch. Both may be established by mod-
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elling from first principles, making necessary assumptions. Minimising actuation time is of
importance due to the direct link between actuation time and capacity (Section 2.4.1.5).
2.4.3 Reliability, availability and maintainability
Reliability is the ability of a system/component to perform required functions under stated
conditions for a specified period. Availability is a portion of time for which an asset is avail-
able for use. Maintainability contributes to availability by influencing scheduled downtime
(Rausand and Hoyland, 2004). Service reliability is influenced by asset reliability, though
measures differ.
2.4.3.1 Service reliability
Service reliability is published in two measures, PPM (Public Performance Measure), and
DMs (Delay Minutes). PPM is a non-technical figure for the public, specified for a whole
network. It provides insufficient detail compared to direct incident analysis; PPM is not
be used herein. One DM is incurred for each minute each train affected by an incident
arrives late at its final destination only, if it arrives over ten minutes late (five, for commuter
and south-east services). It is therefore possible that two identical infrastructure failures
result in different DM totals, or that DM are negated if delayed trains catch-up with the
timetable. DMs are open to manipulation, and whilst widely used, are not considered a
scientific measure - values are indicative only (ORR, 2015). ORR has published asset failure
and DM figures since 2008, shown in Table 2.3 (ORR, 2013). In every published year apart
from 2013-2014, points failures contribute the highest portion of delay incidents. However,
points failures have fallen significantly over the same period. This may be due, in part, to
Network Rail’s II programme (Section 2.2.5.2).
2.4.3.2 Operational reliability
It is necessary to distinguish mean time between unsafe failures (i.e. system in an un-
safe state), and mean time between operational failures. Literature represents either by the
term ‘MTBF’ or ‘MTTF’ (Meant Time Between/To Failure). Herein, MTBF refers to mean
time between unsafe failures, and MTTSAF (Mean Time To Service Affecting Failure), to
failures which interrupt operations. MTTSAF reflects the service quality that the system
provides, and is expected to be significantly lower than MTBF (Dwyer et al., 2012; Goodall
et al., 2006). To make this distinction for track switching specifically, the MTBF is required
to be of SIL-4 standard (108 to 109 hours between failure) – i.e. so high that one would
not normally expect to encounter a failure within the working life of a network population.
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Incident count Delay minutes (’000s) Mean mins
08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 Mean 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 /incident
Track 7750 6665 5879 5519 5346 5997 6193 957 764 763 804 855 931 137
Speed Restrictions 1428 1278 932 717 685 747 965 204 147 107 78 71 100 122
Track Faults 6322 5387 4947 4802 4661 5250 5228 753 617 655 726 784 831 139
Non-Track 32001 30109 27157 25767 25121 25491 27608 2829 2596 2612 2609 2673 2700 97
Points 8022 7118 5803 5162 5021 4376 5917 752 663 646 597 577 514 106
Level Crossings 2261 2162 2003 1932 1857 1936 2025 101 96 101 93 100 104 49
OLE/Third Rail 1458 1241 1281 1276 1265 1259 1297 238 245 251 227 325 309 205
Signals 6559 6202 5116 5018 4449 4278 5270 313 256 216 240 235 258 48
Track Circuits 5381 5145 4567 4243 3902 3729 4495 585 517 550 605 534 515 123
Axle Counters 1096 913 648 683 706 799 808 122 107 67 72 86 114 117
Signalling/Power 3750 4016 4422 4202 4494 4684 4261 442 419 517 486 517 545 114
Other Signalling 1495 1430 1513 1505 1300 1338 1430 64 56 60 60 53 60 41
Telecoms 1406 1352 1252 1176 1513 2406 1518 70 70 53 56 73 95 46
Cables 573 530 552 570 614 686 588 142 167 150 172 173 187 281
Other 12633 9303 9084 9212 9289 10753 10046 779 601 639 654 795 977 74
Structures 397 436 385 279 444 574 419 80 79 62 60 161 194 253
Other Infra. 5478 3772 3455 3774 3612 4739 4138 251 204 213 253 297 318 62
Track Patrols 3362 2565 2269 1949 2213 2075 2406 68 34 33 30 34 34 16
Mishaps 1839 1183 1493 1838 1836 2009 1700 191 108 133 145 147 228 93
Fires 197 221 250 257 116 218 210 17 32 34 22 13 64 145
Bridge Strikes 1360 1126 1232 1115 1068 1138 1173 172 144 163 144 144 139 129
Total 52384 46077 42120 40498 39756 42241 43846 4565 3961 4013 4066 4323 4608 97
Table 2.3 Failure count and delay minutes (thousands) incurred for GB mainline infrastruc-
ture assets between 2007-2012, for top 18 incident categories by total count. Source: ORR
(ORR, 2013)
(EN61508, 2002) describes SIL levels and their calculation . However, the MTTSAF is
much lower, of the order of 104−105 hours (Chapter 5) (Rama and Andrews, 2013). This
is further described in (EN50126, 1999), and illustrated in Figure 2.14.
Figure 2.14 Effects of failures within a railway system. Source: (EN50126, 1999, p. 14)
2.4.3.3 Metrics
The most relevant metrics used by industry are:
• MTTSAF - Mean Time To Service Affecting Failure, describes how often the system
can be expected to suffer a failure which is service affecting (operational reliability).
• MTTFRI - Mean Time To Fault Requiring Intervention, describes the frequency that
maintenance crews must visit the asset to rectify faults and failures.
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• MTTR - Mean Time To Repair - the mean time from reporting of a failed asset (or
subsystem thereof) to returning that asset or subsystem to an as-good-as-new state.
MTTSAF and MTTFRI are useful measures for constant failure rate systems, but if fail-
ure rate is heavily skewed to early-life (infant mortality) or late-life (wear-out), arithmetic
means provide skewed impressions of the data. MTTSAF is the de-facto industry stan-
dard, however for skewed distributions the 50% survivor function, or B50, provides a better
indicator. B50 indicates the time at which half the population is expected to have failed
(the median). Highly skewed distributions have been observed in switches, and the 2P-
Weibull model is established as the most appropriate for modelling switch failures (Rama
and Andrews, 2013); equations for calculating MTTSAF and B50 from this distribution are
published (Hecht, 2004). Alongside population statistics, expected lifetimes and failure dis-
tributions of individual subsystems can provide useful comparators. For 2P-Weibull models,
these are represented by β (the shape parameter) describing skew to early or late life fail-
ures, and η , the characteristic life. One drawback of the Weibull function is that it is not
capable of exhibiting non-monotonic shapes in the hazard function. This means the bathtub
curve, typically observed over a whole population lifetime, cannot be replicated. However,
this drawback can be offset by the sample period being across a range of component ages,
and the use of confidence intervals to give an indication of goodness-of-fit of the distribu-
tions identified. MTTR is covered in Section 2.4.3.4.
2.4.3.4 Availability
Availability metrics (EN50126, 1999) specifies availability for railway systems as ‘the
ability of a product to be in a state to perform a required function under given conditions
at a given instant of time or over a given time interval assuming that the required external
resources are provided’. Availability is the ratio of system uptime to system downtime.
Calculation of availability, therefore, requires knowledge of all aspects of downtime - due
to failures (i.e. reliability) and maintenance interventions. To an infrastructure custodian,
availability may be considered a more useful metric than reliability, as it describes total asset
downtime. EN50126 also specifies the knowledge required to make an informed calculation
of availability; expressed in diagrammatic form on (EN50126, 1999, p. 17) and as a simple
list (EN50126, 1999, p. 13), reproduced here:
a) reliability in terms of:
- all possible system failure modes in the specified application and environment;
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- the probability of occurrence of each failure or alternatively, the rate of occur-
rence of each failure;
-the effect of the failure on the functionality of the system.
b) maintainability in terms of:
- time for the performance of planned maintenance
- time for detection, identification and location of the faults;
- time for the restoration of the failed system (unplanned maintenance).
c) operation and maintenance in terms of:
- all possible operation modes and required maintenance, over the system life-
cycle;
- the human factor issues
At very high availabilities, unavailability, rather than availability, is usually expressed,
due to the relative scale of the numbers involved. If very high availabilities are expressed,
it is usually as a percentage approaching 100%, this having led to the adoption of ‘nines’ as
an informal unit . A system with 99.9% uptime can be referred to as ’three nines’ or 3N.
Relevant availability calculations are presented in (EN50126, 1999, p. 59) and referenced
as used.
Differing impact of unavailability It is worth noting that unavailability may have differ-
ent consequences at different times; for example a railway operating 12 hours per day could
achieve a perfect service with only 50% availability so long as the two time periods intersect.
The required availability will change depending upon network and location. Section 2.4.1
establishes that the general GB trend is towards an ever higher capacity utilisation, including
traffic encroaching traditional maintenance windows. This indicates that high availability is,
or will soon become, key to both maintenance flexibility and service reliability. There will
be a different monetary cost between scheduled and unscheduled elements of unavailability;
unscheduled typically being much higher.
Emergency response time, MTTR and τ MTTR is difficult to quantify through research
as the time the switch is unavailable following a failure is not recorded by the infrastructure
operator; nor are staff transit-to-site times, a constant is therefore adopted for the work in
Chapter 5. Traditional reliability modelling of a system may deliver results which are some-
what abstracted from the realities of the day-to-day operation of a railway. Some modelling
herein takes a railway asset management perspective, in that the primary controlled variable
is one which can be directly affected by the asset manager to bring about the level of avail-
ability required of the asset. This variable is τ , which describes the target time period in
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which a failed (or isolated as identified faulty) unit must be replaced by a maintenance team
to deliver a given system MTBSAF:- a target MTTR. The variable has been used in this way
in reliability modelling literature (Dwyer et al., 2012; Goodall et al., 2006)
2.5 Institutional and industry body recommendations
An IRSE report explores how fault-tolerant principles (Section 2.3) can be implemented
in rail control systems(IRSE, 1993). The importance of reliability engineering, including
RBDs, is noted, as is the necessity of fault-tolerance in order to provide required availability.
The report falls short of specifying fault tolerance be applied to track switching.
“When designing a new railway control system, the signal engineer should con-
stantly bear in mind the great importance of overall reliability and maintainability of
new systems. The required availability level shall therefore be an essential part of the
specification and its achievement shall be checked at every stage of the design and
development process.” (IRSE, 1993, p. 28)
The RTS (Rail Technical Strategy) (Yianni, 2012) sets out the future vision of the British
rail industry, its strengths and areas requiring further research and development. Switch
designs are listed as one of the main infrastructure development objectives; specifically:
“New designs of switches and crossings reduce failures to negligible levels and
reduce costs and disruptions associated with maintenance interventions. (...) Detailed
modelling work has shown that the existing railway could double its capacity and still
provide the current levels of public performance measures if (...) some key infrastruc-
ture, such as points, underwent a step change in performance.” (Yianni, 2012, p. 37)
Switches are also recognised in influencing other development objectives and enablers,
notably 2.56, 2.57, 2.63, 2.68-2.70 and 2.80. In 2014, the academic community published a
response to the RTS highlighting active areas of research towards it’s objectives. The work
in this thesis is cited on two occasions (Iwnicki, 2014, p. 10, p. 21).
2.6 Conclusions
The background and literature review has been presented in three sections; track switching,
fault tolerance and performance metrics.
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The design and operation of traditional track switch installations has been explored.
Switches operate in harsh conditions, often remote from the operator and maintainer, and
adhere to minimal fault tolerant design principles. There are a variety of switch actuation
methods, but each acts to bend the switch rails to position before locking in place. Switch
operation is a fundamental part of the rail safety architecture; for this reason the position of
the rails and lock is interlocked with signals to minimise derailment risk. Most faults are
undetected until failure occurs, and some faults/failures are only detected by human inspec-
tion. Switches are therefore subject to intensive inspection and preventative maintenance.
Fault tolerance is of importance to systems which need to provide safe and cost effective
operation without sacrificing availability. One of the most effective means of achieving
fault tolerance is through systematic analysis of system fault modes, and integration of fault
tolerant principles at the design stage. There are several methods to achieve fault tolerance:
re-design of systems; inclusion of redundant channels; fault tolerant control systems; or a
combination. Fault tolerant actuation in high integrity systems is often achieved through
redundancy. Redundant channels can also have benefits for maintainability. Much research
exists in the parallel fields of fault detection/diagnosis/prognosis and fault tolerant control.
There are many ways to measure performance, with a dichotomy between the numeric
methods in literature and industrial metrics. Some industrial measures are not scientific in
their derivation, so results should be treated carefully. It will require a mixture of approaches
to ascertain the theoretical and practical implications of fault tolerant track switching.
The literature review indicates fault tolerant track switching has not yet been explored.
Therefore, the opportunity is presented for novel work to investigate engineering fault tol-
erance into railway track switching. If switch systems can be engineered for fault tolerance,
then the performance characteristics of the system need to be modelled to ascertain whether
further development would be justified. A lack of literature in the area indicates novelty in
the work presented in this thesis; specific novelties are listed in each chapter introduction.
Chapter 3
Evaluating novel track switch designs
3.1 Introduction
This chapter evaluates novel railway track switching solutions. Alternative designs of track
switch may offer better performance, however, any novel design must meet track switching
requirements to be feasible. As Chapter 2 established that there is no formally defined
requirement set for a track switch, requirements are firstly established herein in Section
3.2. Each requirement is decomposed to its fundamental parts to understand how it can be
satisfied; requirements are functional and non-functional. Candidate solutions, identified
from a series of industry workshops in Section 3.4, are compared to the requirements set
in Section 3.4.2, and ranked using the weighted average decision matrix technique. The
traditional track switching solution is found not to satisfy all requirements, and could be
considered unfit for purpose. The highest ranking novel solution is termed the ‘Repoint’
concept, which is described in further detail in Chapter 4.
The novel contributions of this chapter are threefold. Firstly, to formally establish a set
of functional requirements for track switches. Secondly, to identify that traditional track
switching solutions do not meet the functional requirement set, and are therefore unsuit-
able, in their current form, for a modern, high-performance rail transport network. Thirdly,
to identify that several novel solutions have the potential to fulfil all functional require-
ments with the potential to outperform traditional solutions in non-functional areas. Work
presented in this chapter led to a journal paper by the thesis author and supervisors, titled
‘Rethinking Rail Track Switches for Fault Tolerance and Enhanced Performance’ (Bemment
et al., 2016).
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3.2 Requirements analysis
3.2.1 Overview
Switches fulfil a given purpose within a wider rail transport system - to allow different vehi-
cles to follow different routes through the network. Switches can simultaneously be consid-
ered subsystems of a rail infrastructure system, or systems within a transport/railway SoSE
(System of Systems Engineering) framework. SoSE is a branch of systems engineering
which considers the interrelationships between distinct systems within a larger system envi-
ronment (Boardman and Sauser, 2006; Jamshidi, 2011). SoSE is recognised in the transport
domain (DeLaurentis, 2005). Switch systems interact with the surrounding environment,
placing a set of requirements upon the switch to perform in a certain manner. These require-
ments can be functional or non-functional (Young, 2001). Functional requirements specify
what the switch must and must not do - i.e. specific behaviour of the switch. Non-functional
requirements specify criteria that can be used to judge the operation of a system when com-
pared to other solutions. A systemic review of requirements engineering is available in
literature (Neill and Laplante, 2003). One method to formally capture requirements is to ex-
amine all interactions with neighbouring systems and ‘actors’ (or stakeholders), to establish
the way the system must behave in each case (Sharp et al., 1999). This method is suitable
for track switches, as though technical solutions may change, interactions and actors remain
equivalent between locations and networks. A key tool for understanding these interactions
is the System Context Diagram (SCD), which defines the boundary between a system and its
environment, identifying all external entities that may interact with the system (Kossiakoff
et al., 2011). Figure 3.1 shows the SCD for a track switch.
Requirements placed upon a switch are a combination of requirements for a track sys-
tem, those for a safety-critical asset, and those for a mission-critical asset. As a broad defini-
tion, functional requirements are those placed upon the switch in day-to-day operation - i.e.
how the switch must function. Non-functional requirements, referred to as ‘desirable prop-
erties’ in some literature (Neill and Laplante, 2003; Young, 2001), are generally related to
‘one-off’ considerations, such as the purchase price of the system - business and economic
considerations (Pohl, 1994). Functional requirements are placed upon the switch by the rail
vehicles, the signalling system and the operations management system. These requirements
are shown in Figure 3.1 as arrows. Arrows pointing towards the switch system indicate an
action performed upon it, whereas arrows pointing away represent an action performed by
the switch.
Let us consider that any switch design will most likely consist of three elements, namely
‘track elements’, ‘actuator elements’ and ‘feedback elements’. The track elements have
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Figure 3.1 SCD for a generic track switching system, with external condition monitoring.
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Figure 3.2 SCD for a railway track switching system with internal condition monitoring.
requirements equivalent to corresponding plain line, namely support and guide vehicles ad-
equately. The actuator elements are required to direct vehicles along the correct path. The
feedback elements are required to confirm the path the vehicles will be directed along to
the interlocking, alongside information which confirms that the switch is safe/unsafe. In
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ID Sub-ID Description
1 The switch shall adequately support and guide all passing vehicles (as in (Net-
work Rail, 2010a), for the GB case).
a It shall support vertically and laterally the specified static loading.
b It shall support vertically and laterally the specified dynamic loading.
c It shall guide the wheel sets with maximum deviations as specified for the given
track quality.
d It shall manage the wear and degradation of support and guidance elements to
allowable levels.
2 The switch shall direct vehicles along the path specified by the interlocking
((Genner, 1997; Hadaway, 1950)).
a When commanded to, and not otherwise, it shall align any movable elements as
to direct the wheelset of a vehicle along the specified route.
b When commanded to, it shall align any movable elements for the requested route
within a specified maximum time-frame.
c It shall ensure all wheel sets of a vehicle are directed along the same route.
3 The switch shall confirm to the interlocking the route vehicles will be directed
along, and that all active elements are safe for the vehicle to pass ((Genner,
1997; Hadaway, 1950)).
a It shall provide feedback to the interlocking that the requested route is set.
b It shall provide feedback to the interlocking if the requested route is unable to be
set.
4 The switch shall provide information to maintenance organisations regarding
the future projected ability to perform requirements (2) and (3).
a It shall monitor wear of wear-susceptible parts and adjustment of adjustable parts.
b It shall communicate current state of wear and adjustment to maintenance organ-
isations.
c It shall calculate and communicate the remaining time of useful operation of the
asset without maintenance intervention.
d It shall achieve a given minimum level of availability commensurate with the op-
erations at the node.
e The design shall minimise maintenance downtime, and personnel track-side, to a
level commensurate with the operations at the node.
Table 3.1 Top level functional requirements of track switching solutions.
the past, these have been the only requirements of a switching solution. However, given
the high performance standards of a modern railway and the criticality of switch availabil-
ity established in Chapter 2, another functional requirement could be included; namely to
communicate the current and predicted ability of the switch to meet the other requirements
to operators. This may involve communicating the state of switch subsystems to the main-
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tenance managers. This set of requirements is what would normally be met by the use of
a condition monitoring system. It is possible that a condition monitoring system may now
be a functional requirement, rather than a desirable. This arrangement (and subsequent
additional requirement) is shown in the revised system context diagram in Figure 3.2.
3.2.2 Functional requirements
Using the SCDs, 3.1 and 3.2, a top-level list of functional requirements can be compiled.
Each requirement can then be further decomposed into functional elements as in (Neill
and Laplante, 2003). These requirements are listed alongside a requirement identification
number in Table 3.1. However, there are weaknesses in this definition and decomposition
method. Firstly, the system boundary has been set through a combination of research, inter-
view, and engineering judgement. However, it would be both possible and reasonable to set
the boundary elsewhere using a different set of assumptions and/or constraints, which could
lead to a wildly different conclusion. An example of a different but valid system boundary
is that track switching could be achieved by a steerable vehicle with static track elements,
which would place the ‘vehicle’ element inside the boundary. Secondly, whilst every effort
has been made to correctly establish the system interactions, it is possible that the some
interactions may have been excluded, which would then lead to missing functional require-
ments. The risk of this has been minimised through the use of peer review (Bemment et al.,
2016).
3.2.3 Non-functional requirements
Alongside the functional requirements are further requirements that need to be established,
collectively termed ‘non-functional’ requirements (colloquially ‘desirables’). Whilst solu-
tions should satisfy all functional requirements, non-functional requirements form a set of
trade-offs whereby the relevance of each will vary in every given scenario. For instance,
there is pressure in Europe to reduce track-side working for safety reasons. There is politi-
cal pressure to reduce the cost of infrastructure (McNulty, 2011). In some retrofit locations
(depots, city centres), space is at a premium; the alignment of the track, or capacity, is sac-
rificed as there is insufficient room for a switch of the ideal specification (Ison et al., 2012),
not as often the case in new build. A non-exhaustive list of the most relevant non-functional
requirements was established with the aid of the focus group (Section 3.4). It must be ac-
knowledged that as the list of desirables is representative of the views of the group, that list
and subsequent rankings may be inherently biased towards those views. A different focus
group with alternative views or experience may have generated or ranked the list differently.
3.2 Requirements analysis 57
Limitations of focus group methods with small sampling frames are described, for instance,
by (Collis and Hussey, 2013, pp130). The limitations introduce a potential weakness in
the method whereby the ranking and selection process is unable to be fully validated. Un-
fortunately, due to constraints of time and resource, more appropriate methods such as a
poll with wider population, or the use of several, independent focus groups to cross-check
results, perhaps through a fixed questionnaire (Collis and Hussey, 2013, pp143), were un-
available to the thesis author. Additionally, the sampling (in this case the selection of the
focus group members) was completed before the thesis work began, meaning that the focus
group may be judgementally sampled, perhaps further aggravating the weaknesses above.
1. Degree of Fault Tolerance: How long/well can the switch tolerate faults, remaining in
a usable state until such a time as repair can be performed?
2. Design Adaptability: Switches must handle many types of traffic at many speeds.
Whilst many different designs could fulfil these different purposes, a single, adaptable
design is preferable.
3. Unit Cost: Monetary cost of the solution, estimated using engineering judgement.
4. Space Utilisation: Physical footprint of the solution.
5. Energy Requirements: Lower energy requirements are more desirable due to the dif-
ficulty of supplying power line-side (Section 2.4.2).
6. Ease of Manufacture: Able to be mass-manufactured using existing techniques and
processes.
7. Likelihood of Acceptance: The rail industry has processes and standards regarding
the design of products for use upon the network. Is the concept likely to be certified?
8. Switching Speed: Whilst there is a functional requirement to meet a given maximum
switching time; the faster the switch can change positions, the better (Chapter 2.4.1).
9. Maintainability: Does the design help to ease maintenance, and reduce the amount
of time personnel spend performing maintenance tasks track-side?
10. Standardisation:Can the design be built from COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) com-
ponents, or are many custom components necessary?
11. Human Factors: Maintenance teams (and trespassers) may be exposed to movable
elements of the switch. How big is the risk posed?
3.2.4 Concept ranking and selection technique
Having established a set of requirements, the next step is to develop an approach for rank-
ing and selection of candidate solutions. As stated earlier, functional requirements must be
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met without exception in order that the solution be suitable. Several solutions may meet
this set, therefore a method is required to discern which one(s) may offer the best available
solution. Literature explores various methods of selecting one of a number of options based
upon a set of goals; in business and operations management literature as well as engineering
design literature. (Cross and Roy, 1989, p. 140-161) in particular lists several methods of
selecting the best solution, from a mechanical design evaluation perspective. In this case,
the ‘Weighted Objectives’ technique will be used. The weighted average decision matrix
technique was used for this down-selection process due to its speed and suitability for deci-
sion making across a smaller sample size of varying opinions. It is acknowledged that with
greater resource or time, other processes such as the Delphi approach to disruptive innova-
tion, or other methods listed in (Collis and Hussey, 2013; Cross and Roy, 1989) including
cross-checking individual, smaller focus-groups, may have offered more academically rig-
orous results.
The weighted-objectives technique requires a matrix to be created specifying the rela-
tive importance of each requirement. Requirements are ranked, by combining pairs; each
requirement is then assigned a weighting. Calculation is simplified if the weightings sum to
one. Each design option is then scored, in this case out of 10, against how well it satisfies
each non-functional requirement, and this score is multiplied by the weighing representing
the relative importance of that requirement. The resulting weighted scores are summed to
give each option a total score. Thus, it follows that a concept which scores highly in many
areas is may not be identified as the best option if the weighting of those requirements is
low.
Table 3.2 shows a comparative ranking between each of the established non-functional
requirements listed in section 3.2.3, for the GB mainline scenario. The results of each pair
comparison have been generated through discussion with a panel of British stakeholders
in track switching (Section 3.4.1). Reference was made to earlier sections of this thesis,
particularly relevant sources cited in Chapter 2. It is important to note that the rankings are
subjective; a different judging panel, or consideration of a different railway jurisdiction may
lead to different weightings and therefore a different final solution ranking.
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Figure 3.3 Systems Context Diagram for traditional railway track switching systems. Re-
quirements are met through the use of three subsystems - track, actuation and detection.
Interactions between the switching system and external systems are shown alongside some
relevant interactions entirely outside the system boundary.
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3.3 Comparing traditional switches to the requirements
3.3.1 Identifying satisfied requirements
Referring to the numbered requirements in Table 3.1, and to Figures 2.1 and 2.2, each re-
quirement can be mapped to a functional element of existing switches. The subsystems used
to achieve this, and their interactions, are shown in the systems context diagram in Figure
3.3.
Requirements (1a,b,c) are achieved by designing the track elements of the switch to be
of equivalent rating to the surrounding plain line and traffic requirements. However, in or-
der to meet (1c), in some cases this has meant relaxing the standards, notably around the
switch toes, in order to prevent having infinitely thin blades at the point of intersection of
routes (Section 2.2.3.2). Requirement (1d) is achieved through a regular programme of
inspection with wear gauges, followed by corrective action such as grinding or packing, as
laid down in industry maintenance handbooks (Cope and Ellis, 2001; Network Rail, 2013c).
For requirements (2a,b,c), routing of vehicles is currently achieved by the combination
of an actuator and two moveable switch rails (Section 2.2.2.1). The actuator acts to close
one switch rail against the corresponding stock rail, and open the opposite to create a flange-
way. The same actuator, by means of a mechanical arrangement, then provides locking to
prevent un-commanded movement of the rails. However, the use of a single actuator means
that component failures may easily prevent the actuation elements meeting this requirement,
even with appropriate maintenance as per requirement (4).
Requirements (3a,b) are provided through the detection elements. Limit switches indi-
cate that the two movable switch rails are in the correct position, and that the lock preventing
movement (for requirement 2c) is engaged. A signal is then transmitted to the interlocking.
If the switch is unable to be set for a particular route, then not all of the limit switches can be
engaged, thus no detection signal is transmitted, and after a given time-frame as in (2b), the
signaller would deduce there was a failure. Switches do not, in the signal to the interlocking,
differentiate between ‘currently moving to desired position’ and ‘unable to move to desired
position’; both states appear equivalent to the limit switches.
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3.3.2 Identifying unsatisfied requirements
Some existing designs - specifically the classic electro-mechanical - (Section 2.2.4.5) fail
to meet requirements (1b,c), (2c) and (3a) due to issues with the design of stretcher bars.
Stretcher bars are responsible for holding the open switch rail in place; their failure al-
lows the switch rail to close, uncommanded, against the corresponding stock rail, almost
inevitably leading to derailment. Traditional designs have several stretcher bars, partially to
counter this possibility. Regular inspection and maintenance is used to mitigate against the
risk, at as high a frequency as once per week. Derailment and loss of life has happened twice
in recent history - at Potters Bar and Greyrigg (Figure 1.2). Despite mitigations, short-cuts
taken in the inspection and maintenance processes contributed to these disasters (RAIB,
2011; RSSB, 2005). Switch designs based around the use of the bolted stretcher bar, and
without a mechanical backup or monitoring system, fail to meet the functional requirements
laid out above, on the grounds that a programme of regular, frequent additional inspection
has necessarily been adopted to provide mechanical integrity. Traditional switches do not
meet requirements (4a,b,c) for this reason.
Existing switch designs are least compliant with the requirements in group (4), perhaps
as these requirements have only evolved with the enhanced performance of a modern rail-
way system. Network Rail has recently retro-fitted condition monitoring equipment to better
meet (4a) and (4b) (Section 2.2.5.2) (McNaughton, 2007). As a retro-fit, this is shown exter-
nal to the switch system in Figure 3.3. However, safety-critical , and wear part monitoring
is still achieved by regular human inspections, clashing with requirement (4e). Requirement
(4c) is currently not catered for, however work in the prognostic field seeks to improve this
(Marquez et al., 2010; Silmon and Roberts, 2010).
3.3.3 Performance against non-functional requirements
Despite some POE failing to meet some of the functional requirements, it is a useful exercise
to compare existing switches to the non-functional requirements in order to benchmark.
Using the scoring system presented in Table 3.2 (Section 3.5), traditional switches were
ranked. The results of this exercise are presented in the first two columns of Table 3.4. The
first column, ‘As is’, indicates switches as currently deployed - scoring 5 for each category
as per Table 3.3, giving a weighted non-functional score of 5.90. The second column lists
mean scores for an ‘Ultimate evolution’ switch; the ultimate performance evolution of the
traditional track switch design, scoring 6.37 overall.
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3.4 Novel concepts
3.4.1 Industry focus groups and idea generation
An industrial focus group was assembled on four occasions through 2011-2013, to generate
and rank candidate track switching solutions. Further to these sessions, a series of remote
and face-to-face meetings was conducted with other stakeholders within Network Rail and
London Underground (Bemment et al., 2016).
Sessions were structured around questions related to existing and novel track switching
solutions before providing an open forum. Questions were structured to include system
(and human) interactions of the track switching system as well as the engineering elements.
The sessions resulted in over 100 individual ideas related to improvements to switches and
crossings, covering their physical design, signalling and operation, associated maintenance
activities, and routes to market. Specific questions were as follows:
1. What alternate means of directing and supporting traffic may be adopted?
2. What alternate means of actuating any moveable elements may be adopted?
3. How might we avoid ‘failures’ due to obstruction of the mechanism?
4. The other main failures could be grouped under: Friction, Adjustment, Mechanical,
Control and Feedback, Other. How might we go about reducing the probability of
other failure modes?
5. How might we go about removing the indeterminate (OOC) state from the normal
operation of the switch?
6. What are the rules that might change as a result of the implementation of points in-
corporating redundancy to provide very high reliability and integrity?
7. Who should we be involving during the concept evaluation and development phases
to ensure industry buy-in?
8. What areas of the network could provide good case studies as to the potential benefits
of such a concept?
9. What are the factors which may prevent successful deployment of any novel concept
upon the network?
3.4.2 Idea filtering and down-selection
The first filter for down-selection was to exclude any ideas which were mechanically im-
plausible; it is the nature of a brainstorming-type approach that construction and operation
of some ideas will not be possible, these ideas must be rejected at an early stage. Secondly,
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any ideas which would require wholesale modification of the entire rolling stock fleet were
excluded, including the removal of all wheel flanges, or steerable bogies. These options
can broadly be defined as ‘Vehicle-Based Switching’ (VBS). Whilst it is accepted that VBS
may ultimately deliver higher levels of performance than track based switching (Ward et al.,
2014), this is out of scope for this work. Thirdly, any ideas which would require more than
20 years estimated ‘time to market’ were excluded. For example, novel vehicle control solu-
tions which required European Rail Traffic Management System ERTMS Level 4 or higher
(Stanley, 2011). In some cases this would also have ruled out VBS solutions. These solu-
tions also fall outside the scope of this work - regulatory body panel members noted industry
would be unlikely to adopt such solutions due to the cyclic nature of development funding
in the sector and the need to deliver benefits early. Thirty novel options remained to be
investigated and ranked. These solutions ranged from detail changes to traditional switches
(towards the ‘Ultimate Evolution’) to completely novel designs, which are now listed.
3.4.3 Novel concepts
This subsection presents the novel designs remaining after idea filtering; ranked in Section
3.5.
3.4.3.1 Concept A: ‘The track substitution switch’
Shown in Figure 3.4. Not used on the GB mainline, but can be seen at amusement parks
with tracks of large cross-section, or where the bogie wraps entirely around the rails, such as
monorails. Track for either exit route is entirely separate, and substituted into the available
space when required. This substitution can be by way of sliding, rotating, or lifting.
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Figure 3.4 Concept A: (Top) General arrangement of a track substitution switch, and (Bot-
tom) a roller coaster implementation, ‘Kingda ka’, Six Flags, USA (Credit: Dusso Janladde,
wikimedia)
3.4.3.2 Concept B: ‘The single flange controlled switch’
Traditional switches provide a flangeway for each wheel to pass through the switch, with one
or both flanges contacting the switch rails to set a direction. It may be possible to do away
with one moving switch rail, instead providing a fixed flangeway one one side and selecting
direction with a single moveable switch rail on the opposite side, as a moveable check rail
as in Figure 3.5 On longer switches designed for faster traffic, this may mean some distance
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where the wheelset is running upon the tip of the flange, with the resulting implications on
the ride dynamics. This may restrict maximum traffic speed, but its advantage is to halve
the moving parts of traditional layouts.
Figure 3.5 Concept B: General arrangement of the single flange controlled switch
3.4.3.3 Concept C: ‘The wheel-face switch’
This switch has fixed track elements, with flange-ways built in, as in Figure 3.6. An element
higher than the running rails contacts the wheel faces and acts to direct the vehicle along
either route. Multiple elements could be provided to enable redundancy. Contact elements
would need to be locked in place as in a traditional switch, to prevent splitting the switch.
These arrangements would eliminate the opening and closing gap between the switch and
stock rails upon existing designs which can lead to blockages of the mechanism. They may
also simplify the provision of multi-channel actuation and locking elements as several wheel
face contact elements could be utilised together. One drawback is simultaneous failure of
both wheel face contact elements would leave switch in an undefined state.
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Figure 3.6 Concept C: General arrangement of the the wheel-face switch
3.4.3.4 Concept D: ‘Interlocking rails’
This concept (Figure 3.7) provides the locking function through the shape of the rails them-
selves, rather than through an additional mechanism. The rails are locked in place by virtue
of being lowered into cut-outs, but when raised are free to move laterally between positions.
The rails would need to be unlocked by an actuation element which would need an element
of vertical motion. This could assist in enabling multi-channel actuation; each actuator may
be capable of unlocking the switch rails individually. Unlike existing designs which rely
upon the stretcher bar to restrain the open rail, this concept could positively lock both rails
in position in multiple places. However, because of its similarity to existing designs it may
have similar disadvantages - much machining of switch rails and possible blockages.
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Figure 3.7 Concept D: Interlocking rails - general arrangement
3.4.3.5 Concept E: ‘The stub switch’
Figure 3.8 Concept E: General arrangement of a stub switch, showing bending full-section
rails to select route. Additional routes are possible, a third is shown in dashed lines.
The stub switch, in Figure 3.8 reverses elements of a traditional switch, using full-section
rail throughout. The route is selected by bending or hinging the approach rails to position.
There is no opening/closing gap between switch and stock rails. This has the benefit of al-
lowing more than two routes from a single switch, and reduces the probability of blockages.
There is, however, a discontinuity at the rail ends. In practice it may be difficult to control
the track alignment at this discontinuity. Actuators may be required along the moveable
length of the rail to ensure it follows the correct alignment.
3.4.3.6 Concept F: ‘The over running rail switch’
The concept in Figure 3.9 takes a fixed set of diverging rails and places a specially shaped
ramp over the left or right rail in order to direct the vehicle along one of the two (or three)
potential routes. One side of the wheelset is lifted over the running rail; no flangeway is
provided. Devices like this are in use as temporary turnouts in work sites to direct on-track
3.4 Novel concepts 69
plant onto temporary track, and also as derailers. The ramps could be actuated using multi-
channel parallel actuation for fault tolerance, and be self-locking by underside shape.
Figure 3.9 Concept F: A temporary over running rail switch. (Credit: Martinus Rail Aus-
tralia)
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3.4.3.7 Concept G: ‘Raising and lowering the switch rails’
Figure 3.10 Concept G: Raising and lowering the switch rails.
It may be possible to raise and lower the switch rails instead of the traditional lateral
motion (Figure 3.10). The raised switch rail would need supporting adequately for the static
and dynamic loading from rail vehicles, and the lowered rail would need to be locked in a
lowered position. It may be easier to provide multi-channel actuation and locking with this
arrangement when compared to a traditional switch. The switch rails still need to support the
mass of a vehicle, perhaps through actuating the rails by driving shaped wedges underneath.
3.4.3.8 Concept H: ‘The swing-nose switch’
The swing-nose crossing exists as a method to support the wheelset at the common crossing;
a similar concept is applicable to the switching elements as in Figure 3.11. A flangeway is
created by flexing a pair of rails. The rails can be held a certain distance apart. The drawback
is the additional energy required to bend/pivot two pairs of moving rails, though if the
bearing surfaces were contained under the spacing elements, friction could be controlled.
Accurate alignment of the rail ends could be achieved by limiting elements; rails would
have to be closely controlled and aligned. It may be possible to have more than two routes
out of the switch, as per concept E. This arrangement has a lower likelihood of blockages,
as the variable gap between switch and stock rail is eliminated.
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Figure 3.11 Concept H: General arrangement of a swing-nose switch, showing pivot-
ing/flexing pairs of full-section rails to select route. Plates maintain gauge (1) and limit
blocks (2) maintain accurate track alignment .
3.4.3.9 Concept I: ‘The hopping switch’
Also known as the bunny switch, and illustrated in Figure 3.12. In this arrangement, the
switching rails hop between fixed, locked positions. The rails could either hinge or bend. A
switch of this design which uses a track substitution arrangement is patented (Winter, 2006).
The rails are lifted out of position and dropped in an adjacent position.
Figure 3.12 Concept I: Hopping switch general arrangement. (Source: (Winter, 2006))
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3.4.3.10 Concept J: ‘The Spring Switch’
Some switches of the traditional type exist without actuators, typically used at remote pass-
ing loops , to always direct traffic in a given direction for a facing move, but allow trailing
moves from either direction (Morgan, 2009). Many switches are used for trailing moves
only, the primary example being exiting directional platforms at stations. It may be possible
to have an entirely passive solution for select locations, including at higher speed.
Figure 3.13 Concept J: General arrangement of a spring switch. All vehicles making a
trailing move are directed passively; facing moves along the turnout route.
3.4.3.11 Concept K: ‘Hopping Stub Switch’ (D, E and I Combined)
During the idea downselection process, the panel noted that ideas D, E and I were not
mutually exclusive and could be combined into a single concept which may deliver the
combined benefits of each, which is included here as an additional concept, K. The concept
is a stub switch arrangement, which hops between positions, using interlocking rail ends to
provide a positive lock when in position.
3.5 Ranking novel concepts
Each concept was then ranked against the weighted non-functional requirements in Table
3.2, with scoring guidelines in Table 3.3. This was carried out with input from the industrial
panel. Each member of the judging panel was independently asked to score each concept
against each category. Also included in the ranking were traditional switches in two forms;
‘As is’ and ‘Ultimate evolution’ (Ult. Evol.) (Section 3.3.3). Note Concept J scores 10 in
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the Product Acceptance category; this design is already deployed. The mean scores, totals
and concept ranks from this exercise are shown in Table 3.4.
Score Description
0 Impossible to fulfil this requirement
1 Very minimal ability to fulfil this requirement
2 Minimal ability to fulfil this requirement
3 Some ability to fulfil this requirement
4 Good abbility to fulfil this requirement
5 Matches the capability of existing solutions
6 Marginally exceeds the capabilty of existing solutions
7 Fulfils this requirement better than existing solutions
8 Fulfils this requirement significantly than existing solutions
9 Fulfils this requirement very significantly better than existing solutions
10 Perfectly fulfils this requirement
Table 3.3 Scoring used for judging the performance of each novel solution.
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3.6 Analysis of rankings
3.6.1 Relevance of score weightings
Section 3.2.4 explains the methodology for assigning weightings to non-functional require-
ments. It upon the opinions of the panel. In this case, the panel were told to consider the
GB mainline and significant metro networks only. It is possible that for other situations
different weightings would have been assigned. This may mean that, in a different situation,
a different switch design may have ranked top in non-functional requirements. Examples
of this may include new build city systems, where switching speed and space utilisation
may be of higher weighting; and long distance routes through remote, difficult to reach lo-
cations where energy requirements may be of more importance. Crucially, this may mean
that whilst the industry has standardised around a single solution, there may be a range of
solutions with unique advantages which decide particular suitability. It is therefore impor-
tant not to eliminate any solution based upon a marginally lower weighted score in Table
3.4. Further work may be carried out to establish different versions of Table 3.4 for given
locations or scenarios. This is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis.
3.6.2 Comparison to benchmark
The traditional track switch achieved a score of 5.9, and the ultimate evolution 6.37. Seven
novel concepts ranked higher than the ‘as-is’ switch, and four ranked higher than the ulti-
mate evolution. Of the four concepts outscoring the ultimate evolution:
• Concept K scores the highest of all options with 7.51. This concept is a combination
of concepts D, E and I, and could therefore be expected to score more highly than
each of these concepts ranked alone. The concept scores very highly in degree of
fault tolerance, adaptability and space utilisation. The design scores low in human
factors due to the likelihood of harm to trespassers with the novel motion. However,
the weighting matrix places more emphasis on the former three factors.
• Concept J, scored second highest at 7.18. The design scores 10/10 for likelihood of
product acceptance as examples already exist. The design also scores full points in
energy requirements and switching speed, being entirely passive. However, because
of the passivity of the concept, it scores very low (0.9) in design adaptability - it
could not be used in every location. As the second highest scoring concept, and with
higher scores in other areas, the opportunity could be explored for further roll out of
the spring switch across the network in locations which have trailing moves only, or
facing moves of a single direction.
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• Concept D scores 6.93, with particular strengths in unit cost and likelihood of product
acceptance, but with weaknesses in the degree of fault tolerance (due to heightened
blockage likelihood) and maintainability (due to the complex stock rail arrangement).
Concept K eliminates some of these concerns and therefore scores more highly.
• Concept E, the stub switch, scores 6.64. It has particular strengths in space utilisation
and adaptability, by allowing multiple routes from a single switch. Alone, the design
scores low in the degree of fault tolerance, and the energy requirements of bending
and holding full-section rail between positions.
Concepts I, B and H score between the as-is and ultimate evolution benchmarks. This
means that with the given requirements weighting matrix they may, or may not , outperform
traditional solutions. Concepts A, C, F G score less than the ‘as is’ benchmark. All other
concepts evaluated as part of this process (Section 3.4) scored less than concept A (3.65),
the lowest scoring concept in Table 3.4.
Concept K is the highest ranking option, with a score significantly higher than the ul-
timate evolution of traditional designs. It allows a degree of fault tolerance through a re-
dundancy of actuation and locking not possible with traditional designs, and will thus be
explored further in this thesis. The proposed function of this concept, alongside modelling
of its operation, is described fully in Chapter 4. Development of the concept into a labora-
tory demonstrator is the subject of Chapter 7.
3.7 Summary and conclusions
This chapter firstly developed a set of functional and non-functional requirements for track
switching. The traditional track switching solution is found not to satisfy all requirements,
and thus it could be considered unfit for purpose; different designs fail to meet different
requirements. Any novel design must meet the functional requirements to be suitable, and
exceed the performance of the traditional design in its non-functional properties (desirables)
in order to offer a preferable solution. Several novel designs of switch, generated during
workshops with an industry panel, were evaluated against the desirable properties using
the weighted average decision matrix technique. Several concepts rank highly, though it
is noted that for a different weighting of non-functional requirements, a different concept
may have ranked first. The highest ranking novel solution for the GB mainline requirements
weighting will be described in functional and mechanical detail in the following chapter. It
is termed the ‘Repoint’ switching concept.
Chapter 4
The ‘Repoint’ switching concept
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 detailed a set of requirements for track switching before identifying a concept
based upon interlocking rail ends with a hopping motion on a stub switch arrangement,
termed the ‘Repoint’ concept, as highest ranked for further development. This chapter ex-
plores this concept in further detail, in two halves. In the first half, the general design is
described, including it’s enabling of multi-channel actuation and locking. In the second
half, the concept is modelled from first principles to establish that it has feasible, practical
characteristics; fundamental formulae governing the design of stub switches are derived.
Novel contributions of this chapter are the introduction of the concept of ‘Passive Locking’,
a practical solution to engineering multi-channel actuation and locking of railway track
switches for the first time; the arrangement to put this into practice, and the first principles
modelling of these elements to ensure feasibility. In this chapter, Section 4.2 introduces
the new concept for multichannel passive locking, before describing the overall Repoint
concept in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, it is shown how the concepts meet the functional
requirements from Chapter 3. In Sections 4.5, the proposed layout and actuators are mod-
elled. Concepts described in this chapter have been extensively published (Bemment et al.,
2012a, 2013a,b, 2015a, 2016), and form granted UK patents (GB Patent: Loughborough
University, 2013a,b). Further detail is provided in Chapter 7, which explores the design and
development of a laboratory scale demonstrator.
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4.2 Providing multi-channel locking - ‘Passive locking’
Chapters 2 and 3 established the requirement to lock the track elements in place to pre-
vent trains splitting the points. Chapter 5, however, identifies that the locking system is a
significant source of unreliability in existing designs. It is relatively simple to provide, for
example, multiple actuators or detectors with existing designs. However, the locking re-
quiremen introduces a design choice if providing full multi-channel redundancy; any failed
lock may prevent any switch movement, causing an operational failure. There are several
design options:
1. Remove the requirement for locking.
2. Provide ‘soft locking’ through a software, control or ‘energised’ solution.
3. Provide multi-channel locking, and an arrangement in which each actuator is able to
unlock all other channels to allow movement.
4. Provide single channel locking only.
It is unlikely that options 1 or 2 would be acceptable to the regulatory bodies, given the
history of locking-related accidents (RAIB, 2011; Rolt, 1982; RSSB, 2005) and the conse-
quent requirement for FPL written into British law (ORR, 2006). Option 4 would signifi-
cantly restrict the performance improvement available as a single point of failure would still
be present (See Chapter 5). Option 3 is not possible with locking designs in existing POE
arrangements (Section 2.2.4.5). However, the novel design of actuator described herein -
using the hopping actuation motion described in Concept I of Chapter 3 - can allow this.
The passive locking concept follows a lift-move-drop action to move the switch rails
between adjacent positions. When the rails are lowered, they sit in grooves which prevent
lateral movement at each bearer. When raised, they are free to move laterally. Each actuator
unit is therefore capable of unlocking the locking elements of all other actuator units purely
by lifting the rails. When the rail is in one of its stationary, lowered positions, it is unable
to move in any direction apart from directly upwards. Compared to other axes, there are
no significant uplift forces present, and a significant net downward force when the mass of
a train is present. This fundamentally differs from all existing designs, which have active
mechanisms or linkages specifically to lock the rails. If an actuator unit is isolated, it still
provides a positive lock when the rails are lowered - illustrated in Figure 4.2. This principle
is novel, and has been termed ‘passive locking’ as no external mechanism is required to lock
the rails - they are locked whenever at rest.
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4.3 Design overview
This section makes reference to the numbered elements in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The design
is based around a stub switch arrangement. The stub switch reverses the elements in a
traditional switch, replacing long, planed down switch rails in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 with
short, stub-ends formed of full section rail, able to move between positions (3). Figure 4.1
shows the general arrangement of a ‘Repoint’ stub switch, with an optional second turnout
route shown. A bank of actuators (1) is responsible for moving the full-section switch rails
between each position. The actuators bend the rail from a stationary point (7), beyond which
the track is plain line. There is no hinge. To ensure the correct bending profile, it may be
necessary to alter the cross section of the rail around the stationary point and an established
method such as flange relief could be applied to achieve this. If the rail position requires
further lateral restraint between the stationary point (7) and actuator bearers (1), this may be
achieved with passive locking bearers (2) which feature the locking elements of Figure 4.2
only.
4.3.1 Actuation and locking
Actuation is provided by a multi-channel actuation bank (1), with actuation elements within
bearers near the movable rail ends. ‘Actuator-bearers’ are each capable of moving the switch
independently, giving triplex redundancy. However, the number of actuation channels could
be tailored to particular RAMS requirements. The moveable rail is supported upon the
actuator-bearers, which transmit the static and dynamic loading from vehicles to the track
substructure. These bearers have a movable top surface, a ‘shuttle’ (15), to which the rails
are attached. The lower casing of the actuator-bearer is embedded in ballast or affixed to
slab track. Vehicle load is transmitted from the rails, through the shuttle and then locking
blocks (16, 17) to the bearer casing, where it is distributed to and through the substructure
as normal. When the rails are lifted, they are free to move laterally, but restrained longitu-
dinally. The rail moves in an semi-circular path between adjacent positions. If an actuator
is isolated, adjacent unit(s) can still actuate the switch, as the lifting action will unlock the
isolated unit. There are many ways to provide drive inside the actuator units, this work
proposes utilising a motor (10) and gearbox (11), linked to a rack (12), two cams (13) and
followers (14) as per the figure. Ultimately, the actuators would be enclosed in sealed, line-
replaceable units. The motor and gearbox arrangement needs to be back-driveable, in order
that, if a failure occurs between positions, the mass and spring force of the elevated rail will
cause the switch to drop back into one of the safe, lowered and locked positions. The system
can be considered ‘bistable’.
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Figure 4.2 Actuation (top) and locking (bottom) elements within each actuator bearer. Num-
bered elements: (10) Motor; (11) Gearbox; (12) Toothed actuation rod; (13) Cam; (14) Cam
follower; (15) Shuttle; (16) Upper locking block; (17) Lower locking block.
4.3.2 Control, detection and condition monitoring
A line-side control cabinet (5) interfaces with the signalling, commanding each actuator
bearer when a movement is requested (6). Each bearer transmits back the shuttle (and
therefore rail) position, even if the actuation elements are isolated. The line-side controller
can then deduce switch position using voting logic as per SSI (Cribbens, 1987) - 2-out-
of-3 voting, with 2-out-of-2 fall-back. Detection would need to establish the vertical and
lateral rail position; though it may be sufficient to detect vertical position only, given the
locking arrangement. The line-side controller is also responsible for condition monitoring
in each actuator-bearer. If a fault is suspected, the bearer can be immediately isolated, and
the maintenance organisation informed.
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4.3.3 Rail ends
The interaction of the moving rail ends with the static rails (4) in the track panel needs to
be managed. Stub switches have historically used butt joints. Butt joints are an undesirable
solution due to rail-creep, temperature variations and alignment issues. It is unlikely that a
butt-joint would provide the support and guidance necessary across the full operating range
- i.e. requirement 1 in Table 3.1. A novel rail end solution was therefore required. This
solution was in the form of chamfered mating rail ends.
4.3.3.1 Diagonal chamfer mating rail ends
The first version of the chamfered rail ends (Figure 4.3) used a single chamfer in a diagonal
plane, such that the movable female element would self-align and self-lock upon the male
element when lowered. The fixed half is shaped such that foreign objects would be shed,
minimising blockages. The rail end is relatively short and (ideally) standardised such that
spares can be held which is different to replacing existing long, planed-down switch rails
(Section 2.2.2.1). During development it was noted that excessive rail creep or thermal
expansion may lead to a vertical step in the railhead or a gap in the running rails;. It would
therefore fail to meet Requirement 1 in Table 3.1.
Figure 4.3 Diagonal chamfer mating rail ends - photograph of prototyped mock-up.
4.3.3.2 Double chamfer mating rail ends
This refined design combines chamfers in two planes, as per Figures 4.4 and 4.5. The
longitudinal chamfer locks and locates the rails, allowing an amount of expansion or con-
traction of the switch rails without introducing a vertical step. The chamfer in the vertical
plane allows a gradual load transfer from one element to the other as each wheelset passes,
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as in an expansion switch (British Railways, 1962, 1965). These refinements overcome
earlier functional deficiencies in order to meet requirements. It is noted that additional sup-
port/strengthening may be required at the rail ends; support conditions and vehicle dynamics
are the subject of further study (Sarmiento-Carnevali et al., 2017a). This support could con-
sist of full section rails connected to the bearers outboard of the moveable ends to ensure
stability and consistency of deflection under load.
Figure 4.4 Double chamfer interlocking rail ends. Holes are shown for bolted mounting
though units could be welded.
Figure 4.5 Double chamfer interlocking rail end mock-ups as fitted to laboratory demon-
strator.
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4.3.4 Maintenance considerations
With design, redundant systems can continue to function until repair is effected. Concep-
tually, it is proposed that the functional elements take the form of LRUs (Line Replaceable
Units). LRUs, rather than being repaired, maintained or adjusted track-side, can simply be
replaced with a known-good unit. The removed unit may subsequently be maintained or
repaired in the background. For examples explored in Chapter 5, the LRUs may either be at
the subsystem level, or at the POE level, depending upon the redundancy architecture cho-
sen. The maintenance organisation would then have the choice of when to intervene, based
upon a target reliability, availability or service pattern (Section 2.4.3.4). This concept has
important implications in Section 5.6 in particular, as LRU replacement time becomes an
important variable in availability modelling. A value of 2 minutes scheduled unavailability
has been suggested as a target for this action; this value was suggested by Network Rail as
being a typical service ‘firebreak’ (Section 2.4.1.5) meaning that maintenance actions could
occur without disruption to the timetable.
4.3.5 Other considerations
The novel motion has other potential benefits. In existing switches, slide chairs provide a
low-friction surface for the movable switch rails, in addition to providing vertical support
for the switch rail vehicle load. However, these plates are exposed to the elements and
friction related failures are a significant source of unreliability (Chapter 5). The Repoint
actuation path enables the separation of bearing surfaces required for switch movement and
vehicle support, meaning the movement bearings can be sealed and properly lubricated. The
design also makes stretcher bars obsolete; rail gauge is maintained by standard sleeper tops,
plates, and rail clips. Stretchers are a one reason some traditional designs do not meet all
functional requirements, (Section 3.3.2) and a significant source of unreliability. The upper
locking element can have unique cut-outs for each route through the switch, enabling the
track to adopt a differential cant for each route, allowing a higher traffic speed (Section
4.5.2).
4.4 Fulfilling the functional requirements
4.4.1 Systems context diagram and primary use case
Figure 4.6 shows subsystem interactions within the Repoint concept. Compared to those
presented in Chapter 3, the locking system is no longer separate; it is passive and part of
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the Actuation subsystems. The Actuation and Detection systems are multi-channel redun-
dant. Figure 4.7 illustrates the subset of the subsystem interaction diagram which forms the
primary use case, that of the signaller operating the switch and receiving feedback of its
position; the switch subsequently supporting and guiding vehicles.
4.4.2 Comparison to functional requirements
Referring to the functional requirements (Section 3.2.2), it is postulated that the Repoint
solution can meet all requirements, exceeding the extent to which existing systems meet
requirements, as follows:
1. Adequately support and guide all passing vehicles:
(a) The solution is constructed of the same rail as surrounding plain line.
(b) Dynamic loading should be reduced due to the track alignment through the
switch being of full-section rails.
(c) The solution has full-section rail throughout, accurately aligned at each sleeper/bearer,
exactly as for plain-line, including cant.
(d) (1b) means that wear could be reduced. The wear element is now the inter-
changeable and standardised chamfered rail end, rather than long switch rails.
Wear can be managed as the rail ends are replaceable as a short pair.
2. Direct vehicles along the path specified by the interlocking:
(a) The switch can move to a new route when commanded, however it can always
form a route when commanded due to the multiplicity of actuators.
(b) The concept can switch at an acceptable rate as actuators do not have to be sized
to overcome variable friction; energy is stored in the rails, which may be used to
assist in the motion for the second half of the throw. (Section 4.5)
(c) The locking elements of each bearer ensure the switch remains locked on a single
route for traffic until commanded otherwise. The switch is not able to move
under the mass of a train, as the mass acts downwards and thus further locks the
switch. It eradicates the ambiguous failure state between routes.
3. Confirm to the interlocking the route vehicles will be directed along, and that all active
elements are safe for the vehicle to pass:
(a) Limit switches can provide confirmation to the interlocking that each bearer is
in a given lowered position, and therefore which route is set.
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Figure 4.6 Systems context diagram for ‘Repoint’. Note multiple, redundant systems per-
forming the same task internally. Condition monitoring is integral.
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Figure 4.7 Primary use case for ‘Repoint’ system - subsystems directly providing the ability
for the primary actor to direct a train and receive confirmation.
(b) The local condition monitoring processor can determine if there is an issue pre-
venting a route being set through comparing signals, and indicate such to the
operator. The incidence of ‘unable to set’ is likely to be reduced due to the
parallel-channel actuation and reduced chance of blockages (Chapter 5).
4. Provide information to maintenance organisations regarding the future projected abil-
ity to perform requirements (2) and (3):
(a) Condition monitoring, for the function of the multiply-redundant actuation, could
monitor wear. A high false positive rate can be of lesser significance with a
multi-channel system, easing the task of condition monitoring (Hecht, 2004).
(b) Lineside processing could communicate switch prognosis.
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(c) As above.
(d) Redundant elements enable a higher level of operational reliability and avail-
ability to be achieved.
(e) Redundant channels mean the active elements of the switch are fault tolerant,
providing the opportunity for maintenance to be carried out in existing down-
time. LRU’s mean that maintenance tasks performed track-side are reduced in
time.
4.5 Modelling concept feasibility
Before any further development work, it is important to establish the mechanical feasibility
of the concept, which is the purpose of the remainder of this chapter. The work herein does
not seek to create a fully developed model of the Repoint concept. Its purpose is purely to
establish that there are no serious flaws with the concept with regards the areas modelled.
Further modelling work, including dynamic simulation and stresses due to traffic, would be
required at a later stage in development. Four key factors which may prevent feasibility were
identified (numbering corresponds to the research map in Figure 1.3) and are addressed in
turn:
1. Static rail shape in the horizontal plane being unsuitable for the passage of traffic.
2. Bending the rails in the vertical plane requiring an actuator size, power consumption
or time greater than practicable.
3. Bending the rails in the vertical plane placing too great a stress upon the rails.
4. Long-term longitudinal movement of the free rail being too large to be accommodated
by the proposed rail end interface.
It is important to note that whilst these factors view the switch in isolation, clearly the
interaction of the switch and vehicle, and behaviour of the switch under the vehicle, is also
of prime concern to concept feasibility. Modelling interaction with vehicles was carried out
as part of the wider research work (Sarmiento-Carnevali et al., 2017b), but was not wholly
the work of the author and is therefore excluded from this thesis.
4.5.1 Modelling rail flexure
Central to establishing (1-3) is the modelling of rail flexure; described in this section. The
rail bending model is validated against a switch model created using commercial FEA soft-
ware.
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4.5.1.1 Modelling approach
The modelling of switch rail flexure across all switch types is complicated by many factors.
Typically, commercial FEA (Finite Element Analysis) software is used to model a rail as
a solid before applying forces to discern relative displacements along the rail length - or
vice-versa. Such software includes Nastran, NX and CATIA. However, this necessitates
a labour-intensive process of model definition, performing the task at each rail position
in the actuation path for the desired granularity, repeated for each switch length and rail
cross-section. A basic FEM would also not simulate any of the dynamic effects present
in the system – e.g. acceleration of the rail. Another approach is to use MBS (Multi-
Body Simulation) software, e.g. SIMPACK. MBS packages can simulate interacting flexible
bodies under the influence of external forces. However, model set up times are even longer
than FEM, MBS relying upon an FEM mesh. As the goal of this modelling is to rapidly
establish forces, shapes and power requirements across a range of design options, a more
rapid and easily user-adjustable approach was required; a relatively simple beam bending
model was therefore created from first principles using MATLAB.
4.5.1.2 Variable-section rail flexure model
Figure 4.8 shows the nomenclature and co-ordinate system for this section. The MATLAB
model is based around an iterative, two-dimensional finite element solver. The solver re-
quires a single proscribed x,z or y,z position, through which the rail, treated as a beam, must
pass. The solver then iterates to find the x or y forces which must be applied at a given z
position to bring about this rail position. Outputs can be specified, and can include arrays
defining the x or y displacement, slope, curvature etc of all beam elements in z. The reso-
lution of the solver and granularity of the elements (dz) in the beam can be user-specified.
Rails are described through discrete arrays of element length dz which describe masses, in-
cluding point masses (e.g shuttles) (Me(z)), second moment of intertia Ixx(z), Iyy(z), and any
other external forces, e.g. back-drives (Fe(z)).
The solver assumes small bending angles only (i.e. constant beam span), and has several
limitations. Firstly, the beam is not prevented from bending into the negative y direction at
any point other than the proscribed x,y,z position, therefore vertical results (y) must be
manually checked to ensure beam position is positive throughout; additional ‘back-drive’
actuators being required if this is not the case. Friction in the interaction of rails and shuttles
is not simulated, nor is that upon slide chairs for beam elements remaining at y = 0; however
as the goal is to lift the rail throughout, this is only a limitation when using the model for
traditional switches. The solver can be wrapped in a range of scripts, described in each
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Figure 4.8 Beam bending model - elements and nomenclature.
relevant section below. Further scripts were developed for traditional switch geometries for
comparative assessments, but are only used for model validation herein.
w(z) =
((
−Me(z)×Ae(z)
)
+Fe(z)
)
× l
dz
(4.1)
v(z) =
∫ l
0
w(z)dz (4.2)
M(z) =
∫ l
0
v(z)dz (4.3)
θx(z) =
∫ l
0
M(z)
EIxx(z)
dz (4.4)
θy(z) =
∫ l
0
M(z)
EIyy(z)
dz (4.5)
x(z) =
∫ l
0
θx(z)dz (4.6)
y(z) =
∫ l
0
θy(z)dz (4.7)
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The solver makes use of the direct integration method of the Euler beam bending equa-
tions (Hibbeler, 2005) using discrete beam elements of a single, fixed cantilever, illustrated
in Figure 4.8. The direct integration method takes, for each element, a force w expressed in
kN/m, as per equation 4.1. Equation 4.2 integrates w in z, to give the internal shear force
present in the beam at a given element, v, in N. The integration constant is the variable force
to be calculated to give a target displacement, F . Integrating again in Equation 4.3 gives
the internal moment, M; the constant of integration is 0 as there is no externally applied
moment. Dividing by beam stiffness, EI(z) and integrating again, as in Equations 4.4 and
4.5 for x and y respectively, gives the angle of rotation of the beam (θ ), expressed as a
slope (i.e length per length, and therefore unity); the constant of integration is initial slope
at z = 0 :- 0. A final, further integration in Equations 4.6 and 4.7 gives displacement in x or
y respectively; the constant of integration is displacement at z = 0 and therefore also 0. For
variable section rails (e.g. traditional switches), Ixx and Iyy need to be calculated from beam
cross sections, provided in, for example, RE/PW/807 (Section 2.2.2.1), with interpolation
along z where necessary. For constant section elements, rail manufacturers provide Ixx and
Iyy values which can simply be doubled to allow for 2 rails.
4.5.1.3 Model validation
Description Symbol Value Unit Source / notes
Young’s modulus, mild steel E 210×109 N/m2 (Vitaly et al., 2016)
Density, mild steel ρ 7820 kg/m3 (Vitaly et al., 2016)
Shuttle Masses MSx 0 kg Assumed 0 to verify rail model in isolation
Cam Radius r 57.5 mm Resultant toe opening of 115mm
Switch moveable length l 8.9 m RE/PW/807 (CVS Specification)
Rail neutral offset N 0 mm i.e. ‘Y-switch’
Actuator location in z (FAB3) 8.9 m i.e. actuator at toes
Second moment of inertia (Horizontal) Ixx Variable cm4 Linear interpolation of sections in RE/PW/807
Second moment of inertia (Vertical) Iyy Variable cm4 Linear interpolation of sections in RE/PW/807
Rail Mass MR Variable kg/m Linear interpolation of sections in RE/PW/807
Table 4.1 Parameters used in the validation of the variable-section rail flexure model.
The model was validated against a CATIA model produced by an appointed third party
with FEA capability (Corbin, 2016), as in Figure 4.9 for static forces and resultant torque
for a single actuator force (FAB1). Comparative results are listed in Table 4.2 and illustrated
in Figure 4.10.
Results show residual error between the two models is small. Due to the smaller magni-
tude of forces in x, this translates to a larger percentage error, but the resolution to a torque
value negates this with residual torque error between the two models being a maximum of
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Figure 4.9 Screenshot from CATIA FEA analysis provided by Motion Concepts Ltd.
Source: (Corbin, 2016)
Figure 4.10 Plots of rail flexure model validation data from Table 4.2. Top left: force in x
and y; Bottom left: force error in x and y. Top right: torque; Bottom right: torque error.
10Nm on a peak torque of 215Nm. Possible error causes are different meshing methods;
CATIA selects a variable element size, and also interpolates on cross section to ascertain an
accurate Ixx and Iyy value, whereas the MATLAB model assumes linear interpolation. Peak
error is small with regards to maximum values and proportional error large only at very
small force values, which are not the values which will define performance of the switch.
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Cam Angle MATLAB CATIA Error (Abs) Error (Proportional)
FAB1(x) FAB1(y) Torque FAB1(x) FAB1(y) Torque FAB1(x) FAB1(y) Torque FAB1(x) FAB1(y) Torque
Deg N N Nm N N Nm N N Nm % % %
0 -431 3607 207 -542 3680 212 111 -73 -4 20.5 2.0 2.0
10 -424 3873 215 -549 3927 217 125 -54 -2 22.7 1.4 0.8
20 -405 4131 215 -542 4168 215 137 -37 1 25.3 0.9 0.3
30 -373 4373 207 -521 4388 204 148 -15 4 28.4 0.3 1.7
40 -330 4592 190 -485 4585 184 155 7 6 32.0 0.2 3.3
50 -277 4781 165 -438 4751 156 161 30 8 36.7 0.6 5.2
60 -215 4934 131 -379 4883 122 164 51 10 43.2 1.1 7.9
70 -147 5047 91 -311 4975 81 163 72 10 52.6 1.5 12.6
80 -75 5117 47 -235 5027 37 161 90 10 68.2 1.8 27.1
90 0 5140 0 -155 5035 -9 155 105 9 100.0 2.1 100
100 75 5117 -47 -72 4999 -54 147 118 7 203.9 2.4 13.2
110 147 5047 -91 11 4919 -96 136 128 5 1239 2.6 5.0
120 215 4934 -131 91 4801 -133 124 133 2 136.7 2.8 1.8
130 277 4781 -165 167 4645 -164 110 136 0 65.8 2.9 0.1
140 330 4592 -190 234 4459 -188 96 133 -2 41.0 3.0 1.2
150 373 4373 -207 293 4247 -203 80 126 -4 27.2 3.0 2.0
160 405 4131 -215 340 4013 -210 65 118 -5 19.1 2.9 2.4
170 424 3873 -215 375 3766 -210 49 107 -6 13.0 2.8 2.7
180 431 3607 -207 397 3517 -202 34 90 -5 8.5 2.6 2.6
Table 4.2 Variable section rail flexure model validation results
4.5.2 Static turnout rail profiles
This section establishes that the running rail geometry for the turnout route is generally
comparable to existing turnout geometries. It does not seek to optimise the turnout profile;
an entire research field in itself (Section 2.2.3.2). The work in this section corresponds to
item 1 in Figure 1.3.
4.5.2.1 Toe offset, cam radius and switch lengths
Figure 4.11 Rail end toe offset and cams nomenclature.
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Figure 4.12 Calculation of slope at given offset for a given curve radius. Not to scale.
Figure 4.11 shows the nomenclature of the toe offset and cam radius calculations. As the
passive locking concept requires vertical movement at the beginning and end of the stroke,
the cam must move the rail through a 180°motion, defining offset as 2r (Equation 4.8),
and peak rail lift during motion H as r, (Equation 4.9). Assuming a railhead width Wh of
69.85mm (BS113a rail (Steel, 2014)), and a required clear flangeway of Wf as 50mm (as
per RE/PW/807), rail end offset is 119.85mm; r is therefore approximated as 60mm.
To establish whether it is possible to flex a full section rail within the approximate en-
velope of existing designs, the length of rail where the curve intersects with a traditional
switch rail at the 120mm offset point, with equal slope γ , needs to be established. Flexure
only needs considering to this point. Beyond this, in the fixed section, rails can be positively
constrained by sole plates. Analysis is performed for each switch size in RE/PW 807 (B-H),
from which the diagram of switch curvature is reproduced in Figure 4.13. In all cases, γ , the
slope at the 120mm offset, falls in the ‘R2’ constant radius section, simplifying calculation
of γ and ltangential to trigonometry as in Figure 4.12 and Equations 4.10 and 4.11. In order to
calculate the Repoint ‘natural’ beam length, equations derived from the integrals presented
in Equations 4.1 to 4.7 can be used, valid under the assumption of constant section only.
Equations 4.12 and 4.13 describe displacement and slope at the beam tip, for a given ap-
plied point force P at that tip. These can be combined, the force terms cancelling out, to
give Equation 4.14, which expresses the natural beam length lrepoint in terms of cam radius r
and desired intersection slope γ . Results are presented in Table 4.3, and the relative lengths
of the different designs in Figure 4.14.
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Switch Design Speed Switch Radii 120mm offset: Moveable Length
R1 R2 γ γ ltangential NR V NR I lrepoint
mph m/s m m ° m per m m m m m
B 20 8.94 230.725 184.012 2.069 0.0361 6.644 7.480 n/a 1 4.982
C 25 11.18 287.251 245.767 1.791 0.0313 7.679 8.900 10.580 5.758
D 30 13.41 367.038 331.687 1.541 0.0269 8.921 9.610 11.230 6.690
E 40 17.88 739.696 645.116 1.105 0.0193 12.442 12.480 14.480 9.331
F 50 22.35 1137.067 980.92 0.896 0.0156 15.343 13.900 17.080 11.507
SG 60 26.82 1398.518 1263.74 0.790 0.0138 17.415 16.740 20.330 13.061
G 70 31.29 1826.293 1650.38 0.691 0.0121 19.902 19.580 22.280 14.926
H 90 40.23 3000.716 3000.716 0.512 0.0089 26.836 25.545 30.080 20.126
Table 4.3 Comparison of existing and Repoint ‘Natural’ switch rail lengths. 1 ‘B’ switch
deprecated for NR Inclined series switches.
2r =Wh +Wf (4.8)
r =
Wh +Wf
2
(4.9)
Ltangential =
√
R2− (R−2r)2 (4.10)
γ =Cos−1
(R−2r
R
)
(4.11)
2r =
Pl3repoint
3EIxx
(4.12)
γ =
Pl2repoint
2EIxx
(4.13)
lrepoint =
3r
γ
(4.14)
It can be seen from Table 4.3 and Figure 4.14 that in each case, the Repoint natural
flexing length is shorter than the equivalent NR-V or NR-I design, indicating the approach
is feasible from a moveable length perspective. However, it is also important to establish
that the deviation of the switch rails from the ‘ideal’ curve required by traffic is acceptable.
4.5.2.2 Stub rail profile vs traditional switches
This section compares typical deviations from ‘perfect’ shown by traditional switches and
potential stub layouts to establish that the stub approach is within reasonable bounds. Sec-
tion 2.2.3.2 established that geometry through traditional switches is compromised. For
tangential switches, geometry is illustrated in Figure 4.13, which shows a disjointed switch
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Figure 4.13 Tangential switch geometry for BVS-GVS (top) and HVS (bottom) switch de-
signs. Not to scale. Reproduced from RE/PW/807 (Network Rail).
entry angle α . Despite known negative effects of this disjoint upon vehicle dynamics, it is
accepted to enable manufacture. Tangential geometry in NR-V series switches is defined
by several abutted radii (R1, R2), presented in Table 4.3. NR-I series switches use an ap-
proximated transition curve on switch entry, necessitating longer switch rails, but still apply
‘switch toe tangent’ for manufacturing reasons. In a stub switch, there can be no entry angle;
flexing full-section rails does not allow instantaneous changes in curvature or slope, leading
to deviations from both the curvature of traditional switches and ‘ideal’ plain-line curves.
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Figure 4.14 Moveable rail lengths vs switch design speed for NR-V and NR-I switches;
including tangential natural length and Repoint natural length for r = 60mm, from Table
4.3.
The variable section bending model was used with full section rail of lengths specified
in Table 4.3. The required outputs were displacement and slope at peak bend in x, and tip
displacement of 120mm. These profiles were then plotted with the ‘ideal’ and as-designed
NR-V tangential switches. The output of this comparison, for B, F and H switches only (for
space reasons), is shown in Figure 4.15. Figures 4.16 and 4.17 illustrate relative error from
the perfect curve for displacement and slope for all GB switch sizes.
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Figure 4.15 Offset and slope of perfect tangential, NR-V and Repoint ‘natural’ stub switch
layouts for B (20mph), F (50mph) and H (90mph) switches.
4.5.2.3 Analysis
• It can be observed from Figure 4.15 that the natural curves obviate the need for a
defined switch entry angle, providing smoother entry. However, there is instead an
instantaneous change in curvature (rate of change of slope) at the root of the flexible
beam, to a curve with smaller radius, this curvature reducing to infinite radius at the
tip. This change is the opposite to an ideal entry transition curve, where radius reduces
with distance from entry.
• Whilst removal of the entry angle may improve ride dynamics at that point, the ef-
fects of the curve remain unknown as is is not a geometry currently found on the
infrastructure. Whilst ride quality is strongly influenced by jerk, there are many other
contributory variables in the wheel rail interface which would need significant further
modelling to understand. Further analysis is therefore necessary.
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Figure 4.16 Displacement error vs length for NR-V (Solid) and Repoint (Dot-dash) natural
switches from B-H sizes. Error is considered linear offset difference from ‘perfect tangential
curve’.
Figure 4.17 Slope error vs length for NR-V (Solid) and Repoint (Dot-dash) natural switches
from B-H sizes.
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• It should be noted that this ‘reverse transition’ curve may be more suited to some
situations; often switches turn onto straight track, the natural curve in this instance
providing an approximated curve exit transition.
• A pattern emerges in the displacement error in Figure 4.16 in that Repoint error is
limited in all cases to around 12mm. NR-V error reaches a peak of around 6.7mm
in the ‘B’ switch, and smaller for increasing switch size, Repoint ‘natural’ error is
therefore twice traditional; though this in itself is not significant as dynamics are
governed by a number of factors including rate of change of cant deficiency and lateral
acceleration.
• Repoint slope error is of the same magnitude as traditional throughout, though there
is a greater spread of error in positive/negative which may have a detrimental effect.
• From a feasibility perspective, this analysis shows that deviations when bending full-
section rail stubs are within reasonable approximation of traditional switches. Some
unknowns remain regarding particular rail geometries. If future analysis reveals that
the profile of the turnout route needs to be modified, this could be achieved by stiff-
ening (i.e. adding material or an alternate rail profile) or encouraging bending (e.g.
flange relief) in key locations. The variable section rail bending model described in
Section 4.5.1 is ideal for rapidly iterating designs in future work.
4.5.2.4 Increased traffic speeds
One conclusion from the geometry study above is that a shorter natural curve, removal of
the switch entry angle and the ability to apply cant throughout the turnout may allow traffic
speeds to be increased. This was later confirmed by a third party report, commissioned to
examine geometry in Repoint switches compared with traditional (Foan, 2014), quantifica-
tions from which are replicated in Table 4.4. This forms an important input to the capacity
modelling exercise in Chapter 6. Further modelling work on ride dynamics, based upon
(Foan, 2014), is the subject of later collaborative publication (Sarmiento-Carnevali et al.,
2017b).
4.5.3 Actuation time and energy use requirements
This section explores the actuation time and energy use of the Repoint switch. Switch sizes
from previous sections will be used with the moveable length assumed as the natural length
(Table 4.3). The energy use is defined as that required by the moveable elements, with the
actuator-bearer treated as a ‘black box’.
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Size Traditional design Repoint (clothoidal) Improvement
mph m/s mph m/s %
B 20.00 8.89 25.86 11.50 29.3
C 25.00 11.11 29.89 13.29 19.6
D 30.00 13.33 34.72 15.43 15.7
E 40.00 17.78 48.43 21.52 21.1
F 50.00 22.22 59.72 26.54 19.4
SG 60.00 26.67 67.78 30.12 13.0
G 70.00 31.11 77.46 34.43 10.7
H 90.00 40.00 104.44 46.42 16.0
Table 4.4 Increased turnout road speeds through use of clothoidal transitions and cant
through stub layouts, compared to range of standard switch sizes, excerpt from (Foan, 2014).
Figure 4.18 Equilibrium horizontal and vertical forces, resolved to a torque, for a Repoint
stub C-switch natural length, with single actuator at tip of moveable length.
Figure 4.18, generated from the MATLAB model, shows equilibrium forces in x and y,
resolved to cam torque (Figure 4.11), for a Repoint C-Switch. Forces vary linearly with
beam displacement in x and y, as expected. When resolved to a torque upon the actuator
cam, two distinct phases occur. In the first phase, the torque required is positive, indicating a
net energy input to the system, as energy is being stored in the rail as gravitational potential
energy and as spring energy. For the second phase, torque becomes negative, as the stored
energy is released. When the cam is at, or near, top-dead-centre, there is comparatively little
torque required, and a point where all forces in the system balance at around 105°. This has
several implications:
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• Energy input required for actuation is concentrated in the first half of the stroke.
• In the second phase, there is an opportunity for regenerative braking to recover energy.
The actuator may be required to function as a brake so as to prevent heavy impacts.
This means an element of active control is necessary.
• Assuming regenerative braking, net energy use for a single operation is small, and
recoverable from the opposing swing (by also recovering the stored horizontal spring
energy over an N-R R-N cycle).
• The above is also true of traditional switches under a zero friction assumption. How-
ever, in the Repoint case, friction is managed in sealed bearings in the mechanism,
specified for the motion, rather than on open-to-elements slide chairs.
• Peak torque in Figure 4.18 is not indicative of peak or mean power - this plot does
not account for dynamic load. The opportunity exists to optimise the power profile to
remove potential peaks - but in order to establish feasibility, it is instead important to
calculate mean power.
• When establishing mean power, the two phases of the motion need to be considered
in isolation.
4.5.3.1 Energy transfers during switch actuation
Total energy transferred in each phase can be calculated using knowledge of the beam shape
and classic mechanics formulae. Considering the flexing switch rail as a closed system, in
the first phase, there are three energy transfers (Equation 4.15):
• GPE (Gravitational potential energy):- Energy is required to lift the mass of the rails,
shuttles and fixings to top-dead-centre.
• EPE (Elastic potential energy):- Energy is input to bend the rail in the vertical. If the
switch is moving from straight to turnout, then energy is also required to bend the rail
in the horizontal. Otherwise, energy is released from the straightening horizontal.
• KE (Kinetic energy):- Energy is required to accelerate the switch rails to a velocity at
which they are able to complete the move in the specified time.
And in the second phase:
• GPE:- Energy is released from the falling mass of rails, shuttles and fixings.
• EPE:- Energy is released from the bend in the vertical. If the switch is moving from
straight to turnout, energy is required to bend the rail in the horizontal. Otherwise,
energy is released from the straightening horizontal.
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• KE:- Energy is released in decelerating the switch rails to a stop - ideally a dead stop
at opposite register to prevent damage2.
Etotal = GPE +EPE +KE (4.15)
GPE = mgh (4.16)
k =
F
x
(4.17)
EPE =
kx2
2
(4.18)
KE =
mv2
2
(4.19)
v =
2π×0.0586
t
(4.20)
GPE Energy required to raise a mass m to given height h is given in Equation 4.16, where
g is acceleration due to gravity (9.81m/s2). As this is a linear relationship, and the rail
follows a curved profile, mean rail height can be used. Vertical beam profile is an output
provided by the beam flexure model which indicates mean lift is 0.0226m for a B switch;
this figure will be assumed throughout to remove complications from longer back-driven
switches. Additional masses needs to be added to allow for the shuttle elements.
EPE Energy stored in a spring is a function of spring constant k, which can be calculated
from force and displacement as in Equation 4.17; the spring constant is unique to each
beam length. Force and displacement are obtained from the MATLAB model in both x
and y. Equation 4.18 defines the energy required to bend a spring of given spring constant
k a given distance x. In this instance the figures used for k and x are tip flexure, though
equivalents could be taken from any point on the beam length.
KE Energy required to accelerate/decelerate a mass m to/from a given speed v is given in
Equation 4.19. To estimate beam velocity, it is assumed that for the first phase, the beam is
linearly accelerated to peak angular velocity at top-dead-centre, (where velocity is entirely
in x), and linearly decelerated to a stop in the second phase. Peak velocity for each point on
the length of the beam is therefore twice mean velocity. Though mean lift is 0.0226m, due
to the squared term in the KE function an RMS value of beam shape must instead be used,
obtained from the MATLAB model as 0.0586m, giving mean beam travel over the 180 °arc
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Switch Length Mass Peak forces Spring Constants First Phase Second Phase
l m Fx Fy kx ky EPEx EPEy GPE KE Total Power EPEx EPEy GPE KE Total Power
m kg N N N/m N/m J J J J J w J J J J J w
B 4.982 558.0 4886 13449 40718 224157 73.3 403.5 256.1 0.6 733.5 489.0 73.3 -403.5 -256.1 -0.6 -586.9 -391.3
C 5.758 644.9 3128 8609 26064 143488 46.9 258.3 275.4 0.7 581.3 387.5 46.9 -258.3 -275.4 -0.7 -487.4 -325.0
D 6.690 749.3 2028 5581 16897 93020 30.4 167.4 298.6 0.7 497.1 331.4 30.4 -167.4 -298.6 -0.7 -436.3 -290.9
E 9.331 1045.1 757 2084 6310 34738 11.4 62.5 364.1 1.0 439.0 292.7 11.4 -62.5 -364.1 -1.0 -416.3 -277.5
F 11.507 1288.8 400 1102 3335 18361 6.0 33.0 418.2 1.2 458.4 305.6 6.0 -33.0 -418.2 -1.2 -446.4 -297.6
SG 13.061 1462.8 273 752 2276 12532 4.1 22.6 456.8 1.3 484.7 323.1 4.1 -22.6 -456.8 -1.3 -476.5 -317.7
G 14.926 1671.7 184 506 1533 8437 2.8 15.2 503.1 1.4 522.5 348.3 2.8 -15.2 -503.1 -1.4 -516.9 -344.6
H 20.126 2254.1 75 206 624 3435 1.1 6.2 632.2 1.9 641.4 427.6 1.1 -6.2 -632.2 -1.9 -639.1 -426.1
Table 4.5 Energy transfers in 3 second Repoint actuation by switch length, from straight to
curved route. Results include 75kg allowance per shuttle. Positive energy transfer indicates
work done on the switch.
Switch B C D E F SG G H
Actuation Time, t (s) 0.404 0.341 0.312 0.304 0.322 0.339 0.361 0.427
Table 4.6 Minimum Repoint actuation times for a 1000W power supply.
as 0.184m, and peak speed at top-dead centre defined by Equation 4.20 (where t is switch
actuation time).
4.5.3.2 Concept feasibility results
Selected results from calculations are presented in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.19, which assume
a 3 second switch actuation time. Power available track-side is established in Section 2.4.2
as 1000W continuous (Network Rail, 2006; Simmons, 2001). In shorter switches, EPE
is the dominant contributor, whereas in longer designs GPE becomes dominant. KE has
a negligible influence throughout due to the relatively low velocity. The highest power
requirement in the range is the B-size switch, at 489W, falling to just 293W for the E-
size. It can be observed in all cases that mean power is below the typical amount provided
trackside. All switch lengths are therefore deemed feasible at a comparable switching time
as existing, using existing power supplies, even allowing for losses of up to 50%.
4.5.3.3 Improved switching time
Sections 2.4.1.5 and 2.4.2 identify the time taken to actuate the switch as a key contributor
to capacity loss at junctions. Section 4.5.3.1 identifies an opportunity to provide regener-
ation in the second part of the motion. With regeneration, it is surmised that a line-side
energy store could provide for the first phase of actuation, to be partially replenished by the
negative transfer in the second. In this case, mean power use becomes the energy lost by
the system in a full actuation cycle. To estimate losses, knowledge of the particular actuator
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Figure 4.19 Energy transfers in 3 second Repoint actuation by switch length, from straight to
curved route, from results in Table 4.5. Top: First (rising) phase. Bottom: Second (falling)
phase.
and transmission efficiency is required; the transmission efficieny from the Repoint labo-
ratory demonstrator (Section 7.4.4) will be used as a basis for this, approximated here as
0.75. Figure 4.20 is a contour plot of external power requirement for each switch length and
switching time. At much reduced actuation times (i.e. under 0.5s), KE quickly becomes the
dominant and limiting factor due to the v2 term. Table 4.6 indicates actuation time achiev-
able assuming a 1000W supply limit (Network Rail, 2006; Simmons, 2001). These figures
do not consider whether an actuator/transmission to provide such an energy transfer is a
practical proposition; actuator sizing is explored in Chapter 7. Table 4.6 forms an important
input to capacity calculations in Chapter 6.
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Figure 4.20 Contour plot showing power input required (Watts) for a given actuation time
upon a given turnout route speed.
4.5.4 Stress and fatigue in rails during vertical flexure
Stress is a function of beam curvature and material properties. The shorter the switch,
the greater the curvature, therefore the greater the stress. The ‘B’ size switch will there-
fore be evaluated, assuming a natural bending length of 4.982m from Table 4.3, that the
beam is full-section 56lb rail, and that material is linear-elastic (i.e. Hooke’s law applies).
Material furthest from the neutral axis undergoes greatest stress as it has the greatest exten-
sion/compression per unit length (Equation 4.22). The equation relating stress and strain
is given in 4.21. Stress is defined as the force per unit area of material; in order to avoid
permanent disfigurement, stress imposed on the rail should be significantly less than the
compressive/tensile yield strength of 540MPa (Vitaly et al., 2016). The neutral axis of the
rail is identified as 82.17mm from the crown of the rail (Cornish, 2014). Fatigue failure,
which is the structural failure of the material after repeated loading cycles, is another con-
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Figure 4.21 Stress and strain in rail from vertical flexure (not to scale).
sideration. In order to prevent fatigue failure over an infinite number of cycles, the stress
must not exceed the material’s Se value, which for undamaged steel is equal to 290MPa -
half the ultimate tensile strength (Beer et al., 1992).
E =
σ
ε
(4.21)
ε =
dle
le
(4.22)
∴ σ = dleE
le
(4.23)
For this calculation, the beam bending model was used to define the curvature of the
‘B’ size switch in the vertical plane at maximum lift - i.e. ω = 90 (Figure 4.21). Peak
curvature in this case occurs at the beam root, a conclusion confirmed by the B-switch
slope plot (curvature is gradient of slope) in Figure 4.15. The curvature at this location
has a vertical radius of 138168m, equating to a strain ε in compression of (rail head) and
elongation (rail foot) of −5.947×10−7 and 5.543×10−7 respectively. This in turn equates
to a peak compressive stress of 124.9 MPa, and peak tensile stress of 116.4 MPa. It
can be observed that the peak stress from the Repoint vertical bending occurs in the rail
head, and is circa 23% of the yield strength. It should be reiterated that this is an absolute
worst-case scenario, with the smallest bending radius in the family of standard switch sizes,
and full-section rail throughout. Performing the same calculations for a ‘C’ switch, for
example, shows peak compressive stress in the rail head as reducing to 93.5 MPa, and for
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an ‘E’, 35.6 MPa. From a feasibility perspective, stress in the rail is therefore considered
manageable. From a fatigue perspective, all stress values are significantly less than the Se
value of 290MPa, and fatigue in the rail is therefore considered manageable. However, the
quoted Se value is for undamaged material, and damaged material may have an Se value
significantly lower (Beer et al., 1992). It may therefore be necessary to regularly inspect the
stub switch rails. This is not considered onerous, as it is already standard practice for all
plain-line rails.
4.5.5 Longitudinal rail movement calculation
Rail temperature fluctuates with the environmental temperature. In continuously-welded rail
this variation is unable to expand/contract the rail due to pre-stress (Network Rail, 2012b).
However, pre-stress cannot be applied to switch rails as they are longitudinally unrestrained
at the toes. The same applies at the the movable section of a stub switch, though the effect
is more critical; difficulty managing movement is one factor preventing the widespread use
of stub switches. An additional complication is long-term rail creep, managed in traditional
switches by a ‘ball and claw’ arrangement (Ciobanu and Nogy, 2017; Morgan, 2009). Con-
ceptually, the double chamfer rail end (Figure 4.4) can accommodate longitudinal move-
ment. With a practical upper limit on movement set by the pitch of bearers, typically at
0.65m centres (Esveld, 2001; Network Rail, 2010a), it is unlikely expanding/contracting
rail would be able to remove or refit itself from/to a second bearer. If both sides of the
switch are unstressed (Figure 4.22), the practical upper limit is half this.
Figure 4.22 Longitudinal stress and expansion zones of traditional switch and stub switch.
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Variable Symbol Value Unit Source
Rail Stress-free temperature TSF 24 °C 21 °C - 27 °C allowable (Network Rail, 2012b)
Rail Minimum temperature Tmin -20 °C Approximated
Rail Maximum temperature Tmax 50 °C Approximated (Max. ambient + 10 °C)
Thermal expansion coefficient (mild steel) α 1.25× 10 −05 m/m C (Network Rail, 2012b)
Ball and Claw fixed tolerance (+/-) LBC 7× 10 −03 m (Ciobanu and Nogy, 2017)
Stress Transition Length (max) LST 90 m (Ciobanu and Nogy, 2017)
Free Movement Length LFM Various m Table 4.3
Table 4.7 Variables used to calculate rail longitudinal movement and thermal expansion.
To establish feasibility, it is necessary to ensure that the maximum longitudinal variation
(∆L) is below this upper limit. It is assumed creep (LBC) is managed as in traditional designs
in each fixed half. Temperature will influence rail length over the free stub ends (LFM) and
over the stress transition zones (LST ) (Ciobanu and Nogy, 2017). Using the formulae in
Equations 4.24, 4.25 and 4.26, with parameters in Table 4.7, expansion from stress-free
(∆LT max), contraction from stress-free (∆LT min) and total size change (∆L) are tabulated for
each common switch size in Table 4.8. ∆L is below the ceiling in each worst-case; switch
size has minimal influence as the fixed stress transition zones are dominant. This indicates
a single rail end design may be suitable for the entire range of switch sizes. Results are of
the order of that which expansion switches accommodate - 100-150mm (British Railways,
1962, 1965).
∆L = ∆LT max−∆LT min (4.24)
∆LT max = α(Tmax−TSF)(2LST +LFM)+2LBC (4.25)
∆LT min =−α(TSF −Tmin)(2LST +LFM)−2LBC (4.26)
4.6 Summary and conclusions 110
Switch Type Free Movement Length Expansion Contraction Length change
RE/PW/ LFM ∆LT max ∆LT min ∆L
800-806 m mm mm mm
B 4.982 67.2 -122.7 189.9
C 5.758 67.4 -123.1 190.5
D 6.690 67.7 -123.7 191.4
E 9.331 68.4 -125.2 193.7
F 11.507 69.1 -126.5 195.6
SG 13.061 69.5 -127.4 196.9
G 14.926 70.0 -128.5 198.6
H 20.126 71.5 -131.6 203.1
Table 4.8 Longitudinal rail movement calculation results
4.6 Summary and conclusions
The previous chapter described the idea generation and subsequent selection of a concept
for railway track switching which may better meet the established set of desirable proper-
ties. This chapter has made two important contributions. The first describes the operational
concept of the ‘Repoint’ track switch, which was the highest scoring design from the pre-
vious chapter. The core of the concept is the passive locking philosophy, which enables,
for the first time, parallel locking functionality, and separates out the actuation and locking
mechanisms. The actuation elements are contained in hollow bearers, and the rails are actu-
ated in an arcuate motion, lifting them out of the passive locking recesses and placing them
into corresponding recesses for the corresponding route. This section also describes how the
design meets, or could meet, the functional requirements for track switches established in
Chapter 3. The second contribution models the concept from first principles to establish that
the design has both feasible and practical characteristics. Significant further potential bene-
fits in actuation time and turnout route traffic speeds are identified. However, also identified
are significant areas of required further understanding, related to the ride dynamics through
revised geometries and potential loads at the rail discontinuity. The following chapter con-
centrates on modelling the potential reliability, availability and maintainability performance
of this design.
Chapter 5
Modelling reliability, maintainability and
availability performance
5.1 Introduction
This chapter establishes the performance of existing and fault tolerant track switching solu-
tions with respect to reliability, maintainability and availability. The analysis begins in Sec-
tion 5.2.1 by acquiring field data to establish reliability performance of existing switches,
alongside a review of literature to establish maintainability (Section 5.3) and availability
(Section 5.4). The reliability data is used in Section 5.5 to create 2P-Weibull models of the
expected failure rates of each switch subsystem, across each common POE type. These fail-
ure rates are then used as an input to modelling the potential reliability and availability of
a range of possible fault-tolerant switch architectures in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 concludes
the chapter by examining maintainability of fault tolerant designs. The work described in
this Chapter corresponds to items (5) and (6) in the research map in Figure 1.3. The con-
clusions to the modelling indicate that a significant performance improvement is possible
across reliability, availability and maintenance flexibility by the adoption of fault-tolerant
architectures. Work detailed in this chapter directly resulted in two journal publications
(Bemment et al., 2018, 2017b). The novel contribution of this Chapter includes:
• The operational reliability of existing designs and their constituent subsystems is
quantified through study of historical failure data. 2P-Weibull failure distributions
and confidence intervals for each subsystem are calculated.
• A range of potential fault-tolerant architectures is established for the first time. The
reliability, availability and maintenance flexibility of those architectures is quantified,
with the potential performance improvement established as significant.
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5.2 Existing switch reliability
To quantify any improvement in switch reliability through the introduction of fault tolerance,
it is first necessary to establish the performance of existing designs. Existing performance
will be used both as a basis for comparison, and as an input to later fault-tolerant reliability
modelling. The literature review (Chapter 2) established that whilst improving switch relia-
bility (e.g. through RCM) is an active area of academic study, there is limited literature on
field reliability performance beyond top-level MTTSAF figures.
5.2.1 Assumptions and limitations of the study
The first step in analysing reliability is to establish exactly what data are required and/or
available. Switches present both continuous and discrete use cases, therefore reliability
could variously be expressed in terms of time, number of actuations, or tonnage of traffic.
Whilst any could be used as a measure, reliability will be related to all three, requiring
extensive data for a ‘perfect’ study:
1. The number of actuations each switch performs within the time period, and the time-
stamp of those actuations.
2. The tonnage of traffic which passes each switch, along each route, of what type and
at what speed, and the time-stamp of each occurrence.
3. Environmental conditions at each switch for the time window in question.
4. Maintenance interventions at each switch, including actions performed, and the time
stamp of these interventions.
5. The failures of each switch, the components/subsystems which failed, the time to
response and repair, and the time-stamp of each occurrence.
This study is limited by the available data. (1), (2) and (3) are not logged by the in-
frastructure owner. Some general statistics regarding (2) were provided (Section 5.2.4). (3)
may be inferred from historical weather reports with limited precision due to sun heating ef-
fects, micro-wetting etc. Some of (4) is logged, but relatively inaccurately, and the database
cannot be manually interrogated. FMS (Section 2.2.5.3) gives accurate and accessible data
regarding (5), but digital recording only began in 2006, in limited form, thus limiting the
study time window. The ideal window is infinite - clearly not possible - though a window at
least the order of expected MTTSAF should be adopted to limit confidence bands. Whilst
limited, the available data is enough to perform a reliability study, if the limits of that study
and its results are understood and acknowledged:
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• The limited data mandates the use of time as the measure of expected reliability, as
traffic volume and actuations remain unknown, even though it is accepted that other
measures may be more suitable.
• The limited time window for which data was available will result in a wider con-
fidence band (Section 5.2.2). This will have the biggest impact on relatively rare
failures with few data points.
• Models and results apply to the whole studied population only; this does not necessar-
ily transfer to an individual switch - i.e. one cannot say that an individual switch with
an MTTSAF of 3 years will fail after exactly 3 years, only that this is the population
mean. It should be understood that individual units will show a range of performance
according to local conditions.
• Without knowledge of maintenance interventions, maintenance is assumed part of
the system and perfect - i.e. performed on time and to specification. The exception is
where data explicitly cites humans as a cause of failure; to accommodate this instance,
‘Humans’ are considered a functional element of the system (Section 5.2.3)
• One must be careful making comparisons between the reliability of different switch
classes due to differing use cases (Section 5.2.4)
• If extending models or results to future cases (i.e. the fault tolerant case), the assump-
tion is made that unknown variables (actuation count, tonnage) remain time invariant.
• Often, parts used for repair are reconditioned units rather than new. Their quality
is known to be lower than brand new in some way. However, as no information is
available on the fraction of reconditioned vs new parts, it is assumed all parts are of
equal quality.
5.2.2 Obtained dataset and cleansing process
Network Rail provided a dataset extracted directly from FMS (Section 2.2.5.3), a database
query for all entries pertaining to switches for dates between 1 April 2008 and 17 Septem-
ber 2011, supplied in CSV format. 1 April 2008 was the earliest date the database became
‘stable’; the query was performed on the 22nd September 2011, these dates thus limiting the
available study window. The population of switches on the GB mainline was 21602 in 2011
(Network Rail, 2012a), and has stayed broadly constant during the period, so populations
will be considered constant throughout this analysis. The data corresponds to a cumulative
operating time of 74,800 years. Since the data were directly extracted from the database, ex-
tensive processing was required before use. Of the fields supplied, several contain duplicate
information, and not every field was populated for every record. Identifying duplicates was
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Total Records Obtained/Analysed: 39339
Minus:
Blank/insufficient data/corrupted/irrelevant: 966
Pneumatic machines: 1519
GRS Type 5 Machines: 253
Remaining Useable Data Records: 36601
Of which:
Criticality 1-3 (Service Affecting Failure): 17603
Criticality 4 (Non-service Affecting): 18998
Within The Useable Data:
Unique Switch assets identified: 12042
(from an analysed population of:) 19915
Switches without a failure event in the period: 9560
Showing only a single failure event: 4756
Showing two failure events: 2516
Showing three failure events: 1567
Showing four or more failure events: 3203
Table 5.1 General properties of pre- and post- cleansing dataset obtained from Network Rail
for period 1 April 2008 and 17 September 2011.
therefore important for data cleansing. Firstly, a script was created which back-populated
missing fields based upon the contents of populated entries. Secondly, selected switch types
were then excluded from the usable data, for example, those with very small populations,
obsolete technology already being phased out (e.g. pneumatic machines), and hydraulic
derailers. Table 5.1 identifies the number of records discounted for each reason.
5.2.3 Subsystem identification and event assignment
POE types were classified as in Section 2.2.4.5; classic and modern electro-hydraulic were
pooled as the data did not discern between Hydrive and Clamplock Mk1/2/In-bearer. Under-
standing the design and operation of each POE design allows decomposition of components
into a number of functional subsystems. The division of functionality into subsystems is
however, in some cases, an exercise of engineering judgement, as some components can
cross functional boundaries. The subsystem divisions used for the modelling are presented
below. A shorthand letter for each subsystem has been adopted. The relationship between
these subsystems is shown in Figure 5.1.
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All Recorded Fault/Failure Incidents (FRI) Service Affecting Failures Only (SAF)
POE Class (Pop) A C D H L P Total A C D H L P Total
Elec.-hydraulic 6852 5412 1780 2358 256 5129 885 15821 2494 921 1120 115 2235 346 7231
Modern elec.-mechanical 599 345 548 872 32 n/a 20 1817 175 328 601 17 n/a 13 1134
Classic elec.-mechanical 9153 5799 2607 2681 349 1483 1687 14606 2874 1466 1327 178 778 655 7278
Mechanical 3311 2102 52 1251 50 837 66 4357 656 23 494 21 320 18 1533
Total 19915 13658 4987 7162 687 7449 2658 36601 6200 2738 3542 331 3332 1033 17176
Table 5.2 Switch populations and fault/failure incidence count for each subsystem type
within each switch class, for sampled period
• (A) Actuation: Elements for moving the track between positions and actuating the
locking mechanism; actuator/gearing, transfer of power/motion, including backdrive
arrangements
• (C) Control / Power: Elements which locally control the other subsystems, and pro-
vide power. Signalling relays, transformers, back-up supplies.
• (D) Detection: Elements which sense and transmit the position of the switch rails and
lock back to the control system. Microswitches, contacts, LVDTs.
• (H) Human: Humans responsible for the design, maintenance and operation of the
switch; including maintenacne, fault finding and repairs.
• (L) Locking: Elements which prevent the un-commanded movement of one or both
switch blades. Lock bodies, lock dogs, associated mechanisms
• (P) Permanent Way: Elements which support and guide vehicles, maintain the gauge
and alignment of the track. Stretcher bars, track clips, slide chairs, but NOT stock
rails or sleepers/bearers, whose failures are considered those of plain line and logged
independently.
Traditional switches can be represented in RBD form (Section 2.3.5). Figure 5.2 il-
lustrates this case, with a single subsystem of each type connected in series, meaning any
failure of a single subsystem directly causes a whole system failure.
By comparing the switch type, assembly type and component type identified in each
dataset record, each failure event can be assigned to a particular subsystem, for a given
POE class. The total number of records in each assignment is shown in Table 5.2. It is
not possible to separate the locking and actuation functions in the HPSS machine, as the
locking is carried out by the screw jack mechanism within the actuation element (Section
2.2.4.5); all failures have thus been grouped in the Actuation category. Failure counts for
‘Control/Power’ upon mechanical switches is comparatively low. This does not indicate a
much higher reliability; not every mechanical switch is fitted with electronic interlocking
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Figure 5.1 System Context diagram showing relationship between functional subsystems,
and where appropriate, their relationship with the wider railway environment.
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Figure 5.2 Reliability Block Diagram illustrating traditional switch architecture, with a sin-
gle subsystem of each category connected in series.
Figure 5.3 Network Rail track categories based upon speed and tonnage. EMGTA = Equiv-
alent million gross tonnes per annum. Source: GC/RT5023 (Fargher, 1999).
and at the time of analysis, data was not available on the portion of the population with or
without this feature.
5.2.4 POE use cases
Devolved purchasing decisions have allowed a range of POE populations in different geo-
graphical locations (Table 2.1). Engineering policy, however, dictates some POE types as
recommended fitment. The criticality of fitment locations is decided by categorisation of
track, where category 1/1A track is very high speed and/or high tonnage, and category 6
very low speed and/or low tonnage, as per Figure 5.3. More details on track categories is
provided in standard GC/RT5023 (Fargher, 1999). This differing usage intensity presented
to each POE class in the failure data prevents direct comparison between POE classes in
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Track category
1a 1 2 3 4 5 6 Unlogged
Electro-hydraulic 152 809 1047 1292 1236 881 927 964
Modern electro-mechanical 119 183 104 64 36 15 13 48
Classic electro-mechanical 393 1142 1979 1640 1323 919 951 318
Mechanical 3 65 143 384 375 414 409 1400
Total 667 2199 3273 3380 2970 2229 2300 2730
Table 5.3 POE population by track category on NR infrastructure. Source: (Network Rail,
2012a)
Figure 5.4 Relative proportion of POE population by track category on NR infrastructure.
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the results of this study. Network Rail provided population counts of POE class per track
category for this study, but were unable to link individual machines identified in the failure
data in Section 5.2.2 to a particular track category. Table 5.3 shows POE populations by
track category; Figure 5.4 illustrates this as the portion of total POE class population which
falls into each track category. There is a clear trend for the modern electro-mechanical class
to be fitted in higher category locations, and mechanical in lower category locations, with
the remaining electro-hydraulic and classic electro-mechanical classes appearing most often
in middle category track.
5.2.5 Establishing failure rates and distributions
5.2.5.1 Constant failure rate assumption
Industry standard practice is to assume a constant failure rate, in which case well known
equations presented by, e.g. (Hecht, 2004), can be used to calculate MTTSAF and MTTFRI
figures for each subsystem using data in Table 5.2. Equation 5.1 expresses the sum of
the operational time between events (TTF) and observational suspensions (T T S) for each
failure event (NFT ) in the total (NSAF or NFRI) and observational suspension event (NST ),
divided by the number of observed failure events (NF ). An observational suspension (also
known as a censored lifetime) is a subsystem reaching the end of the observation window in
a functional or repaired state; the asset is known not to have failed in that period but its exact
point of failure subsequent to the window is unknown. In the case of a fixed observation
window across all assets, as here, this can be simplified to equations 5.2 and 5.3, including
the known population (P) and observation time window (T ). For a constant failure rate, the
rate can be expressed as the reciprocal of the mean, as in equations 5.4 and 5.5.
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MTTFRI (Years) MTTSAF (Years)
A C D H L P All A C D H L P All
Elec.-hydraulic 4.4 13.3 10.1 92.7 4.6 26.8 1.5 9.5 25.8 21.2 206.1 10.6 68.5 3.3
Modern Elec.-mechanical 6.0 3.8 2.4 65.0 n/a 102.2 1.1 11.8 6.3 3.5 121.1 n/a 157.4 1.8
Classic Elec.-mechanical 5.5 12.1 11.8 90.6 21.4 18.8 2.2 11.0 21.6 23.9 178.4 40.7 48.3 4.4
Mechanical 5.5 219.9 9.2 230.9 13.7 174.3 2.6 17.5 490.6 23.2 548.3 35.8 621.4 7.5
All 5.0 13.8 9.6 100.3 9.3 25.9 1.9 11.1 25.2 19.5 208.4 20.7 66.7 4.0
Table 5.4 MTTFRI and MTTSAF figures for functional subsystems of common POE
classes, assuming a constant failure rate.
MT T F =
∑NFTi=1 T T Fi +∑
NST
j=1 T T S j
NF
(5.1)
MT T SAF =
P×T
NSAF
(5.2)
MT T FRI =
P×T
NFRI
(5.3)
λSAF =
1
MT T SAF
(5.4)
λFRI =
1
MT T FRI
(5.5)
B50SAF =
ln2
λSAF
(5.6)
B50FRI =
ln2
λFRI
(5.7)
The results of this calculation are tabulated in Table 5.4. Mean times calculated in this
way are indicative of the relative unreliability contribution of each subsystem to the whole
system, and of the reliability of each POE class in-service. One must be careful, however, in
comparing classes (Section 5.2.1). To provide baseline values for comparison with variable-
failure rate analysis later in the thesis, the B50 values of the same assets are shown in Table
5.5. The B50 values in Table 5.5 have been derived from Equations 5.6 and 5.7, which are
valid under the assumption of constant failure rates only.
5.2.5.2 Variable failure rate modelling
Constant failure rate models do not require failure timestamps as the time of failure within
the window is irrelevant to their calculation. However, as the FMS data includes times-
tamps of each failure, it is possible to parametrise variable failure rate models. A range of
suitable variable failure rate models were evaluated using the data, including 2P- and 3P-
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FRIB50 (Years) SAFB50 (Years)
A C D H L P All A C D H L P All
Elec.-hydraulic 3.0 9.2 7.0 64.3 3.2 18.6 1.0 6.6 17.9 14.7 142.8 7.4 47.4 2.3
Modern Elec.-mechanical 4.2 2.6 1.6 45.1 n/a 70.8 0.8 8.2 4.4 2.4 83.9 n/a 109.1 1.3
Classic Elec.-mechanical 3.8 8.4 8.2 62.8 14.8 13.0 1.5 7.6 15.0 16.5 123.6 28.2 33.5 3.0
Mechanical 3.8 152.4 6.4 160.0 9.5 120.8 1.8 12.1 340.0 16.1 380.0 24.8 430.7 5.2
All 3.5 9.6 6.7 69.6 6.4 18.0 1.3 7.7 17.4 13.5 144.5 14.3 46.2 2.8
Table 5.5 B50 figures corresponding to the MTTSAF and MTTFRI figures presented in Table
5.4, assuming a constant failure rate.
Weibull, Gamma, Normal and 1P- and 2P- Exponential, using a correlation coefficient test
and the MLE approach described below. For each subset of data, the 2P- or 3P- Weibull
distribution proved the best fit for the data. In the analysed cases where the 3P-Weibull
distribution proved most suitable, it did so with an offset parameter which was insignifi-
cantly small; the 2P- Weibull was therefore selected as the most suitable distribution for
this exercise. Published work obtains a similar though more targeted dataset from the same
source and fits distributions to the grouped data (Rama and Andrews, 2013). The work also
establishes that the Weibull distribution is the most appropriate distribution to model switch
component lifetimes, and selects the 2-Parameter model over the 3-Parameter model for the
same reasons. (Rama and Andrews, 2013) lists a number of assumptions which are equally
applicable here:
1. Each failure is rectified by repairing or replacing the failed component
2. Equipment can either be in a good (operational) or bad (failed) state
3. Repair/replacement returns components to the as-good-as-new state
4. Times to failure of individual components are independent of each other
5. Time duration of the component in the failed state is insignificant in comparison to
the functioning period
f (t) =
β
η
(
t
η
)β−1e−(
t
η )β (5.8)
λ (t) =
β
η
t
η
β−1
(5.9)
B50 = η(ln(2))
1
β (5.10)
MT T SAFweibull = ηSAFΓ(1+(
1
βSAF
)) (5.11)
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Figure 5.5 Electro-hydraulic failure interval histogram, indicating tendency to early-life.
5.2.5.3 Distribution fitting process
Records are grouped by each unique asset, and placed upon failure event time-lines. The
output from this process is, for each subsystem/switch type, an array of ‘time to event’
figures, where the event is either a failure or suspension of test. This process was automated
using an iterative script, however due to historical changes in data entry methods (Section
2.2.5.3), significant manual intervention was also required. Figure 5.5 is a histogram of
time-to-failure data for all electro-hydraulic failures analysed, generated from the failure
event time-lines. Figure 5.6 shows the cumulative proportion of observed failures over time
for each POE class. As the gradient is shallower with time across all plots, it indicates that
the failure pattern tends towards infant mortality for all POE classes.
The output data arrays are used as the input to a Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE)
algorithm. MLE is an estimator technique suitable for data which has a relatively high por-
tion of observational suspensions; the proportion of observational suspensions in this data
prevents the use of other techniques, e.g. Rank Regression. MLE develops a likelihood
function based upon sampling the data, and finding the values of parameter estimates that
maximize this likelihood function. It is an iterative method. The process is well established
and documented (Scholz, 2004). β and η values were established (for service affecting fail-
ures only) in each of the subsystems in each switch classification, and the computed values
are tabulated in Table 5.6. Values of the parameters at the extremes of a 90% confidence
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Figure 5.6 Cumulative portion of all failure events over time by POE Class.
interval are also provided to indicate the confidence of fit. Table 5.6 also lists the computed
B50 values for each subsystem, and (for the sake of compatibility with existing practice only)
the computed MTTSAF values, also with 90% confidence intervals. The calculation of these
values for a given 2P-Weibull distribution uses eqns. 5.10 and 5.11, (where Γ represents the
Gamma function).
An example of a fitted exponential model (i.e. constant failure rate) for failure distri-
butions, for the Actuation subsystem of a Classic electro-mechanical POE type, is plotted
in Figure 5.7. Figure 5.8 is a plot of the same failure data, instead fitted to 2P-Weibull
distribution. These two plots illustrate the relative unsuitability of the constant failure rate
model.
5.2.6 Analysis
• The distributions reveal modern electro-mechanical solutions (HPSS) to achieve the
lowest reliability in the field, and mechanical points, the oldest approach, the most re-
liable. The low reliability of HPSS may be due to the observation window coinciding
with the roll-out of HPSS, and the subsequent final development and testing period
with live traffic. However, this result is also subject to the limitations stated in Section
5.2.1, in that different machines will see very different use cases.
5.2 Existing switch reliability 124
Figure 5.7 Best-fit line for exponential failure distribution (i.e. constant failure rate) of
Actuation subsystem of Classic Electro-mechanical class, showing deviation from observed
data.
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Figure 5.8 2-P Weibull failure distribution (β = 0.662,η = 7953) and 90% confidence in-
terval of Actuation subsystem of Classic Electro-mechanical class, showing a closer corre-
lation to the observed data than Figure 5.7
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SAF
A C D H L P All
Elec.Hydraulic βlower 0.716 0.750 0.674 1.268 0.709 0.809 0.636
β 0.738 0.789 0.707 1.477 0.732 0.882 0.647
βupper 0.760 0.829 0.740 1.707 0.755 0.959 0.658
ηlower 4639 12822 13920 13267 5329 26688 1332
η (Days) 4940 14739 15941 19418 5713 35548 1374
ηupper 5276 17104 18434 30914 6144 49022 1417
B50,lower 7.8 22.5 23.2 29.3 8.9 49.8 2.1
B50 (Years) 8.2 25.4 26.0 41.5 9.5 64.3 2.1
B50,upper 8.7 28.8 29.4 63.5 10.1 85.6 2.2
MT T SAFlower 15.3 40.0 47.4 33.3 17.7 77.5 5.0
MT T SAF (Years) 16.3 46.2 54.8 48.1 19.0 103.7 5.2
MT T SAFupper 17.5 54.0 64.0 75.4 20.6 143.7 5.3
Modern Elec.-Mechanical βlower 0.594 0.519 0.599 0.641 n/a 0.809 0.545
β 0.671 0.564 0.637 0.967 n/a 1.253 0.569
βupper 0.754 0.612 0.676 1.389 n/a 1.836 0.593
ηlower 6481 3496 1492 15058 n/a 8756 644
η (Days) 8641 4243 1671 47391 n/a 22730 701
ηupper 12130 5267 1887 326420 n/a 119097 766
B50,lower 22.9 5.1 2.3 31.5 n/a 19.6 0.9
B50 (Years) 31.2 6.1 2.6 88.9 n/a 46.5 1.0
B50,upper 45.2 7.3 2.9 509.1 n/a 208.7 1.1
MT T SAFlower 10.8 15.3 5.7 41.7 n/a 22.8 2.8
MT T SAF (Years) 13.7 19.1 6.4 131.7 n/a 58.0 3.1
MT T SAFupper 18.2 24.4 7.3 914.0 n/a 292.4 3.4
Classic Elec.-Mechanical βlower 0.643 0.771 0.622 1.454 0.594 1.199 0.600
β 0.662 0.804 0.650 1.652 0.629 1.275 0.611
βupper 0.682 0.838 0.679 1.866 0.667 1.354 0.622
ηlower 7388 11327 22576 10515 51175 8277 2211
η (Days) 7953 12645 26253 13991 65123 9405 2293
ηupper 8592 14207 30800 19611 84455 10805 2378
B50,lower 11.8 20.0 35.9 23.7 80.7 17.3 3.3
B50 (Years) 12.5 22.0 40.9 30.7 99.7 19.3 3.4
B50,upper 13.4 24.3 46.9 41.8 125.2 21.8 3.6
MT T SAFlower 26.9 34.9 83.5 26.1 195.2 21.1 8.9
MT T SAF (Years) 29.2 39.1 98.3 34.3 252.9 23.9 9.2
MT T SAFupper 31.7 44.1 116.8 47.3 334.5 27.3 9.6
Mechanical βlower 0.512 0.690 0.649 1.151 0.554 0.910 0.474
β 0.544 1.011 0.698 1.641 0.608 1.360 0.494
βupper 0.578 1.417 0.751 2.253 0.665 1.938 0.513
ηlower 20682 43684 16604 11066 43218 17734 6706
η (Days) 25687 188915 20797 25454 62510 56200 7531
ηupper 32496 2022138 26696 93985 94833 381088 8505
B50,lower 29.9 92.2 27.8 25.7 67.9 40.2 8.9
B50 (Years) 35.9 360.2 33.7 55.8 93.7 117.6 9.8
B50,upper 43.8 3269.6 41.8 187.6 134.9 699.8 10.9
MT T SAFlower 95.3 119.3 56.9 27.9 169.7 45.7 36.9
MT T SAF (Years) 121.8 515.3 72.3 62.4 253.3 141.0 42.3
MT T SAFupper 158.9 5504.0 94.3 219.9 398.0 916.2 48.8
All βlower 0.641 0.729 0.626 1.443 0.661 1.021 0.595
β 0.654 0.751 0.643 1.576 0.679 1.073 0.601
βupper 0.667 0.774 0.660 1.717 0.698 1.127 0.608
ηlower 11035 16225 17562 13109 15862 16625 1962
η (Days) 11675 17767 19115 16281 17225 19090 2008
ηupper 12364 19520 20882 20770 18770 22139 2055
B50,lower 17.4 27.6 27.5 29.0 25.6 32.9 2.9
B50 (Years) 18.3 29.9 29.6 35.3 27.5 37.2 3.0
B50,upper 19.2 32.4 31.9 44.2 29.6 42.4 3.1
MT T SAFlower 40.8 52.6 66.1 32.5 56.3 44.4 8.0
MT T SAF (Years) 43.4 57.9 72.4 40.0 61.5 50.9 8.3
MT T SAFupper 46.2 63.9 79.8 50.6 67.5 58.9 8.5
Table 5.6 Calculated values of β , η , B50 and MTTSAF, including 90% confidence intervals,
tabulated by POE class and subsystem type.
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• The models established in Table 5.6 are comparable to those independently estab-
lished (Rama and Andrews, 2013). Notably the shape parameter β < 1 indicates a
high infant mortality rate. There are some differences between the B50 values in the
constant and variable failure rate models.
• Comparing the MTTSAF and B50 presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 with those in Table
5.6 indicates that assuming a constant failure rate when modelling switch failures is
not an ideal approach, as in all cases whole-system β values are significantly less than
1 - a conclusion which further agrees with (Rama and Andrews, 2013). The accuracy
of many predict-and-prevent models used by industry may be significantly improved
with the use of variable failure rates.
• Comparing the values presented in Table 5.4 with those in Table 5.6 further high-
lights the weakness of the industry-standard MTTSAF measure - the MTTSAF for
mechanical switches at almost 50 years, for instance, is a misleading value for an
asset manager, considering the B50 is nearer to 10 years.
• Most elements show a tendency towards β < 1, indicating a higher incidence of early
life failures. This is not what is expected of an electromechanical device, which would
typically be seen to wear out in use. Permanent way elements, with β approximately
1, have a broadly constant failure rate.
• An electro-mechanical or electro-hydraulic element showing high infant mortality is
an indication of three main possible failure contributors. Firstly, that insufficient burn-
in testing is being completed. Secondly, that there are negative human factors with
regards to installation and adjustment, which lead to the components operating outside
a design envelope. Thirdly, that the components have not been designed for the correct
operating environment (Section 2.3.3). Further analysis would be required to establish
which particular cause (or combination thereof) was prevalent.
• ‘Human error’ failures - that is, failures directly attributable to human error rather than
those manifesting themselves through the failure of a component - have a relatively
high beta. However, the confidence bands of these values are very wide, as there are
relatively few failures attributable to this cause. As there is no obvious reason the
likelihood of human error should increase with time, a constant failure rate model
may be adopted for this element.
• Note that values in the ‘all’ column are calculated using all data points for a given
machine to construct a distribution, which because of the mix of β values discovered
is not considered an accurate approach, a better method being the mixed-Weibull,
considered in section 5.5.
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ID Intervention Type Event Frequency Intervention Time Team Size Possession Intervention
fm (per Year) tm minutes S (People) Requirement Class
1 Track Visual Inspection 52 2 1 No Inspection
2 Track Gauging/Component Inspection 13 30 4 Yes Inspection
3 Track Element Renewals 0.1 600 12 Yes Maintenance
4 Signalling A Service 13 15 4 Yes Inspection
5 Signalling B service 4 30 4 Yes Maintenance
6 Signalling C Service 1 120 4 Yes Maintenance
7 Location Case Inspection 4 5 4 No Inspection
Table 5.7 Typical scheduled interventions for GB switch installations. Labour time does not
include travel to site.
5.3 Existing switch maintenance and maintainability
5.3.1 Calculating maintenance unavailability
The data in Table 5.7 were collated from interviews with staff of Network Rail (Bannister,
2015) and study of the SMS (Network Rail, 2013b), SMTH (Network Rail, 2013c) and
related documents listed in Section 2.2.5.1. This table lists all maintenance interventions,
the labour time required, and whether or not a possession of the track is required. Of note
is the number of operations which take longer than typical timetabled fire-break periods
during the daytime, meaning that the line has to be closed to traffic for the intervention to
occur, and also the team size for most simple interventions. The interventions are the same
across all POE classes (with the exception of mechanical), however different switch lengths
may lead to different intervention times due to component counts.
In addition to scheduled interventions, additional visits are made from alerts in the II
system (Section 2.2.5.2). Network Rail indicates there were 14000 alerts between 1 April
2008 and 17 September 2011 (Network Rail , 2012; Network Rail, 2012a), the majority
towards the end of this period as the system became more widely adopted. However, no
record is kept of which alerts were acted upon outside of the normal maintenance schedule,
nor how long teams attended for. Figures in Table 5.7 must therefore be taken as minima.
Minimum annual maintenance unavailability Uplanned and minimum annual on-site main-
tenance effort Me f f ort (in person-minutes) can then be calculated using equations 5.12 and
5.13 respectively, and the values in Table 5.7.
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Uplanned =
6
∑
ID=2
fm(ID)× tm(ID) = 885 mins/annum (5.12)
Me f f ort =
7
∑
ID=1
fm(ID)× tm(ID)×S(ID) = 4204 mins/annum (5.13)
5.3.2 Maintainability
Maintainability represents more than just the parameters specified in BS/EN 50126 (EN50126,
1999) (Section 2.4.3.4), also encompassing considerations such as access arrangements,
component commonality, spares availability, manual adjustment requirements etc. It is
beyond the scope of this work to investigate every possible maintenance action in every
existing POE design. It is, however, worth noting some general observations on the main-
tainability considerations of existing designs, including those obtained through an interview
with the maintenance organisation (Bannister, 2015):
• Most periodic maintenance is performed by visiting site, opening the POE and adjust-
ing/replacing individual components. However, any maintenance performed track-
side requires closing the line to traffic, impacting capacity (Chapter 6), and exposing
staff to the dangers of the operational railway. There are minimal dangers in disas-
sembling and repairing back at the depot, but this approach is not adopted as it relies
on easy removal and replacement of equipment.
• Maintenance of POE is performed by removing protective covers line-side, which
can lead to foreign object ingress into sensitive mechanical and electrical equipment.
Lubricated surfaces are often exposed (especially slide chairs, and those in uncovered
designs such as clamp-lock types) meaning they collect foreign objects, and must be
time-interval cleaned and have lubricant renewed.
• For reasons above, gaining access and isolation can be relatively slow during heavy
traffic hours as signallers are unwilling to hand over a critical asset to the maintenance
organisation with a distant, and often uncertain, hand-back time.
• Regular inspection and adjustment is necessary due to the load case, and the number
of connections and adjustment points which can drift over time. This is especially
true of machines located outside the 4-foot (nearly all electro-mechanical POE in the
GB), with extra linkages to the switch rails.
• Most designs have a high unique component count, with a large range of fastener
types employed, complicating spares and supply chain. This is also true of permanent
5.4 Existing switch availability 130
way components, where traditional switches require, e.g. distance blocks unique to
switch and bearer, leading to multiple of versions of the same component.
• POE itself is not man-portable, being of the order of 100-250kg in weight. Individual
components are, however, nearly all man-portable.
5.4 Existing switch availability
5.4.1 Modelling availability
Knowledge of the failure rates and planned unavailability from Sections 5.2.5 and 5.3 re-
spectively allows the modelling of benchmark availability figures for each switch type. The
remaining variable is MTTR. MTTR is difficult to quantify through research as the time
the switch is unavailable following a failure is not recorded by the infrastructure operator;
nor are staff transit-to-site times. Values provided in Table 2.3 are used to provide a first
estimate of MTTR of the correct order of magnitude - the mean number of ‘delay minutes’
per incident will be used - 106 minutes. More accurate knowledge of the distribution of
MTTR figures would be of significant benefit to the study, especially in the case of differ-
ent subsystem repair times. However, the influence of this figure upon the results has been
mitigated by assuming a constant.
MTTSAF figures in Section 5.2 assume that the system is non-repairable. In order to es-
tablish unscheduled unavailability, a dynamic simulation including repairs is required. This
can be performed using an RBD (Section 2.3.5) and Monte-Carlo approach. An RBD of
each switch arrangement is first created, representing the series arrangement as in Figure
5.2. Each block in the RBD has a 2P-Weibull model describing its failure rate, obtained
from Table 5.6. If a block fails, the unavailable time is recorded, and after the prescribed
MTTR the block is repaired as-good-as-new, and the system functional again. In this way,
failure and repair of individual subsystems do not affect other subsystems. Blocks cannot
fail when the system is down for maintenance, which is scheduled as in Table 5.7. The
simulation was executed over a 25 year window with a random seed, and the total unsched-
uled unavailability noted, for 5,000 iterations for each POE class. A mean was then taken
to establish the unscheduled availability of that system over the 25 year period U¯25yr, from
which annual mean unplanned unavailability U¯unplanned is calculated by simple division as
per Equation 5.14.
Mean unavailability U¯ , in minutes per annum, is then calculated from total unavailability
as in Equation 5.15. Mean availability A¯ is simply the mean fraction of minutes in a year
(525,600) the system is available, as in Equation 5.16, normally expressed as a percentage.
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For 25-year Window Classic Modern
Symbol Unit Electro-mech. Electro-hydraul. Electro-mech. Mechanical
Planned unavailability U¯planned mins/annum 885 885 885 885
% 0.16826 0.16826 0.16826 0.16826
Unplanned unavailability U¯25yr mins, lifetime total 433.95 246.5 383.5 76.75
U¯unplanned mean mins/annum 17.358 23.670 36.816 7.662
% 0.0033 0.0045 0.0070 0.0014
Mean unavailability U¯ mins/annum 902.358 908.67 921.816 892.662
Availability A¯ % 99.8284 99.8272 99.8247 99.8303
Table 5.8 Unavailability contributions, and availability of each POE class over 25 year life-
time, using failure rates from Table 5.6 and maintenance actions from Table 5.7.
Table 5.8 tabulates these figures for the range of switch classes in Section 5.2.5.
U¯unplanned =
U¯25yr
25
mins (5.14)
U¯ = U¯planned +U¯unplanned mins/annum (5.15)
A¯ =
525600−U¯
525600
×100 % (5.16)
5.4.2 Analysis
• Unplanned unavailability is a relatively low contributor to overall unavailability, how-
ever its impact can be much higher due to the unpredictable timing. This differential
impact is not accounted for in a pure availability figure.
• There is a range of unplanned unavailability figures. However, as these figures are
based on the same field data as Section 5.2, the same limitations apply, particularly
that the figures should not be used to judge relative performance due to differing use
cases.
• In all cases, availability falls within the ‘two-nines’ range, i.e. 99.xxx.
• Depending upon the network, planned unavailability may be of little importance com-
pared to unplanned unavailability. Metro scenarios may have an excess of overnight
maintenance access time, but a failure which took 106 mins to rectify could prevent
use of the whole node for a rush hour period. A power station freight railway may
have traffic 24 hours per day, severely limiting maintenance access, however a failure
which took 106 mins to rectify would not affect the operation of the plant.
• Further work developing these availability models could include assigning impact
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Figure 5.9 An example RBD showing parallel replication of individual subsystems, with
2-out-of-3 voting (for Actuation and Detection), Triplication (Locking) and Duplication
(Permanent Way). Shorthand: 2/3A 2/3D 1/3L C 1/2P H.
values to planned vs unplanned unavailability for particular networks, which may
give a better idea of total impact to the network operator.
• If availability performance is of the highest importance, for instance at capacity-
limited nodes, (Section 2.4.1) then maintenance and maintainability must be targeted
in addition to reliability; in all classes, over 96% of unavailability is for scheduled
interventions.
• All figures in these sections relate to individual switches, but it should be noted that
the impact of unavailability may be larger at larger junctions, as limited resources
mean switches must be maintained or repaired sequentially, keeping the line closed
for longer periods.
5.5 Fault tolerant switch reliability and availability
5.5.1 Modelling approach
With the β and η values established in the previous section, conceptual designs featuring
subsystem redundancy can now be modelled, also through use of RBDs. In this section, it
is again assumed that no repair of failed subsystems takes place. Three examples of RBDs
are provided graphically in this chapter, other combinations are represented in shorthand
only. The shorthand notation is adopted for brevity, whereby a fraction (representing x-out-
of-y redundancy) is followed by the abbreviation adopted for each subsystem as used in the
source data analysis. Figure 5.2 shows the baseline example used previously. This has a
single instance of each subsystem, and would be termed A C D H L P in shorthand. Other
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Figure 5.10 An example RBD showing parallel replication of whole POE units, wherein
each unit has Actuation, Locking and Detection elements. Shorthand: 1/3(ADL) C P H.
example arrangements are shown in Figure 5.9, which has duplicate, triplicate and 2-out-
of-3 elements (shorthand 2/3A 2/3D 1/3L C 1/2P H), and 5.10, which features parallel POE
(shorthand 1/3(ADL) C P H).
5.5.2 Modelling scenarios and strategy
• Actuation elements can be combined in parallel-channel redundancy. A range of actu-
ation options can be examined. Singular (i.e. current practice), Duplicate, Triplicate
(including 2-out-of-3) are considered here. Actuators are relatively expensive. Cost is
not calculated herein, but 2-out-of-3 may enable smaller/cheaper units to be utilised.
• Control/Power elements could be paralleled in a number of ways, however it is an-
ticipated that x-out-of-y approaches would not be suitable due to the complexity of
the control signalling. Therefore the options examined are singular, duplicate and
triplicate.
• Detection elements can easily be paralleled. However, the sole purpose of detection is
to sense the system state, so a problem exists in that a duplicate system showing two
differing positions would likely still be regarded as a failure. Options considered are
therefore singular, and the voting systems 2-out-of-3, and 3-out-of-4. The processing
element is considered perfect.
• Humans Failures caused by human error must necessarily form part of the system
analysis. However, a full analysis of the human factors elements of track switch de-
sign, operation, maintenance and repair is out of scope; the human element is therefore
considered consistent with existing practice.
• Locking elements can be paralleled. As the fundamental purpose of the lock means a
failure could lead to it preventing movement of the switch, it could be deduced that
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multiplying this subsystem may in fact reduce overall system reliability; however it is
assumed that the passive locking described in Section 4.2 negates this.
• Permanent Way elements could be duplicated or triplicated; no voting approaches
could apply as these elements are entirely passive. For clarity, in the multi-channel
design concepts, a duplication of P elements does not mean extra rails, but extra
stretchers, clips chairs and associated fittings.
Another approach to be considered (for power operated points only) is the duplication,
triplication or 2-out-of-3 voting for several identical point machines fitted to a single switch.
This would require parallel detection, actuation and locking channels grouped together, in
a larger framework of voting and processing, again considered perfect. An example of
this approach is shown in Figure 5.10, the shorthand for which is 3(ADL) C P H . These
grouped elements would each have an associated permanent way, control/power and human
elements, which could take the form of the strategies above. It is also not possible to apply
each of these strategies to all POE classes because:
• Actuation upon the mechanical points type consists of rodding and cable runs from a
lever frame to the points. Therefore a redundancy of actuators would not be practical.
• Control/Power elements upon mechanical points type are rare, yet the failure distri-
bution listed is very low as it is for the whole population analysed. This has therefore
been left as a Singular item.
• Locking elements upon modern electro-mechanical points type are combined with
actuation as established earlier.
When all possible approaches listed above are combined there are approximately 350
permutations per POE class. For brevity, therefore, this thesis will present a baseline ma-
chine and a key selection of concepts for each machine type. The process for creating the
distributions is again based upon the Monte-Carlo approach from Section 5.4.1. RBDs rep-
resented by each shorthand are used, with random seed, to predict first failure times of the
system; a process repeated until a dataset of 500 simulated failure points is created, for each
combination. This dataset can then be subject to the same iterative MLE process detailed
earlier, in order to calculate the β and η parameters and B50 values of the combined system.
For completeness, MT T SAF figures are also calculated. This mixed-Weibull approach is
different to that used to calculate the ‘All’ column in Table 5.6, which was to fit a single
2P-Weibull distribution to a dataset which was known to be a mix of different distributions.
Though the results of the two processes are expected to be marginally different, magnitudes
in Table 5.4 can be used to validate the approach.
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5.5.3 Availability
One of the benefits of a multi-channel approach is that the system continues to function un-
til such a time as a repair has been effected, unless all channels fail simultaneously. Whilst
a static analysis can reveal the expected system reliability, a more relevant measure can
be obtained from a dynamic simulation - using the same RBD and Monte-Carlo approach
method as Section 5.4.1 - to establish unscheduled unavailability. The dynamic simulations
are again run over an observation window of 25 years, and the mean unscheduled unavail-
ability per annum, in minutes, taken as a measure for comparison. The results of the static
modelling are presented in Table 5.9, dynamic results are presented in the right-hand column
of the same table.
5.5.4 Analysis
Results in Table 5.9 show that redundancy can provide a considerable improvement over
baseline for every POE class. The mean annual downtime for each redundantly engineered
solution is an order of magnitude lower than the baseline scenario. The following points are
of note:
• In all cases, parallel redundancy of functional subsystems acts to improve overall
system reliability.
• For the modern electro-mechanical class, fitting 3 machines in a parallel configuration
results in a five-fold improvement B50 value.
• For the classic electro-mechanical class, up to 12.5 year B50 values are achievable, a
five-fold improvement.
• For electro-hydraulic types, B50 can also exceed 10 years, also five-fold improvement.
• As expected, different architectures have different effects upon whole system reliabil-
ity. To select a suitable architecture for a given situation, cost constraints must also be
taken into account, alongside the maintenance and repair policy in Section 5.6.
• Figure 5.11 shows the relative reliability importance of each subsystem type, for the
classic electro-mechanical baseline example. Reliability importance is subsystem re-
liability divided by system reliability, and gives an indication of how likely a failure
of that subsystem is to cause a system failure. It can be seen that for the series case,
the failure of any block is of similar likelihood to cause a system failure at any point
in the observation window. This result is to be expected for a series system.
• Figure 5.12 shows the relative reliability importance for a sample case, 1/3A 1/3C
2/3D H 1/3L 1/2P of the classic electro-mechanical class. The importance of all
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Reliability (Static) Unavailability
POE Class Concept Architecture β η MT T SAF B50 U¯unplanned
(days) (years) (years) (mins/annum)
Electro-hydraulic A C D H L P (Baseline) 0.750 1136 3.7 1.9 24.1
2/3A 1/3C 2/3D H 1/2L 1/2P 1.253 2587 6.7 5.1 1.3
2/3A 1/3C 2/3D H 1/3L 1/2P 1.276 2861 7.4 5.7 1.3
2/3A 1/3C 3/4D H 1/2L 1/2P 1.252 2345 6.1 4.7 1.3
2/3A 1/3C 3/4D H 1/3L 1/2P 1.270 2572 6.6 5.2 1.3
1/3A 1/3C 2/3D H 1/2L 1/2P 1.353 4181 10.6 8.6 1.3
1/3A 1/3C 2/3D H 1/3L 1/2P 1.468 4802 12.1 10.0 1.3
1/3A 1/3C 3/4D H 1/2L 1/2P 1.319 3603 9.2 7.3 1.3
1/3A 1/3C 3/4D H 1/3L 1/2P 1.393 4088 10.3 8.5 1.3
2/3(ADL) 1/3C H 1/2P 1.152 1319 3.6 2.5 1.3
1/3(ADL) 1/3C H 1/2P 1.431 3610 7.3 9.3 1.3
Classic A C D H L P (Baseline) 0.716 1568 5.0 2.7 18.9
Electro-mechanical 2/3A 1/3C 2/3D H 1/2L 1/2P 1.036 3618 9.5 7.1 1.8
2/3A 1/3C 2/3D H 1/3L 1/2P 1.035 3682 9.7 7.3 1.8
2/3A 1/3C 3/4D H 1/2L 1/2P 1.037 3251 8.6 6.4 1.9
2/3A 1/3C 3/4D H 1/3L 1/2P 1.036 3303 8.8 6.5 1.9
1/3A 1/3C 2/3D H 1/2L 1/2P 1.114 5845 14.7 12.2 1.7
1/3A 1/3C 2/3D H 1/3L 1/2P 1.119 5995 15.0 12.5 1.7
1/3A 1/3C 3/4D H 1/2L 1/3P 1.086 5025 12.8 10.3 1.9
1/3A 1/3C 3/4D H 1/3L 1/2P 1.078 5143 13.1 10.6 1.8
2/3(ADL) 1/3C H 1/2P 0.989 2398 6.6 4.5 1.9
1/3(ADL) 1/3C H 1/2P 1.155 5603 14.1 11.6 1.8
Modern A C D H P (Baseline) 0.623 555 2.1 0.9 36.2
Electro-mechanical 2/3A 1/3C 2/3D H 1/2P 1.055 1104 2.1 3.1 0.9
2/3A 1/3C 3/4D H 1/2P 1.037 710 2.0 1.3 0.9
1/3A 1/3C 2/3D H 1/2P 1.033 1261 3.5 2.3 0.8
1/3A 1/3C 3/4D H 1/3P 1.020 770 2.2 1.4 0.9
2/3(AD) 3C H 1/2P 1.026 863 2.5 1.6 0.9
1/3(AD) 3C H 1/2P 1.256 2531 6.7 4.9 0.9
Mechanical A C D H L P (Baseline) 0.621 3357 12.5 5.3 8.1
A C 2/3D H 1/2L 1/2P 0.685 5193 16.6 9.0 3.7
A C 2/3D H 1/3L 1/2P 0.680 5412 17.3 9.4 3.6
A C 3/4D H 1/2L 1/2P 0.716 4148 12.8 7.3 3.9
A C 3/4D H 1/3L 1/2P 0.713 4282 13.3 7.5 3.7
A 2/3(DL) C H 1/2P 0.713 3967 12.5 6.9 3.8
A 1/3(DL) 1/3C H 1/2P 0.648 7090 23.1 12.4 3.8
Table 5.9 β , η , MT T SAF and B50 and U¯unplanned values for a selection of redundantly
engineered switch solutions based upon existing POE actuation classes.
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physical subsystems has been considerably reduced, indicating a good fault tolerance.
However, the human element is now dominant throughout. The same is true for all
evaluated architectures - is not possible to add redundancy to the human element in
the same way. Adding additional redundancy beyond that explored herein does not
significantly improve system reliability further; the Human element is the limiting
factor. This result is important in indicating that when implementing functionally
redundant track switching solutions, human factors elements are important in gaining
full reliability benefits.
• The results of the availability modelling show that an order of magnitude reduction in
unscheduled downtime is possible across all asset types.
• The dynamic modelling shows that the particular architecture has a relatively insignif-
icant effect upon the unscheduled unavailability for each switch type when compared
with the act of multiplying subsystems.
• The main contributor to the unscheduled unavailability in each scenario is errors di-
rectly attributable to humans. This is further highlighted in Figure 5.12. The modern
electro-mechanical class performs better than the other drive types in the mean un-
availability per annum due to the fact the η value for human-induced failures is much
higher - there is less likelihood of error as the machine has built-in monitoring and
diagnostics.
• As the MTTR is insignificantly small when compared with the MTTSAF, there may
be some scope in a multi-channel architecture to respond to subsystem failures in a
much longer time frame - perhaps weeks or months - without having a significant
detrimental effect upon availability, a property which is explored in Section 5.6.
5.6 Fault tolerant switch maintainability and availability
relationship
5.6.1 Modelling approach and target repair time
Until now, this modelling has assumed that the MTTR is constant. One of the benefits of a
fault tolerant switch with redundancy is that it continues to function until repair is effected.
Conceptually, it is proposed that the functional elements in the Repoint track switching
system are LRUs (Section 4.3.4), which will not be repaired; maintenance technicians can
simply replace the faulty or failed unit with known-good. The unit may subsequently be
repaired in the background. The opportunity therefore exists to relax the MTTR in order to
5.6 Fault tolerant switch maintainability and availability relationship 138
Figure 5.11 Reliability importance of each subsystem type for baseline case of the classic
electro-mechanical class, over 20 years of operation. All elements contribute similar levels
of unreliability at each point in time.
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Figure 5.12 Reliability Importance of each subsystem type for example 1/3A 1/3C 2/3D H
1/3L 1/2P case of classic electro-mechanical POE class, over 20 years of operation. System
reliability is dominated by human error.
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improve flexibility or reduce costs for the infrastructure owner. For this section, the fixed
MTTR is replaced with a variable τ , which represents the target time in which faulty or iso-
lated subsystems must be replaced; i.e. a target MTTR (Section 2.4.3.4). There is also the
opportunity to adapt maintenance practices to take advantage of the LRU concept; Repoint
could be adopted under existing maintenance regimes or alongside condition-based main-
tenance to better exploit its potential. Several levels of maintenance change will therefore
been examined, as follows:
• Level 0: This represents the benchmark case, as currently implemented.
• Level 1: Triplex redundancy, with no change to the maintenance or inspection regime.
• Level 2a: Triplex redundancy, with no change to the maintenance regime, but with
the system self-inspecting.
• Level 2b: Triplex redundancy, with maintenance performed by LRU (2 minute re-
placement), but no change to the inspection regime.
• Level 3: Triplex redundancy, with maintenance performed by LRU (2 minute replace-
ment), and the system self-inspecting.
Furthermore, for each implementation level, there is a choice of architecture to the im-
plementation of the functional redundancy, namely series or parallel, as in Figures 5.9 and
5.10. In the series example, each LRU contains the functionality of a point machine or
trackside supply/command unit. When an LRU is replaced (maintenance or failure), the en-
tire unit is replaced as a whole. In the alternative, parallel case, each functional subsystem
forms an LRU, and is replaced individually, without affecting functional units of a different
subsystem type. Evaluating both arrangements, at 4 different implementation levels and for
3 different POE Classes (the Mechanical Class is omitted from this section) gives a total of
24 possible scenarios, plus baseline.
The same 25-year window RBD and Monte-Carlo approach as Section 5.4.1 has been
adopted, with the fixed MTTR replaced by the stated τ value, represented by a normal dis-
tribution with σ = τ/4 and scheduled maintenance adjusted accordingly for each scenario;
a mean of 5000 iterations was used for each of the results below.
5.6.2 Results
Simulation results are presented in 3 tables. Table 5.10 shows the output of the simulation
for each of the listed cases, giving availability values at each level of implementation, where
the value of τ has been fixed to 106 minutes as per previous sections. Table 5.11 shows
the extent to which the τ values can be relaxed, working under the assumption that the
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Classic
electro-mechanical Electro-hydraulic Modern electro-mechanical
Availability Unavailability Availability Unavailability Availability Unavailability
hours per annum hours per annum hours per annum
Level 0 (Baseline) 0.99828440 15.0 0.99827240 15.1 0.99824710 15.4
Series redundant architecture
Level 1 0.99708547 25.5 0.99709032 25.5 0.99708846 25.5
Level 2a 0.99893966 9.3 0.99894428 9.3 0.99894329 9.3
Level 2b 0.99808313 16.8 0.99808782 16.8 0.99808607 16.8
Level 3 0.99993738 0.5 0.99994158 0.5 0.99994106 0.5
Parallel redundant architecture
Level 1 0.99708547 25.5 0.99709032 25.5 0.99708846 25.5
Level 2a 0.99893966 9.3 0.99894428 9.3 0.99894329 9.3
Level 2b 0.99808313 16.8 0.99808782 16.8 0.99808607 16.8
Level 3 0.99993738 0.5 0.99994158 0.5 0.99994106 0.5
Table 5.10 Simulation Results: Availabilities of parallel and series architectures at each
implementation level with τ fixed at 106 minutes.
availability must be the equivalent to existing installations as in Section 5.4.1. Table 5.12
imagines a hybrid case where τ is relaxed to one week, and lists the availability achievable
in each scenario.
To further illustrate the relationship between τ and availability, three plots are provided.
Figure 5.13 illustrates the relationship between availability and τ for each implementation
level. Figure 5.14 is a simple bar chart which illustrates the relative contribution of sched-
uled and unscheduled availability, for each implementation level. Figure 5.15 illustrates the
unavailability of each implementation level where τ is fixed to 1 week.
5.6.3 Analysis
• In the baseline case, τ is equal to the emergency response time, therefore increasing τ
has an immediate, significant and detrimental effect upon availability (See table 5.12).
In reality this approach could not be taken with existing systems.
• Not all levels of implementation demonstrate increased availability. Table 5.10 shows
that Level 1 and 2b solutions reduce availability due to the additional maintenance,
and the proportionally large contribution of scheduled maintenance to total downtime.
It is important to note, however, that in both these cases the unscheduled availability
is reduced almost to insignificance, as illustrated in Figure 5.14.
• Level 2a and 3 implementations both show a significant decrease in scheduled and
unscheduled unavailability across all POE classes, leading to substantially increased
availability (Table 5.10). Level 3, in particular, reduces downtime to around 0.5 hours
5.6 Fault tolerant switch maintainability and availability relationship 142
Classic Modern
electro-mechanical Electro-hydraulic electro-mechanical
Level 0
(Baseline) 1.77 1.77 1.77
Series Redundancy Architecture
Level 1 n/a n/a n/a
Level 2a 117 283 272
Level 2b n/a n/a n/a
Level 3 323 768 623
Parallel Redundancy Architecture
Level 1 n/a n/a n/a
Level 2a 118 292 275
Level 2b n/a n/a n/a
Level 3 327 772 625
Table 5.11 The maximum value τ (Hours) can become whilst achieving baseline availability
levels
Classic electro-mechanical Electro-hydraulic Modern electro-mechanical
Availability Unavailability Availability Unavailability Availability Unavailability
hours per annum hours per annum hours per annum
Level 0
(Baseline) 0.99541389 40.2 0.99442105 48.9 0.99175345 72.3
Series redundant architecture
Level 1 0.99633465 32.1 0.99676096 28.4 0.99668535 29.1
Level 2a 0.99818434 15.9 0.99860429 12.2 0.99858454 12.4
Level 2b 0.99731799 23.5 0.99777751 19.5 0.99777718 19.5
Level 3 0.99913906 7.5 0.99961458 3.4 0.9995266 4.1
Parallel redundant architecture
Level 1 0.99632192 32.2 0.99675727 28.4 0.99678579 28.2
Level 2a 0.99818434 15.9 0.99860429 12.2 0.99856542 12.6
Level 2b 0.99737159 23.0 0.99777747 19.5 0.99777816 19.5
Level 3 0.99918206 7.2 0.99961458 3.4 0.9995266 4.1
Table 5.12 Simulation Results: Availabilities of parallel and series architectures at each
implementation level with τ at 10800 minutes (1 week).
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Figure 5.13 Plots showing variation in asset availability vs τ for range of possible imple-
mentation levels using classic electro-mechanical baseline data in a series configuration.
Figure 5.14 Bar chart indicating the relative contribution to unavailability from scheduled
and unscheduled maintenance at various implementation levels, for the classic electro-
mechanical case with τ fixed at 1.77 hours.
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Figure 5.15 Bar chart indicating annual unavailability (hours) for each implementation level,
where τ is fixed at 1 week, for the classic electro-mechanical case.
per year, from over 15 hours at benchmark, for every switch type.
• Table 5.10 shows that ‘four-nines’ availability is achievable with all POE classes with
a level 3 implementation.
• Table 5.11 illustrates the extent to which τ can be relaxed, in each case, whilst main-
taining the availability provided by the benchmark system. For each deployment level
where this is possible, and across all POE classes, the emergency response time can
be relaxed by 2-3 orders of magnitude.
• Table 5.11 illustrates that the emergency response times of the classic electro-mechanical
design cannot be relaxed to the same extent as the other two actuation methods. This
is due to the larger contribution to unreliability of the Permanent Way element in this
case, with a significantly lower η value. The stretcher bar and mountings of such de-
signs are a known weakness (Section 3.3.2). However, this could be offset by having
separate target response times for different subsystems. It is of note that the Repoint
design does not feature stretcher bars, therefore the P-way reliability model would be
closer to that of the modern electro-mechanical system.
• Figure 5.13 indicates the availability achievable for each implementation level as τ is
relaxed. Of note is that the level 3 implementation outperforms the baseline through-
out. At τ > 10000 minutes, all redundantly engineered solutions outperform the base-
line. Below this, the baseline outperforms level 1 and level 2b solutions. This is due
to the additional maintenance requirements.
• Figure 5.13 indicates that a level 3 implementation can outperform the baseline in
availability terms, even with τ > 30000 minutes; 300 times longer than benchmark
practice. Similarly, the level 2a deployment can outperform the baseline with τ >
10000 minutes - two orders of magnitude longer than existing practice.
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• Figure 5.15 and Table 5.12 show that when τ is extended to 1 week, all solutions
outperform the baseline in availability terms.
• There is little difference in availability (in each circumstance) between parallel and
series architecture. Figure 5.15 and Table 5.12 illustrates the case of a fixed τ of
1 week, with the parallel case performing marginally better in the level 2b and 3
implementations, The architectures are not a dominating factor in availability until
τ reaches very high levels. A series architecture may perform slightly worse, but
line-replaceable units containing all functions may simplify maintenance and reduce
human-attributable errors.
5.7 Conclusions
This chapter has established the performance of existing and fault-tolerant track switching
solutions with respect to operational reliability, maintenance/maintainability and availabil-
ity. The operational reliability of existing designs, and that of their constituent subsystems,
is established through study of historical failure data. 2P-Weibull failure distributions and
confidence intervals for each subsystem have been calculated. Annual downtime from main-
tenance interventions is established from literature and interviews with maintenance person-
nel. Inadequacies in recorded and available maintainability data have been identified, and
the remaining data were then were then used to calculate availability.
A range of fault-tolerant architectures are studied, including that chosen for the Chapter
7 demonstrator. The results show that with fault-tolerance, considerable gains in whole-
system reliability are possible; typical time to failures can be more than five times that of
existing solutions, and unscheduled downtime reduced by an order of magnitude. However,
as equipment failures are engineered out, reliability plateaus due to the dominant contributor
to unreliability becoming human error, which cannot be designed out in the same manner.
An important observation from this chapter is that it is possible to improve the availability
and maintenance flexibility of track switching solutions through the use of a fault-tolerant,
multi-channel architecture. However, as unscheduled unavailability is only a small contrib-
utor to total unavailability, a larger improvement arises when maintenance is revised to take
full advantage of the ability of a multi-channel system to accommodate subsystem failure
and remain functional. It is possible to increase switch availability and reliability at the same
time as relaxing tau by several orders of magnitude. Gains in availability are possible even
when emergency response times are orders of magnitude longer than currently achieved.
The work also demonstrates that the subsystem architecture is of relatively low significance
compared to the effect of designing-in fault tolerance.
Chapter 6
Modelling capacity performance
6.1 Introduction
This chapter evaluates the capacity performance of traditional and Repoint track switches.
Section 2.4.1.3 established that there is no absolute measure of capacity, therefore this chap-
ter takes the form of five case studies, identified in Section 6.2. The first three case studies
are based around London Underground, and are described in Section 6.4. The remaining
two are based upon HS2 locations, and described in Section 6.5. In each, plain line capacity
is established using timetable compression methods from (UIC406, 2004). The restrictive
effects of traditional and fault tolerant switch performance is then examined. Fault tolerant
switch performance is based upon calculations in Chapters 4 and 5 and identified in Section
6.3.
Results, presented in consolidated form in Subsections 6.4.6 and 6.5.5, show that a range
of enhanced capacity is available across the selected case study nodes with the adoption of
fault tolerant switching, though the potential magnitude of the gain varies significantly by
location. The work described in this Chapter corresponds to item (7) in the research map in
Figure 1.3.
The original work in this chapter formed part of several papers (Bemment et al., 2012a,
2013a,b). The novel contributions of the chapter are threefold. Firstly, the effect of existing
practice upon nodal capacity is explored, with the relationships between capacity, actuation
time and turnout speed being defined and quantified with respect to equivalent plain line.
Secondly, potential capacity impact from the Repoint switch is quantified in the same man-
ner, using performance results from previous chapters. Thirdly, the relative improvement is
established as significant.
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6.2 Case study selection
It is established in Section 2.4.1.3 that there is no absolute measure of capacity, and that the
influence of changes to infrastructure upon capacity is unique to a particular node, necessi-
tating a case-study approach to capacity evaluation. Five case study scenarios (i to v) have
been selected for this study, listed in Table 6.1.
Network Type Network, Node Node Type Traffic Traffic Speed Signalling
i Metro LU, typical sub-surface Diverging turnout Homogenous Low 2-aspect Colour Light
ii Metro LU, typical sub-surface Converging turnout Homogenous Low 2-aspect Colour Light
iii Metro LU, typical sub-surface Double junction, conflicting moves Homogenous Low 2-aspect Colour Light
iv High Speed HS2, Birmingham Interchange Diverging turnout Homogenous High ETCS (various levels)
v High Speed HS2, Birmingham Interchange Converging turnout Homogenous High ETCS (various levels)
Table 6.1 Capacity evaluation case study nodes
6.3 Potential performance changes
Several aspects of the Repoint concept could impact capacity. Some aspects can be calcu-
lated, others may only indicate a general trend, and not each applies to every scenario, as
follows:
1. Switch actuation time directly affects headway through junctions; reduced switch-
ing time reduces headway. Table 4.6 lists potential switch actuation times for Repoint,
which can be compared to circa 3-8 seconds in existing designs. Whilst some existing
designs may also be able to actuate the switch more quickly if so adapted, without ac-
tive control, and with variable slide chair friction, it would be difficult to consistently
achieve this in practice.
2. Turnout route speed limits affect headways by requiring vehicles to accelerate or
brake on mainline. Table 4.4 lists potential turnout speed increases from the adoption
of the stub switch geometry across the range of standard British switches.
3. Assumption of ‘safety’ for certain moves: The Repoint switch may, by its fault-
tolerant, bi-stable and failure prognostic design features, be declared ‘safe’ to actuate
within the overlap distance. The capacity impact of such a change can be calcu-
lated, though no attempt is made to demonstrate safety herein. Whilst noted that a
wrongly set stub-switch guarantees derailment in a trailing move, capacity impact is
nevertheless evaluated for completeness. It is assumed routing onto occupied track is
contained by signalling changes.
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4. Enabling further signalling changes: The particular network signalling specifica-
tion has a large influence on capacity. The signalling system may have been specified
based upon the available performance of particular asset types, including switches. If
the performance of the switches is different to the assumption, then it may be the case
that alternate signalling systems offering improved performance would be justified.
This may be the case with the fixed vs moving block choice for HS2 - more detail
is provided in Section 6.5.2. This will be evaluated for the HS2 scenarios only - LU
scenarios assume capacity-optimised signalling.
5. Higher reliability and capacity form a trade-off (Figure 2.13); greater reliability can
lead to greater capacity as a greater CUI can be used. The CUI achievable in practice
is obtained empirically or via simulation. Increasing CUI depends upon the improved
reliability of the whole infrastructure system. Capacity change from this approach
is not explored further herein, other than to state significantly increasing capacity by
increasing CUI would require an improvement in reliability across all infrastructure
assets, and switches are currently one of the least reliable (Table 2.3).
6. Reduction in maintenance intensity: Whilst switches undergo maintenance inter-
ventions, the line is out of use (Table 5.7). Whilst individual downtime may be low,
switches are maintained sequentially, meaning that junctions or routes can be unavail-
able to traffic for a larger portion of time. There is, therefore, the potential for capacity
gain through revised maintenance practices (Section 5.6). The potential capacity in-
crease is influenced by each unique route, junction layout, traffic pattern, maintenance
and access arrangements, and this relationship is not explored further herein other than
to state that a reduction in maintenance downtime directly improves capacity.
6.4 London Underground scenarios (i-iii)
6.4.1 Data sources
LU (London Underground) is an urban rapid transit system with many lines of differing
rolling stock, track and signalling specifications. Herein, the Bombardier S8-stock (Webb
and Tee, 2015), operating on the sub-surface (Metropolitan, Circle, District and Hammer-
smith & City) lines, with infrastructure close to mainline specification and train services
running at metro frequencies is evaluated (London Underground, 2014). These scenarios
are representative of dense-service commuter rail. Whilst LU has developed the proprietary
‘journey time capability model’, detailing operational headway calculation (Dowton and
Baker, 2002), in which junctions are identified as critical capacity pinch points, literature
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Figure 6.1 Track layout: London Underground double junction showing key locations. Sce-
nario i considers track linking A, C and E in isolation, forming a diverging turnout. Scenario
ii considers track linking B, D and F in isolation - a converging turnout. Scenario iii consid-
ers the full double junction.
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does not evaluate the direct effects of switch performance upon capacity.
Parameters used in this modelling are listed in Table 6.2; where parameters are unavail-
able for LU specifically, typical metro figures are used (Leach, 1991; Lew and Heede, 2016;
Webb and Tee, 2015). At metro speeds, constant acceleration and deceleration rates are
assumed, as in industry practice (Dowton and Baker, 2002). It is also assumed that lines
are straight and level, driving is perfect, and that signal spacing (or other MA transmission)
is optimised for peak capacity (Sections 2.4.1.3 and 2.2.4.6). Speeds and speed restrictions
are converted to miles per hour for comparison with switch design speeds.
Symbol Value Unit Description
Signalling and Infrastructure
ds 100 m Safety separation distance between trains
ds(switch) 100 m Safety distance for deceleration at speed restricted turnout
dtip f p 80 m Distance from point tips to fouling point
dtip f pdbl 130 m Distance from point tips to double junction fouling point
I 3 s Interlocking response time for issue of MA to train
P 6 s Time for switch to actuate, lock, detect, communicate
vswitch various ms−1 Turnout route speed restriction (= vline for no speed restriction)
vline various ms−1 Line speed
CUI 75 % Capacity Utilisation Index
Rolling Stock
ltrain 140 m Length of train
R 2 s Brake reaction time
bs 1.14 ms−2 Service braking rate
bg 0.7 Guaranteed braking rate (expressed as a fraction of bs )
as 1.1 ms−2 Acceleration rate
Table 6.2 Parameters used in modelling London Underground capacity scenarios
6.4.2 Plain line capacity
To evaluate capacity constriction due to switches, capacity of plain line must be established.
To maintain safety, trains must be separated by a plain-line minimum headway Hp (Section
2.2.4). Headway is calculated using Equations 6.3 to 6.7, from listed contributors shown
in Figure 6.2. Technical capacity CT p, in TPH (Train Paths per Hour), is calculated from
minimum headway using Equation 6.2. Operational capacity, COp, is the usable fraction of
technical capacity defined by the CUI, as in equation 6.1. Headway contributors for plain
line are as follows:
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• R: A margin to allow for the braking system to react fully when commanded.
• B: A margin to allow for a full brake application to stop.
• S: Time to pass an appropriate safety/overrun distance such that stationary trains are
separated.
• L: Time required for the length of the train to pass (at minimum train speed for vari-
able velocity scenarios.)
Figure 6.2 London Underground plain line headway contributors.
COp =CUI×CT p (6.1)
CT p = 3600/Hp (6.2)
Hp = B+R+L+S (6.3)
db = vline2/2bsbg (6.4)
B = db/vline = vline/2bsbg (6.5)
S = ds/min{vline,vswitch} (6.6)
L = ltrain/min{vline,vswitch} (6.7)
Equations 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 describe the calculation of B, S and L respectively, from
parameters in Table 6.2; R is constant. Braking distance db is calculated from the service
guaranteed braking rate using the equation of motion in 6.4. Service guaranteed braking
rate is a worst case deceleration rate expressed as a factor (bg) of service braking, a lower
deceleration rate than achieved in normal running. B is the time it takes to cover this distance
at line speed.
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Figure 6.3 London Underground plain line headway contributors as a function of line speed.
Figure 6.4 Plot showing London Underground plain line capacity as a function of line speed.
(a) Peak capacity achieved at 44mph. (b) Line speed is 60mph, meaning slowed trains do
not have a negative impact on capacity unless below 18.5mph (c).
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Figure 6.3 plots headway and contributors, in seconds, against line speed vline. At low
speeds, headway is dominated by the safety margin S and train length L. At more typi-
cal line speeds (>30mph), braking margin B becomes dominant. Figure 6.3 identifies that,
for this set of parameters, minimum headway of 26.5 seconds is achieved at a line speed
of 19.6ms−1 (44 mph), equating to a peak capacity of 136 STPH or 102 OTPH. This re-
sult corresponds to the S-Stock design speed of 27.7ms−1 (62 mph), and line peak design
speed of 26.8ms−1 (60 mph). Though capacity at line speed of 60mph is below peak, it is
important that a speed drop results in a capacity increase, otherwise delay propagation is
self-perpetuating (Figure 6.4). Note the calculated capacity is high when compared to real-
world service levels, but represents the smallest safe distance between trains on infinite,
straight track with no external influence (station calls, terminations/turnarounds, junctions
etc).
6.4.3 Case study i: Diverging junction
6.4.3.1 Headway margins
At a diverging turnout, additional margins are added to the plain line headway; not all
margins apply to each move, application of each is specified in Table 6.3:
• P: Time for the switch to move, lock and detect its new position.
• I: Time for the interlocking to process and issue movement authority.
• Md: If the turnout route has a lower speed limit, time for the train to brake to the lower
speed on the mainline.
• Dcd: If the turnout route has a lower speed limit, additional time for the train to clear
the switch at the lower speed, until it no longer encroaches the mainline. Includes an
additional safety distance ds(switch).
Figure 6.5 London Underground diverging junction, alternating service pattern headway
contributors
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Speed Restriction? Previous Train Current Train Headway Contributors
Plain Line Junction
B R L S P I Md Dcd
No A-C A-C 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
A-C A-E 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
A-E A-C 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
A-E A-E 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Yes A-C A-C 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
A-C A-E 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A-E A-C 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
A-E A-E 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
Table 6.3 Headway contributors for each sequence of trains through a diverging junction
(Referring to Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.5 illustrates margins in the case of an alternating service pattern through a
junction with a speed restriction. From Table 6.3, with the potential speed restrictions under
study, a service pattern of alternating destinations represents the lowest capacity scenario.
Capacity is calculated in Equation 6.8, using the mean headway calculated in Equation 6.9.
Where different routes have different headways, a mean is used to calculate capacity in
Equation 6.8. Equations 6.10 and 6.11 describe the calculation of headway margins. A full
table of results across a range of line speeds is presented in Table 6.5.
CT d = 3600/Hd(mean) (6.8)
Hd(mean) =
2(B+R+L+S+P+ I)+Md +Dcd
2
(6.9)
Md =
(vline(vline− vswitch)
bgbs
)
−
(vline2− vswitch2
2bgbs
)
vline
(6.10)
Dcd = (ds(switch)+dtip f p)/vswitch (6.11)
6.4.4 Case study ii: Converging junction
6.4.4.1 Headway margins
At a converging turnout, additional margins are added to the plain line headway; not all
margins apply to each move, application of each is specified in Table 6.4. The associated
headway margins are illustrated in Figure 6.6.
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Turnout Speed
restriction? Previous Train Current Train Headway Contributors
Plain Line Junction
B R L S P I Ma Dcc
No D-B D-B 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
D-B F-B 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
F-B D-B 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
F-B F-B 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Yes D-B D-B 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
D-B F-B 1 1 1 1 O/lay O/lay 1 1
F-B D-B 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
F-B F-B 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
Table 6.4 Headway contributors for each sequence of trains through a converging junction
(referring to Figure 6.1.
• P Time for the switch to move, lock and detect its new position.
• I Time for the interlocking to receive detection confirmation, process, and issue a
movement authority to the train.
• Ma: If the turnout route has a lower speed limit, time for the train to accelerate to line
speed upon the mainline.
• Dcc: If the turnout route has a lower speed limit, additional time for the train to clear
the switch at the lower speed, to such a position where its rear is beyond the switch
tips.
Figure 6.6 London Underground converging junction, alternating service pattern headway
contributors
From Table 6.3, it is clear that with or without a speed restriction, a service pattern of
alternating routes represents the lowest capacity scenario. Capacity is calculated in Equation
6.4 London Underground scenarios (i-iii) 156
6.12, from mean headway, itself calculated from contributors in equation 6.13. Equation
6.14 describes the calculation of, Ma, the mainline acceleration margin. Where contributions
from P and I is present, for one route they can be overlaid (that is, only the greatest of the
two margins is used) alongside Ma +Cd as this headway is ‘empty’ after the junction in an
alternating pattern, as per Figure 6.6. A full table of results across a range of line speeds is
presented in Table 6.6.
Cc = 3600/Hc(mean) (6.12)
Hc(mean) =
2(B+R+L+S)+P+ I +max{(P+ I),(Ma +Dcc)}
2
(6.13)
Ma =
(vline(vline− vswitch)
as
)
−
(vline2− vswitch2
2as
)
vline
(6.14)
Dcc = dtip f p/vswitch (6.15)
6.4.5 Case study iii: Double junction
Many junctions in the LU system are double flat junctions, as depicted in Figure 6.1. The
capacity of a flat double junction in both directions can be calculated from 6.16, using the
mean headway calculated in 6.17. This introduces one additional margin and one constraint
for movements as follows:
• Dcdbl: Time for trains taking route A-E clearing the junction, at a lower speed if there
is a speed restriction, now needs to be calculated with the longer clearance distance
dtip f pdbl replacing dtip f p to allow the train to also clear the conflict zone for trains
taking route D-B. Calculated in Equation 6.18
• P: Trains cannot receive MA for the D-B route until points set for the A-E route
are reset to A-C due to flank protection requirements (Marks, 2000), necessitating a
doubling of the points setting margin in this instance.
Cdbl = 3600/Hdbl(mean) (6.16)
Hdbl(mean) = R+B+S+L+P+ I +max
{(Md +Dcdbl
2
)
,
(
P+(
Ma +Dcc
2
)
)
,
(3P+ I
2
)}
(6.17)
Dcdbl = (ds(switch)+dtip f pdbl)/vswitch (6.18)
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The timetable compression method assumes train movements are synchronised to achieve
maximum capacity. The capacity of the junction in either direction is therefore limited to
the lowest of the converging or diverging values (therefore the longest headway). The head-
way is defined in Equation 6.17, which has three possible values depending whether the
diverging (first term), or converging (second and third terms, depending on the greater of
the overlaid margins) headway is greater. Full results are presented in Table 6.7.
6.4.6 Case studies i, ii and iii: Collated results and analysis
Tables 6.5 to 6.7 show a range of results for each of the case studies i-iii, using formulae
described above. Results are presented for a range of key line speed and speed restriction
combinations.
6.4.6.1 Analysis: Case study i, Diverging:
The additional margins present at diverging junctions constrict capacity as follows:
• Switch actuation and interlocking times P and I are added to headway through junc-
tions, directly reducing capacity. The reduced switching time of Repoint thus adds
less headway margin, and provides a capacity improvement over traditional switches
but falling short of plain line.
• Turnout route speed limits affect headways by requiring vehicles to brake on main-
line, and pass an additional safety distance and the switch at this lower speed, before
diverging. This influences parameters Md , Dcd and L. The improved turnout speed of
Repoint adds less headway margin, providing a capacity improvement over traditional
switches but again falling short of plain line.
• If Repoint is assumed ‘safe’, the switching time P and interlocking time I can be
overlaid onto the time S to cover the safety overlap distance ds, with the greater of the
two being used in the headway equation, reducing overall junction headway for train
A-E.
With traditional switches, the junction reduces available capacity to below plain line lev-
els. As expected, the greatest losses occur with the lowest speed restrictions on the highest
speed lines; a B-switch on a 90mph line leaving just 50.3% capacity remaining. However,
isolated converging and diverging switches are more often found at lower line speeds (depots
and stations). Capacity loss is heavily influenced by the presence and magnitude of speed
restriction at the switch, influencing Md , Dcd and L, the switch actuation and confirmation
time also has an effect, with junctions without speed restriction only achieving around 80%
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Line speed (mph) 15 30 44 62 75 90 15 30 44 62 75 90
Switch Speed Actuation Operational Capacity Co (OTPH) Fraction of plain line capacity (%)
type restriction time
(mph) (s)
Plain line
n/a 64.3 95.4 101.8 96.3 89.5 81.4 n/a
Traditional
None 6 52.9 72.4 76.0 72.9 68.9 64.0 82.4 75.9 74.7 75.7 77.0 78.7
SG 60 6 52.9 72.4 76.0 66.7 62.1 56.5 82.4 75.9 74.7 69.2 69.4 69.4
F 50 6 52.9 72.4 76.0 64.3 59.5 53.9 82.4 75.9 74.7 66.8 66.4 66.2
E 40 6 52.9 72.4 65.9 60.6 55.9 50.7 82.4 75.9 64.8 62.9 62.4 62.3
D 30 6 52.9 72.4 60.6 55.4 51.1 46.6 82.4 75.9 59.6 57.5 57.1 57.2
C 25 6 52.9 58.0 56.9 52.0 48.2 44.0 82.4 60.8 55.9 54.0 53.8 54.1
B 20 6 52.9 53.5 52.2 47.9 44.5 40.9 82.4 56.1 51.3 49.7 49.8 50.3
Repoint - Reduced actuation time
None 0.337 59.6 85.3 90.4 86.1 80.6 73.9 92.6 89.5 88.8 89.4 90.0 90.9
SG 60 0.339 59.6 85.3 90.4 77.6 71.4 64.1 92.6 89.4 88.8 80.5 79.8 78.7
F 50 0.322 59.6 85.4 90.5 74.4 68.0 60.8 92.7 89.5 88.9 77.2 75.9 74.7
E 40 0.304 59.6 85.4 76.6 69.5 63.4 56.8 92.7 89.5 75.2 72.1 70.8 69.7
D 30 0.312 59.6 85.4 69.5 62.7 57.3 51.6 92.7 89.5 68.3 65.1 64.0 63.5
C 25 0.341 59.6 66.1 64.6 58.4 53.6 48.5 92.6 69.3 63.5 60.6 59.8 59.6
B 20 0.404 59.5 60.2 58.6 53.2 49.1 44.7 92.5 63.1 57.5 55.2 54.8 55.0
Repoint - Increased turnout speed restriction
None 6 52.9 72.4 76.0 72.9 68.9 64.0 82.4 75.9 74.7 75.7 77.0 78.7
SG 77.46 6 52.9 72.4 76.0 72.9 68.9 59.6 82.4 75.9 74.7 75.7 77.0 73.2
F 59.72 6 52.9 72.4 76.0 66.7 62.1 56.4 82.4 75.9 74.7 69.2 69.3 69.3
E 48.43 6 52.9 72.4 76.0 63.8 59.0 53.5 82.4 75.9 74.7 66.2 65.9 65.7
D 34.72 6 52.9 72.4 63.5 58.1 53.6 48.7 82.4 75.9 62.3 60.3 59.8 59.8
C 29.89 6 52.9 61.3 60.6 55.3 51.1 46.5 82.4 64.2 59.5 57.4 57.1 57.2
B 25.86 6 52.9 58.7 57.6 52.6 48.7 44.5 82.4 61.5 56.6 54.6 54.4 54.7
Repoint - Assumption of safety
None 6 58.1 80.4 81.9 76.7 71.7 66.0 90.3 84.3 80.4 79.6 80.1 81.0
SG 60 6 58.1 80.4 81.9 69.8 64.3 58.0 90.3 84.3 80.4 72.5 71.9 71.3
F 50 6 58.1 80.4 81.9 67.2 61.5 55.3 90.3 84.3 80.4 69.8 68.7 67.9
E 40 6 58.1 80.4 70.3 63.2 57.7 51.9 90.3 84.3 69.0 65.6 64.4 63.8
D 30 6 58.1 80.4 64.3 57.5 52.6 47.6 90.3 84.3 63.2 59.7 58.8 58.5
C 25 6 58.1 63.1 60.1 53.9 49.5 44.9 90.3 66.1 59.1 55.9 55.3 55.2
B 20 6 58.1 57.8 54.9 49.5 45.7 41.7 90.3 60.6 54.0 51.4 51.0 51.3
Repoint - Reduced actuation time AND Increased turnout speed restriction
None 0.337 59.6 85.3 90.4 86.1 80.6 73.9 92.6 89.5 88.8 89.4 90.0 90.9
SG 77.46 0.339 59.6 85.3 90.4 86.1 80.6 68.1 92.6 89.4 88.8 89.4 90.0 83.7
F 59.72 0.322 59.6 85.4 90.5 77.5 71.4 64.0 92.7 89.5 88.9 80.5 79.7 78.7
E 48.43 0.304 59.6 85.4 90.5 73.8 67.3 60.2 92.7 89.5 88.9 76.6 75.2 74.0
D 34.72 0.312 59.6 85.4 73.2 66.2 60.4 54.2 92.7 89.5 72.0 68.7 67.4 66.6
C 29.89 0.341 59.6 70.3 69.4 62.6 57.2 51.6 92.6 73.7 68.2 65.0 63.9 63.3
B 25.86 0.404 59.5 66.8 65.4 59.1 54.2 49.0 92.5 70.0 64.3 61.3 60.5 60.2
Repoint - Assumption of safety AND Increased turnout speed restriction
None 6 58.1 80.4 81.9 76.7 71.7 66.0 90.3 84.3 80.4 79.6 80.1 81.0
SG 77.46 6 58.1 80.4 81.9 76.7 71.7 61.3 90.3 84.3 80.4 79.6 80.1 75.3
F 59.72 6 58.1 80.4 81.9 69.8 64.3 57.9 90.3 84.3 80.4 72.4 71.8 71.2
E 48.43 6 58.1 80.4 81.9 66.7 61.0 54.8 90.3 84.3 80.4 69.2 68.1 67.3
D 34.72 6 58.1 80.4 67.5 60.4 55.2 49.8 90.3 84.3 66.3 62.7 61.7 61.1
C 29.89 6 58.1 67.0 64.2 57.4 52.6 47.5 90.3 70.2 63.1 59.6 58.7 58.4
B 25.86 6 58.1 63.9 60.9 54.6 50.1 45.4 90.3 66.9 59.9 56.6 55.9 55.8
Repoint - Reduced actuation time AND Increased turnout speed restriction AND Assumption of safety
None 0.337 61.8 90.1 95.8 90.9 84.3 76.6 96.2 94.4 94.1 94.4 94.2 94.1
SG 77.46 0.339 61.8 90.1 95.8 90.9 84.3 70.3 96.2 94.4 94.1 94.4 94.2 86.4
F 59.72 0.322 61.9 90.1 95.8 81.4 74.3 66.0 96.2 94.5 94.1 84.5 83.0 81.0
E 48.43 0.304 61.9 90.1 95.8 77.2 69.9 62.0 96.2 94.5 94.1 80.2 78.2 76.1
D 34.72 0.312 61.9 90.1 76.7 69.0 62.4 55.6 96.2 94.5 75.3 71.6 69.8 68.3
C 29.89 0.341 61.8 73.5 72.5 65.1 59.1 52.8 96.2 77.1 71.2 67.6 66.0 64.9
B 25.86 0.404 61.8 69.8 68.3 61.4 55.9 50.2 96.1 73.1 67.1 63.7 62.4 61.6
Table 6.5 LU Scenario i results: Diverging junction absolute and relative capacity.
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Line speed (mph) 15 30 44 62 75 90 15 30 44 62 75 90
Switch Speed Actuation Operational Capacity Co (OTPH) Fraction of plain line capacity (%)
type restriction time
(mph) (s)
Plain line
n/a 64.3 95.4 101.8 96.3 89.5 81.4 n/a
Traditional
None 6 52.9 72.4 76.0 72.9 68.9 64.0 82.4 75.9 74.7 75.7 77.0 78.7
SG 60 6 52.9 72.4 76.0 72.8 68.0 62.7 82.4 75.9 74.7 75.5 76.0 77.1
F 50 6 52.9 72.4 76.0 71.7 67.1 62.0 82.4 75.9 74.7 74.5 75.0 76.1
E 40 6 52.9 72.4 75.2 70.3 65.9 60.1 82.4 75.9 73.9 73.0 73.6 73.9
D 30 6 52.9 72.4 72.6 67.7 62.0 56.0 82.4 75.9 71.3 70.3 69.3 68.8
C 25 6 52.9 70.4 70.6 64.2 58.9 53.4 82.4 73.8 69.4 66.6 65.9 65.6
B 20 6 52.9 67.1 65.7 59.7 55.1 50.2 82.4 70.4 64.5 62.0 61.6 61.7
Repoint - Reduced actuation time
None 0.337 59.6 85.3 90.4 86.1 80.6 73.9 92.6 89.5 88.8 89.4 90.0 90.9
SG 60 0.339 59.6 85.3 90.4 85.9 79.1 70.6 92.6 89.4 88.8 89.1 88.3 86.8
F 50 0.322 59.6 85.4 90.5 83.5 76.0 67.8 92.7 89.5 88.9 86.7 85.0 83.3
E 40 0.304 59.6 85.4 87.6 79.2 71.9 64.2 92.7 89.5 86.1 82.2 80.4 78.9
D 30 0.312 59.6 85.4 81.1 72.9 66.4 59.5 92.7 89.5 79.7 75.7 74.2 73.1
C 25 0.341 59.6 77.9 76.5 68.8 62.8 56.6 92.6 81.6 75.1 71.4 70.2 69.5
B 20 0.404 59.5 72.1 70.5 63.7 58.5 53.0 92.5 75.6 69.3 66.1 65.3 65.1
Repoint - Increased turnout speed restriction
None 6 52.9 72.4 76.0 72.9 68.9 64.0 82.4 75.9 74.7 75.7 77.0 78.7
SG 77.46 6 52.9 72.4 76.0 72.9 68.9 63.6 82.4 75.9 74.7 75.7 77.0 78.1
F 59.72 6 52.9 72.4 76.0 72.7 68.0 62.7 82.4 75.9 74.7 75.5 76.0 77.0
E 48.43 6 52.9 72.4 76.0 71.6 67.0 61.8 82.4 75.9 74.7 74.3 74.8 76.0
D 34.72 6 52.9 72.4 74.0 69.2 64.5 58.1 82.4 75.9 72.7 71.8 72.1 71.4
C 29.89 6 52.9 72.4 72.6 67.6 62.0 56.0 82.4 75.8 71.3 70.2 69.2 68.8
B 25.86 6 52.9 70.8 71.0 64.8 59.5 53.9 82.4 74.2 69.8 67.3 66.5 66.2
Repoint - Assumption of safety
None 6 64.3 90.5 88.7 80.8 74.6 68.0 100.0 94.8 87.1 83.9 83.4 83.6
SG 60 6 64.3 90.5 88.7 77.2 70.7 64.2 100.0 94.8 87.1 80.1 79.0 78.9
F 50 6 64.3 90.5 88.7 75.4 69.2 63.0 100.0 94.8 87.1 78.3 77.3 77.4
E 40 6 64.3 90.5 81.7 72.9 67.1 61.2 100.0 94.8 80.3 75.7 75.0 75.2
D 30 6 64.3 90.5 77.0 69.1 63.8 57.5 100.0 94.8 75.6 71.7 71.3 70.6
C 25 6 64.3 78.3 73.5 66.3 60.9 54.8 100.0 82.1 72.2 68.8 68.1 67.3
B 20 6 64.3 73.1 68.9 62.2 56.9 51.4 100.0 76.6 67.7 64.6 63.5 63.2
Repoint - Reduced actuation time AND Increased turnout speed restriction
None 0.337 59.6 85.3 90.4 86.1 80.6 73.9 92.6 89.5 88.8 89.4 90.0 90.9
SG 77.46 0.339 59.6 85.3 90.4 86.1 80.6 73.4 92.6 89.4 88.8 89.4 90.0 90.2
F 59.72 0.322 59.6 85.4 90.5 85.9 79.0 70.6 92.7 89.5 88.9 89.1 88.3 86.7
E 48.43 0.304 59.6 85.4 90.5 83.0 75.5 67.3 92.7 89.5 88.9 86.1 84.3 82.7
D 34.72 0.312 59.6 85.4 84.6 76.1 69.2 61.9 92.7 89.5 83.1 79.0 77.3 76.0
C 29.89 0.341 59.6 81.9 81.0 72.8 66.3 59.5 92.6 85.8 79.6 75.6 74.0 73.0
B 25.86 0.404 59.5 78.6 77.3 69.5 63.4 57.1 92.5 82.4 75.9 72.1 70.9 70.1
Repoint - Assumption of safety AND Increased turnout speed restriction
None 6 64.3 90.5 88.7 80.8 74.6 68.0 100.0 94.8 87.1 83.9 83.4 83.6
SG 77.46 6 64.3 90.5 88.7 80.8 74.6 65.7 100.0 94.8 87.1 83.9 83.4 80.7
F 59.72 6 64.3 90.5 88.7 77.1 70.7 64.2 100.0 94.8 87.1 80.0 78.9 78.9
E 48.43 6 64.3 90.5 88.7 75.1 68.9 62.7 100.0 94.8 87.1 77.9 77.0 77.1
D 34.72 6 64.3 90.5 79.5 71.1 65.6 59.7 100.0 94.8 78.1 73.8 73.2 73.3
C 29.89 6 64.3 82.2 76.9 69.0 63.8 57.4 100.0 86.1 75.5 71.6 71.3 70.6
B 25.86 6 64.3 79.1 74.2 66.8 61.5 55.3 100.0 82.9 72.9 69.4 68.8 67.9
Repoint - Reduced actuation time AND Increased turnout speed restriction AND Assumption of safety
None 0.337 64.3 95.4 101.8 96.3 88.5 79.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.8 97.5
SG 77.46 0.339 64.3 95.4 101.8 96.3 88.5 76.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.8 93.5
F 59.72 0.322 64.3 95.4 101.8 91.1 82.6 73.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 94.6 92.3 89.6
E 48.43 0.304 64.3 95.4 101.8 87.4 78.8 69.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 90.7 88.0 85.3
D 34.72 0.312 64.3 95.4 89.2 79.9 71.9 63.7 100.0 100.0 87.7 82.9 80.4 78.3
C 29.89 0.341 64.3 86.2 85.3 76.2 68.8 61.1 100.0 90.4 83.8 79.1 76.9 75.1
B 25.86 0.404 64.3 82.7 81.2 72.7 65.7 58.6 100.0 86.7 79.8 75.4 73.4 72.0
Table 6.6 LU Scenario ii results: Converging junction absolute and relative capacity.
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Line speed (mph) 15 30 44 62 75 90 15 30 44 62 75 90
Switch Speed Actuation Operational Capacity Co (OTPH) Fraction of plain line capacity (%)
type restriction time
(mph) (s)
Plain line
n/a 64.3 95.4 101.8 96.3 89.5 81.4 n/a
Traditional
None 6 40.0 53.2 56.2 55.1 53.1 50.3 62.3 55.7 55.2 57.2 59.3 61.8
SG 60 6 40.0 53.2 56.2 53.0 50.4 47.5 62.3 55.7 55.2 55.0 56.3 58.3
F 50 6 40.0 53.2 56.2 51.8 49.3 46.5 62.3 55.7 55.2 53.7 55.1 57.1
E 40 6 40.0 53.2 52.5 50.0 47.8 44.7 62.3 55.7 51.6 51.9 53.4 54.9
D 30 6 40.0 53.2 49.6 47.3 44.5 41.3 62.3 55.7 48.8 49.1 49.7 50.7
C 25 6 40.0 47.5 47.5 44.5 42.0 39.1 62.3 49.7 46.7 46.2 46.9 48.0
B 20 6 40.0 44.4 43.8 41.1 38.8 36.3 62.3 46.6 43.0 42.6 43.4 44.6
Repoint - Reduced actuation time
None 0.337 47.2 71.8 79.6 77.6 73.6 68.3 73.3 75.3 78.2 80.5 82.2 84.0
SG 60 0.339 47.2 71.8 79.6 70.8 66.3 61.2 73.3 75.3 78.2 73.4 74.0 75.2
F 50 0.322 47.2 71.8 79.6 67.5 63.4 58.8 73.4 75.3 78.2 70.1 70.8 72.2
E 40 0.304 47.2 71.9 67.1 63.1 59.5 55.0 73.4 75.3 65.9 65.5 66.5 67.6
D 30 0.312 47.2 71.9 60.1 56.9 54.0 50.0 73.4 75.3 59.1 59.1 60.3 61.4
C 25 0.341 47.2 55.3 55.5 52.7 50.2 46.7 73.3 58.0 54.5 54.7 56.1 57.4
B 20 0.404 47.1 49.6 49.7 47.5 45.4 42.8 73.3 52.0 48.8 49.3 50.7 52.5
Repoint - Increased turnout speed restriction
None 6 40.0 53.2 56.2 55.1 53.1 50.3 62.3 55.7 55.2 57.2 59.3 61.8
SG 77.46 6 40.0 53.2 56.2 55.1 53.1 48.6 62.3 55.7 55.2 57.2 59.3 59.7
F 59.72 6 40.0 53.2 56.2 52.9 50.4 47.4 62.3 55.7 55.2 55.0 56.3 58.3
E 48.43 6 40.0 53.2 56.2 51.5 49.1 46.3 62.3 55.7 55.2 53.5 54.9 56.9
D 34.72 6 40.0 53.2 51.2 48.8 46.4 43.0 62.3 55.7 50.3 50.7 51.9 52.9
C 29.89 6 40.0 49.5 49.6 47.2 44.4 41.2 62.3 51.9 48.7 49.0 49.6 50.7
B 25.86 6 40.0 47.9 48.0 45.0 42.4 39.5 62.3 50.2 47.1 46.8 47.4 48.5
Repoint - Assumption of safety
None 6 48.7 67.0 67.5 63.7 60.2 56.0 75.7 70.2 66.4 66.2 67.2 68.9
SG 60 6 48.7 67.0 67.5 60.9 56.4 51.5 75.7 70.2 66.4 63.2 63.0 63.3
F 50 6 48.7 67.0 67.5 58.6 54.1 49.4 75.7 70.2 66.4 60.8 60.5 60.6
E 40 6 48.7 67.0 61.2 55.2 51.0 46.6 75.7 70.2 60.1 57.3 57.0 57.2
D 30 6 48.7 67.0 56.0 50.5 46.8 42.9 75.7 70.2 55.0 52.4 52.2 52.7
C 25 6 48.7 55.6 52.3 47.3 44.0 40.5 75.7 58.2 51.4 49.1 49.1 49.8
B 20 6 48.7 50.6 47.7 43.4 40.6 37.6 75.7 53.1 46.9 45.1 45.3 46.2
Repoint - Reduced actuation time AND Increased turnout speed restriction
None 0.337 47.2 71.8 79.6 77.6 73.6 68.3 73.3 75.3 78.2 80.5 82.2 84.0
SG 77.46 0.339 47.2 71.8 79.6 77.6 73.6 64.3 73.3 75.3 78.2 80.5 82.2 79.0
F 59.72 0.322 47.2 71.8 79.6 70.7 66.2 61.2 73.4 75.3 78.2 73.4 74.0 75.2
E 48.43 0.304 47.2 71.9 79.7 66.9 62.9 58.3 73.4 75.3 78.3 69.5 70.3 71.7
D 34.72 0.312 47.2 71.9 63.7 60.1 56.8 52.5 73.4 75.3 62.6 62.4 63.5 64.5
C 29.89 0.341 47.2 59.8 60.0 56.8 53.9 49.8 73.3 62.7 58.9 58.9 60.2 61.2
B 25.86 0.404 47.1 56.1 56.3 53.4 50.8 47.2 73.3 58.8 55.3 55.5 56.8 58.0
Repoint - Assumption of safety AND Increased turnout speed restriction
None 6 48.7 67.0 67.5 63.7 60.2 56.0 75.7 70.2 66.4 66.2 67.2 68.9
SG 77.46 6 48.7 67.0 67.5 63.7 60.2 53.9 75.7 70.2 66.4 66.2 67.2 66.3
F 59.72 6 48.7 67.0 67.5 60.8 56.4 51.5 75.7 70.2 66.4 63.1 63.0 63.2
E 48.43 6 48.7 67.0 67.5 58.2 53.7 49.0 75.7 70.2 66.4 60.4 60.0 60.2
D 34.72 6 48.7 67.0 58.7 52.9 48.9 44.8 75.7 70.2 57.7 55.0 54.7 55.0
C 29.89 6 48.7 59.2 55.9 50.4 46.7 42.9 75.7 62.1 54.9 52.3 52.2 52.7
B 25.86 6 48.7 56.3 53.0 47.9 44.5 41.0 75.7 59.0 52.1 49.7 49.7 50.3
Repoint - Reduced actuation time AND Increased turnout speed restriction AND Assumption of safety
None 0.337 50.1 78.8 88.3 86.2 80.5 73.3 77.9 82.6 86.7 89.5 89.9 90.0
SG 77.46 0.339 50.1 78.8 88.3 86.2 80.5 68.3 77.9 82.6 86.7 89.5 89.9 84.0
F 59.72 0.322 50.1 78.8 88.3 77.4 71.5 64.8 77.9 82.6 86.7 80.4 79.8 79.7
E 48.43 0.304 50.1 78.8 88.3 72.9 67.6 61.6 77.9 82.6 86.7 75.6 75.5 75.7
D 34.72 0.312 50.1 78.8 69.1 64.9 60.7 55.2 77.9 82.6 67.9 67.4 67.8 67.8
C 29.89 0.341 50.1 64.6 64.8 61.1 57.3 52.2 77.9 67.7 63.6 63.4 64.0 64.2
B 25.86 0.404 50.1 60.4 60.5 57.3 53.9 49.4 77.9 63.3 59.5 59.5 60.2 60.6
Table 6.7 LU Scenario iii results: Double junction absolute and relative capacity.
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of plain-line levels. The reduced actuation time of Repoint alone recovers around half of this
lost capacity in non-restricted cases, with between 88.8% and 92.6% of plain line capacity
made available in the unrestricted case. Improving the turnout speed restriction has a more
marginal effect, partially as the relative magnitude of speed improvement is smaller, and
partly due to the squared term in the braking equation being dominant with speed changes.
At the peak capacity linespeed of 44mph, combining reduced actuation time and improved
actuation time yields circa an additional 13% capacity across all speed restrictions - equating
to around an additional 11-14 OTPH.
In the case of assumption of safety alone, there is some capacity gain, but this becomes
marginal with higher line speeds as the combined switching and interlocking time margins
(P and I) become much longer than the Safety distance margin S, and therefore dominate.
This influence is negated in higher speed cases with the use of reduced actuation time,
indicated in the lowest section of Table 6.5, which indicates a significant capacity increase
across all speed combinations, with 94.1% plain line capacity available in the unrestricted,
peak plain-line capacity scenario (compared to 74.7% for traditional). At 15mph line speed
(no speed restriction), this means that 96.2% of plain line capacity can be achieved - a
significant result, as there are a large number of lower-speed diverging junctions on the
network, i.e. at grade-separated station approaches.
6.4.6.2 Analysis: Case study ii, Converging:
The additional margins present at converging junctions constrict capacity as follows:
• Switch actuation interlocking times P and I are added to headway through junc-
tions, directly reducing capacity. The reduced switching time of Repoint thus adds
less headway margin, and provides a capacity improvement over traditional switches
falling short of plain line.
• Turnout route speed limits affect headways by requiring vehicles to pass the switch
at lower speed and accelerate on mainline. This influences parameters Ma, Dcc and
L. The improved diverging speed of Repoint adds less headway margin, providing a
capacity improvement over traditional switches but again falling short of plain line.
• If Repoint is assumed ‘safe’, the switching time P and interlocking time I can be
overlaid onto the time S to cover the safety overlap distance ds for the D-B route, with
the greater of the two being used in the headway equation. For the F-B route, the
greater of P+ I or Ma +S is used. This reduces headways.
With traditional switches, the junction reduces available capacity to below plain line
levels; this restriction is to an equal or lesser extent than the diverging case for three rea-
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sons. Firstly, the acceleration rate as is greater than the guaranteed braking specification
bs× bg (the braking rate being safety-related, therefore conservatively set). Secondly, for
instances with a speed restriction, the influence of the points setting and interlocking mar-
gins P and I are negated for the train taking the F-B route as they are applied concurrently
with the acceleration allowance Ma, if present. Thirdly, Dcc is of lower magnitude than Dcd
as the F-B train does not brake for the junction, removing the requirement for the additional
safety distance ds(switch). As in the diverging case, capacity loss is heavily influenced by the
presence and magnitude of speed restriction at the switch, which influences Ma, Ca and L,
and the switch actuation and confirmation times, P and I. The improved actuation times of
Repoint now have a greater influence with greater speed restriction as in certain cases they
allow the margin to occur entirely concurrently with the mainline acceleration allowance,
Ma. The combination of reduced actuation times alongside improved turnout speeds has
significant impact, with capacity available at peak capacity line-speed (44mph) being im-
proved to 90.4% from 76.0% without a speed restriction, and 77.3% from 65.7% with the
greatest speed restriction.
Under the assumption of safety, the fraction of capacity available is improved over tra-
ditional and equivalent diverging cases. The magnitude of this improvement is greater the
lower the speed restriction. At 15mph line speed (no speed restriction), this means that
100% of plain line capacity can be achieved. This is due to the relative length of the fixed
safety distance margin S being long enough to mask the effects of points operation. As for
the diverging case, this result is significant, as there are also a large number of low-speed
converging junctions on the network, i.e. departing platforms. This result is replicated for
some higher line-speeds, including the peak capacity line-speed (44mph), with a range of
speed restrictions, in the case where all changes are made concurrently (the lowest section
of Table 6.6).
6.4.6.3 Analysis: Case study iii
The treatment of margins influenced by switch actuation, interlocking, and turnout route
speed limits is as per scenarios i and ii. Under the assumption of safety, the same overlay
principles apply as in scenarios i and ii, with the flank protection requirement also elimi-
nated, removing one P term from Equation 6.17.
Flat double junctions are more likely to occur away from stations, with trains running
at higher speeds; therefore this analysis will focus upon peak capacity line-speed (44mph).
As expected, in all cases the capacity of the flat double junction is lower than that for either
diverging or converging. In the traditional case, at peak capacity line-speed, capacity falls
to between 43.0%-55.2% that of equivalent plain line, depending upon speed restriction.
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Due to the multiplicity of switch actuation times P, including the requirement for the flank
protection, Repoint’s effect of reducing the switch actuation time is significant in recovering
a portion of this capacity, giving 48.8%-78.2% across the same restriction range. Improving
the turnout speed restriction alone has a much smaller influence (limited to an additional
4.1% at the same line-speed) as the associated margins are overlaid in the headway equation
and therefore no longer influential when compared to switch actuation times. There is larger
gain when combining the reduced actuation times and improved turnout speed restrictions,
across all switches with a restriction, with the peak capacity line-speed capacities improved
to 55.3%-78.2%.
The assumption of safety has much less positive effect than in the converging or diverg-
ing case. This is due to the fact the assumption cannot extend to conflicting train moves -
i.e. the headways over the junction must remain as clear time margins, lessening the effect
of this change. This is true even when the turnout speed restriction is improved. If all three
changes are made concurrently, as in the lowest section of Table 6.7, then the assumption
of safety adds some benefit over the other changes in solitude; in all cases, however, it still
falls short of offering the capacity improvement available in scenarios i and ii. At peak ca-
pacity line-speed, however, capacity is improved to 59.5%-86.7% of plain line, depending
on speed restriction, which represents a significant increase over the benchmark, traditional
case described above. The results in table 6.7 are important for two reasons. Firstly, they
indicate the double junction scenario is the most capacity-constricted junction type for tra-
ditional switching practice on a metro-type system. Secondly, that a significant portion of
the available plain-line capacity lost in these locations can be regained through the enhanced
performance of Repoint.
6.5 HS2 Scenarios
6.5.1 Data Sources
HS2 is a High-Speed rail link in England, due to commence construction in 2018. It is
to consist of a segregated traffic network of high speed and high service frequency (HS2
Ltd, 2011b). Specifications for signalling (McNaughton, 2011) and track (HS2 Ltd, 2012)
are public domain, as are a number of third party reports verifying performance data (HS2
Ltd, 2011a; Systra UK, 2011). Data for the ‘HS2 reference train’ used in this published
modelling is proprietary, though key performance figures are published (Connor, 2014; Mc-
Naughton, 2011). These figures are used for modelling herein. Data sources identify that all
HS2 junctions are to be fully grade separated, removing conflicting moves. The flat-double
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scenario is therefore not evaluated, leaving diverging (scenario iv) and converging (scenario
v) only. Alternating train destinations will again be quantified as this represents the most
capacity constricted case.
6.5.2 Plain line capacity
Figure 6.7 HS2 plain line headway contributing margins (Adapted from (McNaughton,
2011)).
As per scenarios i-iii, headway on plain line must be established in order to evaluate the
capacity constriction caused by switches. Headway is calculated from margin contributions
in the same manner as previously. However, due to different signalling arrangements, to cal-
culate headway, Equation 6.19 needs to be used in place of Equation 6.3, with technical and
operational capacity (Train Paths per Hour) calculated from the result using Equations 6.2
and 6.1 respectively. As the proposed HS2 signalling arrangements are publicly available
(HS2 Ltd, 2012; McNaughton, 2011), plain line capacity will be evaluated for the in-service
case. It is again assumed that the line is straight and level and that driving is perfect, how-
ever in this case, the published specifications of the ETCS-L2 signalling system (Section
2.2.4.6) are used as part of the calculation rather than the assumption of signalling opti-
mised for peak capacity as in scenarios i-iii. Headway contributors for ETCS-L2 signalled
plain line are shown in Figure 6.7. Whilst there are many more margins in the HS2 headway
equation, most are specified as constant times rather than distances, meaning they can be
combined into Mconstant in Equation 6.20. This enables the simplified equation, 6.21. Fixed
margins are listed alongside other key parameters in Table 6.8. There are four line-speed
variable margins:
• B: A margin to allow distance for a full brake application to stop, at plain line speed
(Equation 6.5).
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• S: Time to pass an appropriate safety separation distance - in this case, End of Au-
thority to Supervised Location - (Equation 6.6).
• L: Time required for the length of the train to pass, at minimum train speed for variable
velocity scenarios (Equation 6.7).
• N: Time for the train to pass the detection section (Equation 6.22). The time contri-
bution of this margin is also dependent upon the length of the block sections, and the
speed of the given train.
Hp = B+N +E +S+A+T +R+V +L+C (6.19)
Mconstant = E +A+T +R+V +C = 20 (6.20)
Hp = Mconstant +B+S+L+N (6.21)
N = lblock/(vline or vswitch) (6.22)
Symbol Value Unit Description
Signalling and Infrastructure - (Source (McNaughton, 2011)).
ds 300 m Safety separation distance between trains.
lblock 1600 m Signalling block length (plain line).
lblock 400 m Signalling block length (in junction areas).
vswitch 62.5 ms−1 Turnout route speed restriction.
vline 100 ms−1 Design line-speed.
P 9 s Time for switch to actuate, lock, detect, communicate.
I 3 s Interlocking processing time for switch movements.
E 1 s A margin allowed for odometer error.
A 5 s Time required for the signalling system process the MA. ((Connor, 2014) states 10s)
T 2 s Time required for the signalling system to detect the train.
R 3 s A margin to allow for the braking system to react fully when commanded.
V 7 s Time required for the driver and train systems to respond to the MA .
C 2 s Time required for the MA to be transmitted to the train, processed, confirmed.
Rolling Stock
ltrain 400 m Length of train.
bm(= bg×bs) 0.687 ms−2 Mean train braking rate.
as 0.14 ms−2 Mean train acceleration rate (above 46ms−1 (Connor, 2014)).
Table 6.8 Parameters used in modelling HS2 capacity scenarios. (Source: (McNaughton,
2011))
Literature uses various HS2 reference train parameters, with particular difference be-
tween acceleration and braking performance. Due to the high speeds involved, choice of
these values when modelling (and, by extension, the eventual performance of the rolling
stock) has a significant impact on capacity. (Connor, 2014) in particular provides an expla-
nation of their derivation, opting for more conservative mean braking, and more optimistic
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acceleration values than other publications (McNaughton, 2011; Systra UK, 2011), leading
to lower capacity figures. Official published HS2 parameters are used herein to provide
meaningful comparison to published data.
Figure 6.8 HS2 plain line operational capacity vs line speed for a range of signalling block
sizes.
Figure 6.8 shows the peak plain-line capacity for a range of signalling block length lblock
values. This can be compared to Table 6.9, which shows the range of in-service capacity
figures published by HS2. Referring to the numbered points in Figure 6.8:
1. With 1600m block sections and a 100ms−1 (360km/h) design line speed, peak op-
erational capacity is calculated as 23.3TPH per direction, comparable to the official
published value of 23TPH in Table 6.9.
2. If train speed drops, then capacity increases, preventing self-perpetuating delay prop-
agation (as explained in Figure 6.4). Peak capacity of 26.5TPH with 1600m block
sections is achieved at 56ms−1.
3. At junctions, the infrastructure specification calls for the block granularity to be im-
proved to 400m to cancel out the effects of the additional margins explored later. At
100ms−1, this gives a capacity of 26.0TPH (a). At the turnout route design speed of
62.5ms−1, capacity is much higher at 32.5TPH (b).
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Assumptions Headway (s) Signalling capacity (TPH) Operational capacity (TPH)
Plain Line
Worst 139 23 19
HS2 116 31 23
Best 92 39 29
Diverging Junction
Worst 149 24 18
HS2 119 29 22
Best 95 38 28
Converging Junction
Worst 143 25 19
HS2 125 28 21
Best 106 34 25
Table 6.9 Published capacity of HS2 under different signalling performance assumptions.
Reproduced and adapted from (HS2 Ltd, 2011b).
4. ‘Moving Block’ ETCS Level-3 is equivalent to Level-2 with a vanishingly small block
size, illustrated here as 0m. Whilst Level-2 is specified, if Level-3 were adopted then
plain line operational capacity at 100ms−1 speed rises to 27.1TPH, a 16.3% increase.
5. If Level-3 were adopted, then plain line peak operational capacity is 43TPH, achieved
at a line-speed of 31ms−1.
The wide spread of results in Table 6.9 is due to different assumptions of rolling stock
(braking and acceleration) and infrastructure (mainly MA transmission) performance. The
selection of block size is easily controlled and has a significant impact on capacity. How-
ever, block joints are expensive, require maintenance, and have a reliability impact (Stanley,
2011), thus there is a counter-incentive to make detection blocks as long as possible. 1600m
has been selected by HS2 as a compromise, with a reduction to 400m at key locations to
lessen capacity constriction. Moving block signalling can release extra capacity, and elim-
inate a fraction of the additional performance impact in these other areas. However, (Mc-
Naughton, 2011) includes an important conclusion, which makes the argument to sacrifice
the 16.3% extra capacity available from ETCS Level-3 on HS2 due to the capacity-limiting
presence of existing junction practice:
The technical development of ETCS Level 3 (“Moving Block”) train control
system would have potential benefit for reduction in line-side infrastructure and
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hence maintenance workload and cost. However, it would be of little practical
benefit to signalling headway at the limiting points on the network at junctions.
Therefore it is not considered.
6.5.3 Case study iv: HS2 Diverging turnout
6.5.3.1 Headway margins
At a diverging junction, three additional margins are added to the plain line headway:
• P: Time for the switch to move, lock and detect its new position.
• I: Time for the interlocking to process and issue movement authority.
• Md: Time for the train to brake to the lower speed on the mainline (diverging trains
only).
In addition, the contribution of L increases as it is dependent upon lowest train speed.
Unlike the LU scenario’s, the Dcd margin does not apply as it is allowed for with the lblock
term in the train detection margin N. The simplified Equation 6.23, calculated using junction
speed values, expresses the diverging junction headway, Hd(mean). Results are presented in
collated form in Section 6.5.5.
Hd(mean) =
(
Hp +(Mconstant +B+S+L+N +P+ I +Md
)
/2 (6.23)
6.5.4 Case study v: HS2 Converging turnout
6.5.4.1 Headway margins
At a converging junction, an additional margin is required, Ma, the time for the train to ac-
celerate to line speed after traversing the junction, calculated as for the LU case in Equation
6.14. Hc(mean) is calculated with Equation 6.24 using junction speed values. Results are
presented in collated form in Section 6.5.5.
Hc(mean) =
(
Hp +(Mconstant +B+S+L+N +P+ I +Md
)
/2 (6.24)
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6.5.5 HS2 scenarios: Collated results and analysis
6.5.5.1 Capacity Impacts
Diverging junction capacity is impacted in the following ways:
• Switch actuation interlocking times Just as in the LU scenarios, a reduction in
switching time would directly influence capacity through reducing the P+ I term .
I is considered constant; changing it would require revising interlocking practice, be-
yond the scope of the study. The switch specified for HS2 has a divergent speed of
62.5ms−1 (140mph), which is higher than any existing British specification. Ideally,
actuation time would be established as in Chapter 4, however, this method is depen-
dent on full track specifications (for rail mass, stiffness, curvature, slope etc). which
are not yet defined. Linear Extrapolation of the larger values in Table 4.6, i.e. the val-
ues where GPE is dominant, indicates an actuation time around 1-1.5 seconds if NR
specification rail and switches are used, therefore 3 seconds could be taken as a con-
servative assumption. Figure 6.9 plots the capacity of a range of reduced switching
times in order to quantify the influence of the variable.
• Turnout route speed limits influence speed-variant parameters as explained in Sec-
tion 6.5.3.1. Repoint may offer enhanced turnout route speed limits upon a switch
of this size. Again, however, the exact magnitude of change is unknown. The mean
speed increase in Table 4.4 is 18%, forming a reasonable first assumption. A range of
speeds have been evaluated in order to quantify the capacity influence of the variable.
• If Repoint is assumed ‘safe’, the switching time P and interlocking time I can be
overlaid onto the time S to cover the safety separation distance ds, with the greater of
the two being used in the headway equation, reducing overall junction headway.
• With ETCS-L3 Signalling, lblock = 0m in plain line areas. At junctions, the assump-
tion is made that lblock = 200m, which has the effect of ensuring the train is clear of
the conflict zone in the same way as Dcd , though the practical implementation may
be somewhat different. This distance is inferred from the turnout specifications in
(Connor, 2014).
Similarly, converging junction capacity is impacted as follows:
• Switch actuation interlocking times As for diverging, scenarios, a reduction in
switching time would directly influence capacity through reducing the P + I term.
However, the influence is not as great as diverging, as the second train’s P+ I term is
overlaid onto the spare headway of the converging train in the same manner as Figure
6.6.
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Figure 6.9 Scenario iv results: HS2 diverging junction capacity. Top: Capacity vs. Turnout
route speed restriction for a range of switch actuation times. Middle: As top, with the
assumption of safety. Bottom: As top, with ETCS Level-3 signalling assumptions.
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Figure 6.10 Scenario v results: HS2 converging junction capacity. Top: Capacity vs.
Turnout route speed restriction for a range of switch actuation times. Middle: As top, with
the assumption of safety. Bottom: As top, with ETCS Level-3 signalling assumptions.
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• Turnout route speed limits influence speed-variant parameters as explained in Sec-
tion 6.5.3.1. At high speed, the mean acceleration of a high-speed train is significantly
lower than the mean braking rate, the opposite of the metro scenarios.
• If Repoint is assumed ‘safe’, the switching time P and interlocking time I of the first
train can be overlaid onto the time S to cover the safety separation distance ds, with
the greater of the two being used in the headway equation, reducing overall junction
headway.
• With ETCS-L3 Signalling, the same assumptions are made as in the diverging case.
6.5.5.2 Analysis
With reference to the numbered points in Figures 6.9: and 6.10, the following observations
are made:
• In the diverging case, the HS2 specification junction achieves a capacity of 21.4 TPH
(1). If the highest turnout speed NR specification switch were used (H-switch, at
40ms−1, with 6s actuation time) then junction capacity drops to 19.4 TPH.
• With a turnout route speed improved 18% (to 73.8ms−1) then capacity rises to 22.1
TPH (2). If the actuation time is reduced to 1.5s, this increases further to 22.8 TPH
(3). These are significant improvements when compared with the plain-line capacity
limit.
• Counter-intuitively, for certain combinations of switch performance characteristics,
the junction has a higher capacity than equivalent plain line (4). This is due to the
reduced detection block length lblock of 400m in place at the junction.
• With a Repoint switch under the assumption of safety alone, capacity rises to 21.7
TPH (5), a minimal improvement over standard. With improved turnout speed (6)
and improved actuation time (7), this rises to 22.5 and 23.2 TPH respectively, the
latter equal to in-service plain line specification.
• At very fast actuation times, the limiting factor becomes S, the time it takes each
train to pass the safety separation distance (8). If an NR H-switch were used (90mph
or 40ms−1) , the switch could take up to 4.5s to actuate without affecting capacity
further.
• Under ETCS level-3 assumptions (i.e. block length lblock = 0 so the train must just
clear the conflict zone before actuation), the capacity of the standard specification
diverging junction (9) is nearly equal to the ETCS level-2 plain line case at 23.1 TPH,
and significantly greater than the original switch specifiaction (10). With a greater
turnout route speed (11), capacity rises to 23.9 TPH, and a reduced actuation time
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(12), further to 24.7 TPH; both of which are greater than the proposed in-service
plain line capacity.
• In the converging case, the HS2 specification junction achieves a capacity of 18.7
TPH (13). If the highest turnout speed NR specification switch were used (H-switch,
at 40ms−1, with 6s actuation time) then junction capacity drops to only 14.5 TPH.
• Improving the switch actuation time to 1.5s has relatively little impact (14), giving
19.2 TPH. If turnout route speed is improved 18% (15), capacity improves more to
20.7 TPH. With both improvements, capacity reaches 21.3TPH (16).
• Under the assumption of safety, capacity rises to 18.7 TPH in the traditional switch
performance case (17), or 21.3 TPH with reduced actuation time and greater turnout
route speed (18) (i.e. the assumption of safety gives no benefit here, as the switch is
not required to be actuated in a safety distance.
• At lower turnout route speeds, the limiting factor again becomes S, the time it takes
each train to pass the safety separation distance (19). Also at lower speeds, capacity
falls more significantly than with the diverging case. This is due to the acceleration
rate as being less than the braking rate bm.
• Under ETCS Level-3 assumptions, traditional junction operation restricts capacity at
20.1TPH (20); with greater turnout route speed this becomes 22.3 TPH (21), and with
reduced actuation time in addition, 23.0 TPH (22).
It is clear from Figures 6.9 and 6.10 that the converging junction presents the capacity
constricted case. This conclusion is supported by official figures, for instance in Table 6.9.
Not only is the converging junction more constricting, but capacity is also more sensitive
to the specification of turnout route speed limit, with switch actuation time being of lesser
importance. This is due to the acceleration rate at high-speed as = 0.14ms−2, whereas
the braking rate bm = 0.687 ms−2. This means the mainline acceleration allowance Ma
will be significantly greater than the braking allowance Md for a given turnout route speed
limit. Being able to improve the turnout speed limit is therefore of greater benefit to the
network capacity as a whole than an improvement in switching time. However, the results
are also sensitive to small changes in as; this suggests that if capacity proved an issue for
the network at some point in the future, increasing the installed power in each train may
provide an adequate improvement.
Under ETCS Level 3, converging junctions are again the capacity limitation for the same
reasons as above. Plain line capacity is significantly higher, but constrained without addi-
tional changes to the junction operation. These changes, specifically making the junction
detection block to be as small as the zone of conflict, in themselves yield a small additional
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amount of capacity. However, with reduced actuation time and improved turnout speed,
a large fraction of lost capacity can be regained with 23TPH possible in the assumed best
case. An improvement in constricting case from 18.7 to 23 TPH (23%) may not alone justify
the roll-out of ETCS Level-3 on the network, but may negate the earlier claim that it would
be of little practical benefit to signalling headway at the limiting points on the network at
junctions.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter has evaluated the capacity performance of traditional and Repoint track switches,
across a range of 5 case study nodes from two network types - Metro, and High-speed rail.
In each case study, the capacity of plain line was established using timetable compression
methods from UIC406. Next, the effects of switches, including a range of fault tolerant
switch performance based upon calculations earlier in the thesis, was examined. The effects
of faster switch actuation time, improved turnout road speed limit, the assumption of safety,
and associated signalling changes have been quantified.
In summary, the headline results are as follows:
For the metro study, the range of capacity improvement achievable through reduction in
switch actuation time and higher turnout speed varies significantly depending upon scenario
and location, but is of the order of 14.7% - 26.3% at typical metro line- and turnout- speeds
(44mph, 25mph). Under the assumption of safety alone, the improvement ranges from 4.1%
to 10.1%. Results calculated for a range of parameters indicate that enhanced capacity is
available across all implementations, though the greatest enhancements are upon flat double
junctions - where extra switch movements occur between each conflicting move. This is
significant, as flat double junctions are identified as the capacity-limiting elements of a
metro network.
For the HS2 study, conclusions are that Repoint alone could release only a small fraction
of additional capacity, as other aspects of the proposed system are the limiting factors - in
most cases the acceleration capability of the rolling stock. The capacity limiting case is the
converging junction. At these junctions, improvements in switch actuation time and turnout
speed could release between 2.7% and 13.9% additional capacity. However, also noted was
that Repoint allows a greater portion of the potential capacity of an ETCS Level-3 moving-
block signalling system to be realised, giving a 23.0% increase over in-service specification.
This is an important conclusion when considering the future development and deployment
of signalling systems.
Chapter 7
Design and development of a laboratory
concept demonstrator rig
7.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 introduced a new track switching concept. This chapter presents the modelling,
design and architecture of a scale Repoint laboratory demonstration and development rig,
constructed at 384mm ( 15") gauge.
The chapter begins by modelling switch operation at this scale, in the same manner
as established in Chapter 4, in order to establish size, force and power requirements. The
design, construction and features of the rig are explained in detail. The tasks described in
this chapter correspond to elements 8-11 in Figure 1.3.
The novel contribution of this chapter is to present the design of the first switch actuator
to use passive locking and a semi-circular actuation path. A further contribution is, in a
physical sense, the construction of the rig itself which will be used for future research and
development projects. The work presented in this chapter forms part of a journal publication
(Bemment et al., 2016).
7.1.1 Scaling of the development rig
A 384mm gauge (approximately quarter-scale) was chosen due to space constraints within
the laboratory. This is the gauge of the RHDR (Romney, Hythe and Dymchurch Railway) in
Kent, England; an option available for the first outdoor demonstrator. Though the smallest
gauge in regular passenger use, it is large enough to fall under British ROGS (ORR, 2006).
It retains the main features (i.e. sleepers, rail and switch design) of a mainline railway,
though noting existing RHDR switches are of a loose-heel design. (Figure 1.1)
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7.2 Modelling work for demonstrator development
This section corresponds to element 8 in Figure 1.3. To design an actuator and transmission
system for a scale application, it is necessary to perform the same calculations as in Chapter
4 with the revised switch geometry, including revised rail cross-section.
7.2.1 Source Data
RHDR supplied a report on the design of their track, signalling and rolling stock (Head,
2013) including a sample switch panel design which is shown in Figure 7.1. Key parameters
taken from the report are listed in Table 7.1. The turnout speed limit is 10mph; mainline
speed is limited to 25mph. There are no power switches on the network, all existing switches
are mechanically driven. The rail used is BS 35lb per yard as in Figure 7.2, for which no
published Ixx or Iyy values were available; these therefore had to be hand-calculated using a
geometric approximation created from three rectangles, indicated in the same figure.
Description Symbol Value Unit Source, notes
Shuttle Masses MSx 40 kg Estimated
Second moment of inertia (Horizontal) Ixx 663503 mm4 Estimated from Figure 7.2
Second moment of inertia (Vertical) Iyy 2140925 mm4 Estimated from Figure 7.2
Centroid in y Cy 38 mm From rail foot, estimated from Figure 7.2
Rail Mass MR 17.36 kg/m Figure 7.2
Head width Wh 43 mm Figure 7.2
Minimum flangeway Wf 50 mm Unspecified; estimated from Figure 7.1
Entry radius R1 201.9 m Figure 7.1
Switch design radius R2 76.8 m Figure 7.1
Rail neutral offset N 2r mm i.e. straight route and curved route
Table 7.1 Parameters used for Repoint laboratory demonstrator, including sources.
7.2.2 Static turnout rail profiles
As per the modelling process in Chapter 4, the first step in working out the switch geometry
is to define the rail end offset (Wh +Wf ) and therefore cam radius r. In this case, minimum
flangeway Wf was unspecified - inspection of Figure 7.1 indicated it is around 50mm, with
a railhead width Wh of 43mm. This gives a minimum cam radius r of 46.5mm. The decision
was taken to use the offset of the ‘full scale’ switches modelled in Chapter 4, setting the cam
radius to 60mm. This is more than enough offset for the RHDR scale, and means that though
the gauge is ‘scaled’ to 385mm gauge, the actuation components are of an appropriate size
for a full-scale switch.
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Figure 7.1 Engineering drawing showing layout of existing RHDR Pointwork. Reproduced
from (Head, 2013).
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Figure 7.2 BS 35lb per yard mining rail, and geometric approximation from three rectangles
used to estimate Ixx or Iyy values. Reproduced from (Head, 2013).
As the RHDR design is tangential, the next steps are to use Equation 4.11 to calculate
the slope γ at cam radius r of 60mm, with switch radius R of 76.8m, and then use Equation
4.14 to calculate the length lrepoint of the required natural flexing length. This gives slope
γ = 3.203 and length lrepoint = 3216mm. Inspection of Figure 7.1 shows the original moving
length to be 2515mm, making the latter result interesting, as all Repoint natural flexing
lengths calculated in Chapter 4 were shorter than existing (Table 4.3). This elongation is due
to the fact that the RHDR switch is a loose-heel design (i.e. hinged, rather than flexing rails)
which negate the requirement for longer switch rails to achieve adequate flexing length.
Figure 7.3 plots the proposed turnout road geometry overlaid on the existing geometry
extracted from data in Figure 7.1, including the ideal tangential geometry. It can be observed
that, as the Repoint natural length is longer than existing in this case, the natural flexure
curve forms a reasonable approximation to existing geometry, moreso than the examples in
Figure 4.15. In the absence of further work regarding vehicle dynamics, full-section rail will
therefore be assumed throughout - i.e. no optimisation of geometry through beam stiffness
modification is carried out.
7.2.3 Bearer spacing and differential throw
The demonstrator is constructed with three exit routes, i.e. a straight route and two turnouts.
The turnout routes follow the same geometry, with positive or negative offsets to give left
or right turnouts.
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Figure 7.3 Geometry of the turnout routes on the Repoint demonstrator. Top - from R2
origin to crossing nose. Bottom - close-up view of area from R2 origin to 120mm offset.
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Distance
from R2 Origin Bearer No Turnout route offset Slope Notes
mm count mm °
1070 0 0.0 0.000 Last static bearer
1530 1 3.5 0.840
1990 2 13.3 1.550
2450 3 28.4 2.176
2910 4 47.7 2.634
3370 5 70.1 2.920 Active bearer under software simulation
3830 6 94.6 3.148 Active bearer under software simulation
4290 7 120.0 3.330 Active bearer, physically constructed in laboratory
———————— Rail end interface ————————
4750 8 147.0 3.540 First track fan bearer
5238 9 179.0 3.890
5727 10 214.1 4.230
6215 11 251.5 4.631
6703 12 292.8 5.029
7192 13 337.3 5.370
7680 14 384.0 5.711 Crossing nose
Table 7.2 Bearer centreline locations and offsets for Repoint laboratory demonstrator.
Figure 7.1 indicates bearer spacing on existing RHDR switches. They are variable be-
tween 450-550mm through the switch, but constant at 503mm through the original movable
length. The new movable length of 3216mm falls directly between bearers, and as it is not
practicable to shorten this length, the demonstrator movable length shall span 7 bearers of
equal spacing with bearer 7 of offset 120mm placed at 3216mm. This sets bearer spacing to
460mm. Offsets through the track fan have similarly been adjusted to a value which allows
the crossing nose to sit centrally upon a supporting timber, 488.3mm. The offsets at each of
the bearers in the Repoint layout are indicated in Table 7.2. Of note are bearers 5, 6 and 7 -
the three active bearers, which have offsets of 70mm, 95mm and 120mm, defining the cam
radii r in each of the bearers as 35mm, 47mm and 60mm respectively.
7.2.4 Stress in rail during flexure
With knowledge of flexing lengths and tip offset, peak stress in the rail during flexure can be
calculated as per Section 4.5.4 Using Equations 4.21 to 4.23 with the scale values in Table
7.1, indicating that:
• Peak stress in the rail head is 138MPa and rail foot 157MPa, equal to 26-29 % of the
yield stress of mild steel at 540MPa (Vitaly et al., 2016).
• Peak stress is tensile, occurring in the rail foot, at the root of the curve, at peak lift.
7.2 Modelling work for demonstrator development 181
Actuation time t s 0.2 1 3
Elastic Potential Energy EPE (X) J 19.2 19.2 19.2
Elastic Potential Energy EPE (Y) J 61.9 61.9 61.9
Gravitational Potential Energy GPE J 77.8 77.8 77.8
Kinetic Energy KE J 34.6 1.4 0.2
Etotal J 193.5 160.3 159.0
Mean power W 1935 320.6 106.0
Table 7.3 Energy requirements of scale Repoint switch at selected actuation times t
• This stress is marginally higher than that experienced by a full-scale B-size switch
(124.9MPa compressive, 116.4MPa tensile) as studied in Section 4.5.4, despite being
at significantly smaller scale. Peak stress is now tensile in the foot, whereas in the full-
size switches, peak compressive stress occurred in the head. With the equivalent tip
lift, the effects of a shorter beam length are balanced by the smaller Iyy value deriving
from the smaller beam cross-section, leading to a similar stress magnitude.
7.2.5 Cam torques, energy use and actuation time
Work in Section 4.5.3 examines the energy required to flex the switch rails, providing an
example resolved to a single cam torque for an actuator at the tip of the movable rails.
Here, three actuator bearers will be used in a 1-in-3 redundant configuration (as modelled
in Chapter 5), enabling any single actuator to move the switch if required, thus meaning
each actuator must be sized to move the switch alone. Energy transfer Equations 4.15 to
4.20 were used with the scale switch specifications to calculate mean energy transfers. The
results of this calculation presented in Table 7.3, which lists key values at a selection of
actuation times. Power requirements related to actuation times are plotted in Figure 7.4,
which considers both regenerative and non-regenerative scenarios. The values in the non-
regenerative curve will be used to select an actuator. The regenerative curve can be used to
select a lower-value power supply, should regenerative braking be used, otherwise, a load
bank resistor of equivalent power to the actuator should be adopted.
Also critical to mechanical design is the potential peak cam torque loading. Power/torque
for KE requirements can be regulated by the controller as appropriate, but the effects of the
spring and mass are directly related to cam angle and are independent of actuation time
t. The beam flexure model described in Section 4.5.1 was therefore employed to provide
static x- and y- forces (also resolved to torque), for a 180 °motion of the cam each of the
three actuator-bearer positions. The results of this simulation are plotted in Figure 7.5. This
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Figure 7.4 Power requirements of the Repoint demonstrator actuator bearers.
figure shows that the peak equilibrium torque experienced at the cam is 218 Nm, which
occurs almost equally at bearer 5 and 6 (i.e. furthest from the rail ends), at a 48°cam angle.
Whilst forces at bearers 5 and 6 are significantly greater, the shorter cam radii r, identified in
Section 7.2.3, leads to a marginally lower torque requirement. The small differences in equi-
librium torques result from the differing static beam shapes when applying point forces at
different positions, which is illustrated in Figure 7.6. These figures feed into the mechanical
design described in Section 7.4.
7.3 Development rig design and construction
This section describes the architecture, design, construction and operation of the 384mm
gauge laboratory development rig. This section corresponds to elements 9-11 in Figure 1.3.
The goal of the rig was to demonstrate the operation of a Repoint switch, and to act as a
platform for future development of control systems to enable fault tolerance and condition
monitoring, as described in Chapter 4.
7.3.1 Architecture
For space and cost reasons, the rig was unable to feature an entire track switch panel. In-
stead, it consists of a single physical actuator-bearer in a HIL (Hardware-In-The-Loop) test
environment. The actuator bearer can be commanded to each position from a computer
workstation, either automatically on a timer or by manual intervention. The workstation
7.3 Development rig design and construction 183
Figure 7.5 Peak static forces (top) and cam torque (bottom) vs cam angle at each actuator
bearer position.
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Figure 7.6 Switch rail shapes at peak lift when switch is actuated by Bearer 5, Bearer 6 or
Bearer 7 in isolation.
also commands a software simulation of the remaining moveable switch elements. Several
photographs of the physical layout are shown in Figure 7.8. The functional architecture of
the laboratory rig is shown in Figure 7.7.
To aid visualisation of the switch and its operation, several steps have been taken. Firstly,
the stationary rails, switch rails, other bearers and sleepers have been plotted on the lab-
oratory floor. Secondly, interlocking rail ends (2 moveable and 6 stationary) have been
machined in ABS plastic to demonstrate the action of the interlocking elements, shown in
Figure 4.5. The stationary halves are mounted to the bearer 8 mock-up. Thirdly, the in-
terface workstation is linked to a projector which shows a large-screen image consisting
of a mock-up signalling control panel. This also includes a diagnostic panel showing the
motion of the active bearer alongside the software simulation bearers, and the whole switch
position. This screen is shown in Figure 7.9.
The system architecture is now described in detail referring to each of the five system
groups in Figure 7.7. Of the five elements listed, the author was fully responsible for the
specification, design and construction of the physical actuator bearer, and the specification
and design of the power cabinet and servo drive. These elements will therefore be described
in further detail.
7.3.2 Workstation 1 (dSpace)
The Human interface to the rig is provided through two IBM-Compatible workstations run-
ning Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise. The first workstation is for controller and model
development work. It runs both MATLAB/Simulink, and dSpace ControlDesk NG.
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Figure 7.7 Block diagram illustrating the functional hardware and software elements of the
Repoint laboratory development rig
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At design-time, MATLAB/Simulink can be used to rapid prototype control architec-
tures. These are modelled through the standard Simulink graphical interface, before being
compiled and exported for use in ControlDesk. ControlDesk has a specific interface mod-
ule for loading compiled MATLAB models, which creates a dSpace-compatible real-time
model for upload to the processor unit. ControlDesk also provides an interface design suite,
through which the inputs and outputs of the MATLAB/Simulink model can be assigned to
controls and visual indicators for the operator respectively. This feature has been used to
create both a local monitoring and operation panel, alongside the signalling panel mock-up
shown on the projector screen during demonstrations (Figure 7.9).
At run-time, the interface controller is used to command the HIL simulation - includ-
ing physical bearer - between positions. It can also display or log any relevant variables
communicated back from the real-time processor. In this implementation, this is the signals
from the sensors upon the physical bearer, but for future development could include force
transducers, for instance.
7.3.3 Workstation 2 (Kollmorgen)
The second workstation is responsible for interfacing with the Kollmorgen servo drive lo-
cated in the power cabinet, both at development time and runtime; this is achieved over a
direct Ethernet connection. The workstation runs the Kollmorgen Workbench software.
At development time, this provides a suite of setting options which can be saved as
unique configuration files and ‘flashed’ to the drive to change its behaviour. At runtime,
in this development application, the Kollmorgen Drive needs to receive a heartbeat signal,
which this workstation provides over the Ethernet link. Also at runtime, Workbench can
display key drive variables such as motor position.
7.3.4 dSpace PX10 expansion box (Real-time processor)
The dSpace PX10 Expansion box provides both the control of the physical actuator bearer
and the facility for co-simulation of the remaining switch elements and rail bending. The
PX10 is mounted in an equipment rack, alongside the breakout boxes to which it is con-
nected through proprietary ribbon cables. The PX10 box itself contains a DS1006 Real-
time processor board and a DS2202 HIL interface board. The DS1006 can accept compiled
models from Workstation 1 via Ethernet at design time. At runtime, the DS1006 can output
key variables, whether measured from the rig or calculated as part of the internal simulation.
These variables are transmitted real-time over Ethernet, and can be displayed in the Con-
trolDesk NG software on Workstation 1. The DS2202 board is an analogue IO board which
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takes 24v analogue inputs from the sensors on the physical actuator bearer, in addition to
providing an analogue velocity command to the kollmorgen AKDX 00307 Servo Drive in
the Power Cabinet.
7.3.5 Power cabinet
The power cabinet is a sealed metal utility cabinet. Power enters the cabinet from the supply
through an industry standard 5-pin 63A 415v 3-phase connector. A Type D 15A circuit
breaker is fitted to all phases; Type D breakers are designed to isolate in the event of a 10-
20x over-current. This rating is sufficient to allow significant inrush into the Servo Drive and
Motor without activating. A manual master isolator switch isolates the power electronics
from all three phases. The output of the breaker directly feeds the Kollmorgen AKDX 00307
Servo Drive (Kollmorgen, 2014). This drive unit communicates with Workstation 2 over an
Ethernet link, such that the correct parameters can be uploaded and monitored. Power is
provided to the motor over a direct cable connection, with a secondary connection from
the encoder providing a position feedback signal. The drive could be operated in several
functional modes; in this case it interprets an analogue velocity command signal from the
Dspace PX10 unit. Selection of an optimal control strategy may mean future operation is to
accept a position or acceleration command; though this would not alter the physical layout.
The main elements of this cabinet - power supply and motor servo drive, replicate what
would be necessary line-side, and what is provided in basic form in the location cases at
existing switch installations, under the ‘control and power’ subsystem designation used in
Chapter 5. For a fully triplicate redundant switch, three Servo Drives and a master controller
would be required. The cabinet also has wiring for two emergency stop switches.
7.4 Mechanical design of bearer 7
7.4.1 Overview
This section discusses the mechanical design of the actuator bearer 7. The bearer consists
of independent locking, actuator, gearbox, transmission, sensing and detection elements.
Those elements are connected using Dexion slotted angle to form an open box representative
of a hollow bearer. The Dexion allows elements to be replaced, adjustments to be made, and
the interaction of the drive components to be observed. Each element is now described in
turn.
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Figure 7.8 Photographs of the laboratory development rig. Clockwise from top left: [1]
Front view of the physical actuator bearer [2] Motor, gearbox and rack drive connection
[3] View of cam mechanism with hopper removed [4] Operator station [5] Detection Mi-
croswitches [6] Sensor connection cabinet on bearer [7] Power cabinet with 3-phase supply
and Kollmorgen motor drive [8] Close-up view of cam and locking block arrangement with
hopper lifted and unlocked
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Figure 7.9 Signalling panel mock-up which displays all bearer states as part of demonstra-
tion.
7.4.2 Locking elements
Though in a real implementation it is likely the locking elements would be steel, in the
demonstrator they are machined from engineering nylon for cost and capability reasons.
There are four sets of locking blocks in the bearer, a pair under each rail. All are inverted to
reduce the likelihood of foreign object entrapment; i.e. the cutouts are on the upper half. The
protrusion and cutouts are semi-circular in shape such that they are accurately self-centring,
spreading load in the event of minor misalignment, also allowing one rail to be raised above
the other to provide cant through the movable portion - this causing a slight rotation of the
shuttle in the z axis.
The horizontal faces of the upper locking blocks reach the vertical, meaning that a hori-
zontal force input does not result in any lifting force vector. The sides of the lower locking
protrusion have, however, been slightly cut back to prevent jamming. Figure 7.6 indicates
that under certain actuation conditions, namely the use of Bearer 5 in isolation, the rail ends
sag below the elevation achieved when Bearer 7 is active. This sag is of the order of 2.5mm.
The locking blocks have therefore been chamfered at their furthest natural protrusion, to
create 5mm clearance at TDC. Additionally, this has been chamfered such that, if the two
halves of the lock did foul during actuation, the resultant force vector would assist the rails
over the lower locking protrusion.
During actuation, the inside faces of the locking blocks act against the cam wheels to
keep the shuttle stabilised when elevated. The cam followers feature low-friction bearings
which act on the recess of the upper locking block. Crucially, the OD of the bearings is
10mm less than the ID of the recess. This means that there is much reduced chance of
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jamming, and that fine adjustment of locked shuttle position is performed by the interaction
of the geometry of the locking elements. This clearance also allows the actuators to move
out of synchronisation. The shape and key dimensions of the locking and cam elements are
shown in Figure 7.10.
7.4.3 Transmission
The transmission takes motion from the motor/gearbox to the pair of cams, ensuring the
cams turn synchronously at a suitable speed. Design was limited to what could be fabricated
in the laboratory. Chains and belts were rejected due to the potential sizes required for torque
capability, and due to the fact the cams must rotate in both directions requiring complex
tensioning arrangements. A shaft was also a possibility, but the accurate alignment required
for long-term reliable operation would be difficult to achieve. A rack was therefore chosen.
The rack is capable of transmitting high torque/force in plane, but also tolerant of mis-
alignment over its length. For demonstration purposes, an additional benefit of it being a
simple linkage is likeness to the actuation rods in existing POE designs (Section 2.2.4.4).
The cams engage with the shuttle in the manner described in Section 7.4 and Figure
7.10. Each camshaft has a pinion at the centre, which engages with the rack. Selection of
pinion size is a trade-off; a large pinion requires a long rack movement and therefore long
rack, but transmission efficiency falls with use of a smaller pinion. To transmit the peak
torque, MOD-4 gears were required, space-limiting each pinion to 15 teeth.
7.4.4 Actuator, gearbox and efficiency
The motor and gearbox were selected after careful consideration of the products on the
market which were able to perform the required functions in accepting analogue command
signals, within the specified torque, speed and power range, at reasonable cost. The motor
in the actuator bearer is a Kollmorgen AKM51H Brushless DC type coupled to a Thompson
70:1 Valuetrue ratio sealed unit planetary gearhead, which drives the rack via another pinion.
A planetary gearhead was required to acheive the correct torque/speed output, but allow the
actuator to be back-driven by the rails in the event of a power failure between positions.
The gearbox has an industry standard NEMA mount such that a product from many other
manufacturers could be retrofitted. The specifications of the motor and gearbox are shown
in Table 7.4. The motor is significantly oversized for application in both power and torque (4
×, for intermittent duty), such that it does not become the limiting factor in future research.
The efficiency of the driveline is the product of all component efficiencies, also listed in
Table 7.4, which forms an important input to Section 4.5.3.3.
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Parameter Unit Value Source
Motor: Kollmorgen AKM51H
Peak torque Nm 11.7 (Kollmorgen, 2014)
Max power W 1240 (Kollmorgen, 2014)
Max mechanical velocity RPM 6000 (Kollmorgen, 2014)
Quoted thermal efficiency % 92 (Kollmorgen, 2014)
Gearhead: ValueTRUE, Size 115, 70:1 Ratio VT115-070
Ratio : 70:1 (Murphy, 2014)
Max. Input speed RPM 5000
Quoted thermal efficiency % 90 (Murphy, 2014)
∴ Gearhead output
Max mechanical velocity RPM 71.4
Max torque Nm 819
Rack and pinion drive
Pinion to rack efficiency % 95 (Goswami, 2004)
Rack to camshaft efficiency % 95 (Goswami, 2004)
Overall driveline efficiency % 0.74727
Table 7.4 Key parameters related to the actuator, gearbox and transmission
7.4 Mechanical design of bearer 7 192
Figure 7.10 Shape and key dimensions of demonstrator locking and actuator cam elements.
Bottom right shows interaction of elements: Cam wheel (purple) lifts upper locking block
(green) from lower locking block (red) to a top dead-centre position (blue), showing clear-
ances designed into the mechanism.
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7.4.5 Electrical design
Rack position is fed to the dSpace PX10 processor via a yo-yo potentiometer, from which
cam position can be inferred. Three position detection micro-switches, mimicking the de-
tection subsystem in traditional switches, are installed to indicate hopper position in the
lowered and locked position independent of the rack position sensor. These are single chan-
nel only in the demonstrator. The motor is linked to the servo drive (power cabinet) via
two industry-standard cables - encoder signal and power. Emergency limit switches at the
extremities of possible rack movement are wired as part of the emergency stop circuit, used
to prevent the motor driving the transmission beyond its physical limits.
7.4.6 Design differences between bearers 5, 6 and 7
Whilst bearer 7 is the only one physically constructed, it is worth noting the minor dif-
ferences which would be present between the three should the others be constructed. All
elements would remain the same, as the torque and power requirements are equal (Figures
7.5 and 7.4). The cam wheels and locking blocks would need to be changed, to suit the new
offsets listed in Table 7.2.
7.4.7 Controller and sample output
Other researchers carried out a basic controller design exercise (Wright et al., 2014a,b) to
enable the rig to be run closed-loop and to verify the function of all elements of the system.
At rig commissioning, several sample runs were conducted in order to verify operation and
calibrate sensors, with sensor data logged. Figures 7.11 and 7.12 show samples of these
runs.
Figure 7.11 shows the command signal, detection signal, and lateral (drivetrain) position
feedback. The detection signal is assigned a value of 1, 2 or 3 depending whether the left,
straight or right route is selected and locked. Actuation time is that between command
signal changing, and detection being obtained, which is indicated by a loss of detection
(i.e. detection is equal to -1). It can be observed that the switching time during the initial
calibration runs is 1.5 seconds. Also shown is the software-generated horizontal and vertical
displacement of the shuttle, derived from the rack position sensor, which can be used to
calculate and simulate load due to the switch rails.
Figure 7.12 is taken from the controller model validation process (Wright et al., 2014b).
It shows the model predicted motor speed and current, and the measured speed and current
across the motor during a series of actuations, including the residual error. This demon-
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strates that the simulation models give a good prediction of the behaviour of the actual
units.
Figure 7.11 Data plots for a series of actuations on the laboratory REPOINT rig, downloaded
from the DSpace DS1006. Top: Command, detection signal, and rack position feedback
post-filter. Bottom: Software-generated horizontal and vertical displacement of rail ends
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Figure 7.12 Top: Motor speed and modelled motor speed vs time, obtained during the model
validation process (Bemment et al., 2016; Wright et al., 2014a), for the same set of runs as
Figure 7.11. Bottom: Modelled motor current, actual motor current and residual error, with
moving average. There is a considerable level of noise on the signal, residual error during
periods of motion is below 15%.
7.5 Conclusions and summary
This chapter has described the design and development of a laboratory-based development
rig for the Repoint concept summarised at the end of Chapter 3 and at full scale in Chapter 4.
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The chapter first establishes that a switch at this scale is feasible through modelling from first
principles, and in order to establish size, force and power requirements. The demonstrator
is constructed at 384mm gauge, and consists of a single actuator/bearer coupled with 2
actuator/bearers represented in software co-simulation and a rapid prototyping environment
for future control strategies. The tasks described in this chapter correspond to elements 8-11
in Figure 1.3. The novel contribution of this chapter was to present the design, development,
commissioning and test of the first switch actuator to use passive locking.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
This thesis presents research relating to relating to the improvement of track switching per-
formance through the introduction of fault tolerance. It presents the conception, develop-
ment, operation, potential performance and scale demonstration of Repoint, a novel fault-
tolerant track switching concept.
Track switches have evolved over time prioritising safety, with performance a lesser
consideration. Track switches are complex systems, at the boundary of many operational
elements of rail networks. Modern railway systems place ever increasing demands on the
performance of assets, and switches are identified as the weakest performer. The rail in-
dustry, and other safety- and performance- critical industries, have benefited from the in-
troduction of fault tolerance in order to maintain required operational performance levels
when faults occur. However, existing track switching practice does not utilise fault-tolerant
principles. The aim herein was, therefore, to investigate the opportunity to engineer fault
tolerance into railway track switching, and its potential to improve performance. This aim
was to be achieved through the 5 objectives listed in the research map in Figure 1.3.
Chapter 3 establishes the formal requirements for track switching, and creates a frame-
work for evaluating track switching solutions against those requirements. This meets the
first thesis objective. The requirements and framework are then used to select a candidate
solution for railway track switching from a range of possible solutions, including exploring
benchmarking their potential to improve performance versus that of traditional solutions.
The selected candidate solution is termed the ‘Repoint’ concept. The concept is novel,
and based around a stub switch. The concept uses ‘passive locking’, which enables, for
the first time, multi-channel actuation and locking of railway track switches. Its proposed
general operation is described in detail in Chapter 4. The concept is then modelled to estab-
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lish its physical feasibility. The concept is deemed feasible in key engineering and physics
terms, thus meeting the third thesis objective of establishing feasibility. Further potential
improvements in actuation time and turnout route traffic speeds are identified. However,
also identified are significant areas of further understanding required, related to the ride dy-
namics through revised geometries including the interlocking rail ends (See Further Work
section in 8.2).
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on meeting objective 4, which is to quantify the potential perfor-
mance improvement possible through the design. Chapter 5 studies the reliability, availabil-
ity and maintainability improvement possible. The analysis is based upon field data, used
to create models of the expected failure rates of each switch subsystem. Annual downtime
from maintenance interventions is established from literature and interviews. Failure rates
are then used as an input to modelling the potential reliability and availability of a range
of possible fault-tolerant switch architectures. Results indicated that considerable gains
in whole-system performance are possible with time to failure extended and unscheduled
downtime reduced by an order of magnitude. Typical B50 figures for powered systems are
improved from a typical 1-3 years in existing cases to up to 5-12 years.
Capacity performance was examined in Chapter 6 through a series of case studies,
around London Underground and HS2. The range of capacity improvement achievable
varies significantly, but is in the range of 4.1% - 26.3% at typical LU speeds. Fault toler-
ant track switching is able to release a large portion of the operational plain-line capacity
lost through traditional switching practice, either through a faster actuation time, a higher
turnout route speed restriction, or working under the assumption of being reliable enough
to actuate within a signalling overlap. In certain cases junction capacity can be 100% of
plain-line. Also noted was that Repoint allows a greater portion of the potential capacity of
an ETCS Level-3 moving-block signalling system to be realised, giving a 23.0% increase
over in-service specification upon HS2. This is an important conclusion when considering
the future development and deployment of signalling systems.
The original work of the thesis concludes with Chapter 7, which describes the modelling,
design and architecture of a scale Repoint laboratory demonstration and development rig.
The chapter began by modelling operation at 384mm ( 15") gauge, in the same manner as
Chapter 4, in order to establish size, force and power requirements. The work in this chapter
meets the fifth thesis objective.
Whilst this thesis has demonstrated the principles and benefits of fault tolerant track
switching, much work remains to be completed before a real-world implementation, some
suggestions for which are provided in the final section.
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Chapter 2 established, through literature review, that there were no physical or research
examples of fault-tolerant railway track switches. This thesis has, therefore, opened up
the sub-field of fault-tolerant railway track switching research. However, whilst the thesis
has answered the specific research questions presented in Chapter 1, in doing so it has
revealed more areas in which further understanding would be required before the practical
implementation of such solutions. The key understanding required is as follows:
• Chapter 4 suggests one mechanical drive arrangement to actuate the cams, as demon-
strated in Chapter 7. However, many options are available depending particular re-
quirement mix of cost, reliability, ease of repair, duty cycle, power requirements etc.
Other options include belt or shaft transmission, hydraulics, or twin-motor systems.
An appraisal of all possible mechanical design options would therefore be important
before development to product. The results may be different for different deployment
locations.
• Chapter 4 made a comparison between the natural bending curves of a stub switch
and traditional switch layouts. However, this comparison did not include the ride
dynamics of such differences. These dynamics need to be understood, and potentially
the curves optimised for such. This modelling will need to include the effects and
behaviour of the rail-end interface, for which much greater understanding will be
required before deployment, including differential wear between routes, displacement
during load, accuracy of alignment, and dynamic disturbance to rolling stock and
additional support requirements.
• Chapter 4 describes the novel rail end interface which enables the use of the stub
switch arrangement. Beyond modelling, this rail end will need to be extensively tested
in live use before taking passenger traffic. This may involve full instrumentation
whilst test traffic passes, over a range of track conditions. Design and execution of
this investigation will be a key part of future development of the idea.
• The culmination of the points above would be to develop, design, construct and oper-
ate a full-scale demonstrator of the Repoint concept.
The following is a list of other suggested areas of work building upon that in the thesis:
• Chapter 3 presented a range of novel designs which were then evaluated against a set
of non-functional requirements for GB mainline. As well as the possibility there may
be other methods of switching not explored in this work, performing this process with
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a different set of requirements may mean a different solution may rank highest and
offer greatest performance.
• Chapter 3 used the assumed performance of the ultimate evolution of the traditional
track-switch design. The development of existing designs to this point could be a
future research area, for instance combining fault tolerance in control or detection
only, or research into mechanical elements to enable such.
• Chapter 5 necessarily makes assumptions regarding maintenance response and repair
times due to insufficient data from the infrastructure owner. The accuracy of results
may be improved with this data, especially with variable repair times for the different
subsystems. In addition, another level of analysis could be performed with parts and
labour cost data, with the geographical locations of limited maintenance resources, or
with access constraints of installation sites, for example.
• Chapter 7 describes the development of a scale laboratory demonstrator which has
the additional purpose of being a hardware-in-the-loop rig to enable rapid prototyp-
ing of fault-tolerant control strategies. The control strategies for the actuator-bearers
need significant further research and development work. Three bearers need to act in
unison, potentially with motors isolated, with variable loads. This work may involve
loading the demonstrator with masses and/or springs to simulate the effects of the
movable rails. Further work could involve making the motors slow to a soft stop at
end of stroke to minimise potential wear on the locking elements, and to combine the
energy recovery and storage described in Chapter 4.
References
Andersson, C. and Dahlberg, T. (1998). Wheel/rail impacts at a railway turnout crossing.
Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid
Transit, 212(2):123–134.
Andrews, J. D. and Moss, T. R. (2002). Reliability and risk assessment. Wiley-Blackwell.
Armstrong, J. and Preston, J. (2011). Developing and calibrating capacity utilisation mea-
sures for nodes. In IT15.Rail Symposium: The industrialised Railway (Harvesting the
econmies of scale in planning and production, Zurich, Switzerland.
Armstrong, J., Preston, J., and Hood, I. (2015). Evaluating capacity utilisation and its upper
limits at railway nodes. In CASPT2015: Conference on Advanced Systems in Public
Transport, Rotterdam, The Netherlands. ERASMUS University.
Armstrong, J., Preston, J., Khadem Sameni, M., Potts, C., Khosravi, B., Bektas, T., and
Bennell, J. (2011). Overcoming the capacity constraints imposed by nodes on railway
networks. the 4th International Seminar on Railway Operations Modelling and Analysis,
RailRome2011.
Asada, T. and Roberts, C. (2013). Improving the dependability of dc point machines with
a novel condition monitoring system. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engi-
neers, Part F: Journal of rail and rapid transit, 227(4):322–332.
Bannister, G. (2015). Private Interview.
Bannister, G. (2016). Interview: Mainline poe maintenance, faults, fault teams and asset
management (june 2016). By personal communication.
Barber, F., Abril, M., Salido, M., Ingolotti, L., Tormos, P., and Lova, A. (2007). Survey of
automated systems for railway management.
Beer, F. P., Johnston, E. R., DeWolf, J. T., and Mazurek, D. F. (1992). Mechanics of mate-
rials. In SI Units, McGraw-Hill, UK, App.
Bemment, S., Dixon, R., and Goodall, R. (2012a). Redundantly engineered points (repoint)
for enhanced reliability and capacity of railway track switching. In The RRUKA annual
conference, volume 7.
Bemment, S., Dixon, R., and Goodall, R. (2013a). Repoint redundantly engineered points
for enhanced reliability and capacity of railway track switching. In Proc. 10th World
Congress on Railway Research (WCRR). Sydney, Australia.
References 202
Bemment, S. D., Dixon, R., and Goodall, R. (2012b). An evaluation of redundancy concepts
for fault tolerant railway track switching. In Fault Detection, Supervision and Safety of
Technical Processes, volume 8, pages 763–769.
Bemment, S. D., Dixon, R., Goodall, R., and Brown, S. (2013b). Redundantly engineered
track switching for enhanced railway nodal capacity. In Control and Automation Theory
for Transportation Applications, volume 1, pages 25–30.
Bemment, S. D., Dixon, R., Goodall, R. M., Ward, C. P., and Wright, N. (2015a). Design,
construction and operation of a repoint laboratory demonstrator.
Bemment, S. D., Ebinger, E., Goodall, R. M., Ward, C. P., and Dixon, R. (2016). Rethinking
rail track switches for fault tolerance and enhanced performance. Proceedings of the
Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit.
Bemment, S. D., Goodall, R. M., Dixon, R., and Ward, C. P. (2018). Improving the re-
liability and availability of railway track switching by analysing historical failure data
and introducing functionally redundant subsystems. Proceedings of the Institution of Me-
chanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit, 232(5):1407–1424.
Bemment, S. D., Goodall, R. M., Ebinger, E., Ward, C. P., and Dixon, R. (2015b). Extending
maintenance intervals of track switches utilising multi-channel redundancy of actuation
and sensing.
Bemment, S. D., Goodall, R. M., Ebinger, E., Ward, C. P., and Dixon, R. (2017a). The
repoint fault-tolerant switch. Proceedings of Institution of Railway Signal Engineers.
Bemment, S. D., Harrison, T. J., Goodall, R. M., Ward, C. P., and Dixon, R. (2017b).
Extending emergency repair response times for railway track switches through multi-
channel redundancy of functional subsystems. International Journal of Railway Technol-
ogy.
Bendfeldt, J. P., Mohr, U., and Muller, L. (2000). Railsys: a system to plan future railway
needs. In Allan J, Brebbia CA, Hill RJ, Sciutto G and Sone S, (eds) Computers in Railways
VII, 7th International Conference on Computers in Railways. pp. 249-255., Southampton.
Bezin, Y. (2016). Designing future turnouts–where research capabilities meet industry
needs. Rail Tech Expert Series, 26th January 2016, UIC, Paris.
Blanke, M., Kinnaert, M., Lunze, J., and Staroswiecki, M. (2006). Diagnosis and fault-
tolerant control. Springer, New York.
Blanke, M., Staroswiecki, M., and Wu, N. E. (2001). Concepts and methods in fault-tolerant
control. In American Control Conference, 2001. Proceedings of the 2001, volume 4,
pages 2606–2620. IEEE.
Boardman, J. and Sauser, B. (2006). System of systems - the meaning of. In 2006
IEEE/SMC International Conference on System of Systems Engineering, pages 6–pp.
IEEE.
British Railways (1962). British Railways Chief Civil Engineer’s Dept BR109 / BS110A
Continuous Welded Rail adjustment switch assembly. Technical report.
References 203
British Railways (1965). British Railways Chief Civil Engineer’s Dept: 110A Flat Bottomed
Adjustment switch (expansion joint). Technical report.
BS EN 60947 (1996). Bs en 60947: 1996–2003. Specification for LV switchgear and control
gear. British Standards Institution, 2003.
Cardani, A. (1958). IRSE ‘Green Booklet’ No.14:- Multiple Aspect Signalling. The Insti-
tution of Railway Signal Engineers, London.
Carey, M. and Carville, S. (2003). Scheduling and platforming trains at busy complex
stations. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 37(3):195 – 224.
Champion, D. L. (1957). IRSE ‘Green Booklet’ No.10:- Mechanical Signalling Equipment
(British Practice). The Institution of Railway Signal Engineers, London.
Chen, J. and Patton, R. J. (2012). Robust model-based fault diagnosis for dynamic systems,
volume 3. Springer Science & Business Media.
Ciobanu, C. and Nogy, L. (2017). Rail thermal force calculations for jointed track, article
3. The Journal of the Permanent Way Institution, 135(4).
Colantuono, T., Grossoni, I., Allen, P., Molyneux-Berry, P., and Borczyk, P. (2016). The
optimal strength of shear pins: Requirements in point run-throughs. Proceedings of the
Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit, page
0954409716682657.
Coleman, I. (2014). The Development of modelling tools for railway switches and crossings.
PhD thesis, Imperial College, London, Imperial College, London.
Collis, J. and Hussey, R. (2013). Business research: A practical guide for undergraduate
and postgraduate students. Macmillan International Higher Education.
Connor, P. (2014). High speed railway capacity. Citeseer.
Cope, D. D. L. and Ellis, J. B. (2001). British Railway Track 7th Edition, Volume 5: Switch
and Crossing Maintenance. The Permanent Way Institution, Derby, UK.
Corbin, R. (2016). Repoint Light actuator torque requirements. Technical report.
Cornish, A. (2014). Life-time monitoring of in service switches and crossings through field
experimentation.
Cribbens, A. (1987). Solid-state interlocking (ssi): an integrated electronic signalling sys-
tem for mainline railways. In IEE Proceedings B-Electric Power Applications, volume
134, pages 148–158. IET.
Cross, N. and Roy, R. (1989). Engineering design methods, volume 4. Wiley New York.
Davies, J. (2009). Modelling, control and monitoring of high redundancy actuation. PhD
thesis, Loughborough University, Loughborough University Institutional Repository.
Davies, J., Dixon, R., Goodall, R. M., and Steffen, T. (2014). Multi-agent control of high
redundancy actuation. International Journal of Automation and Computing, 11(1):1–9.
References 204
DeLaurentis, D. (2005). Understanding transportation as a system-of-systems design prob-
lem. In 43rd AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting and Exhibit, volume 1. Reno, NV New
York, NY.
Ding, S. (2008). Model-based fault diagnosis techniques: design schemes, algorithms, and
tools. Springer Science & Business Media.
Dixon, R., Steffen, T., Davies, J., Goodall, R. M., Zolotas, A., Pearson, J., and Du, X.
(2009). Hra-intrinsically fault tolerant actuation through high redundancy. IFAC Pro-
ceedings Volumes, 42(8):1216–1221.
dos Santos, G. F. and Barbosa, R. S. (2015). Modeling of a railway vehicle travelling through
a turnout. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail
and Rapid Transit.
Dowton, A. and Baker, C. (2002). A Guide to the Journey Time Capability Model Workbook
(PROPRIETARY). Technical report, London Underground Ltd.
Dwyer, V. M., Goodall, R. M., and Dixon, R. (2012). Reliability of 2-out-of-n: G sys-
tems with nhpp failure flows and fixed repair times. International Journal of Reliability,
Quality and Safety Engineering, 19(01):1250003.
Ellis, I. (2006). Ellis’ British Railway Engineering Encyclopaedia. Lulu Enterprises, UK
Ltd, London, UK.
Ellis, I. W. (2001). British Railway Track 7th Edition, Volume 9: Track Terminology. The
Permanent Way Institution, Wakefield, UK.
EN50126 (1999). 50126, railway applications–the specification and demonstration of relia-
bility, availability, maintainability, and safety (rams). British Standard.
EN61508 (2002). 61508-1: 2002 functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable
electronic safety-related systems.
Esveld, C. (2001). Modern Railway Track, 2nd Edition. MRT-Productions, NL-5300 AH
Zaltbommel, The Netherlands.
Fargher, M. (1999). Categorisation of track. Railway Group Standard, GCRT5023.
Fleming, E. (2000). Asset Management for the Safety of Signalling and Operational
Telecommunication Systems and Equipment. Safety & Standards Directorate, Railtrack
PLC, London.
Fleming, E. (2015). GE-RT8000: Rule Book (Master Manual). Rail Safety and Standards
Board Limited, London.
Foan, A. (2014). Application of RePoint Concept to GB Switch Geometries. Technical
report.
Fox, F. (1904). River, road, and rail: some engineering reminiscences. J. Murray.
References 205
Garcia, F. P., Schmid, F., Collado, J. C., et al. (2003). A reliability centered approach
to remote condition monitoring. a railway points case study. Reliability Engineering &
System Safety, 80(1):33–40.
GB Patent: Loughborough University (2013a). ‘Railway Points’ (GB 2516706).
GB Patent: Loughborough University (2013b). ‘Railway Points Operating Apparatus’ (GB
2516707).
GB Patent: Loughborough University (2013c). ‘Railway Track Crossing’ (GB2516712).
Genner, R. (1997). Railway group standard gk/rt0062: Control of points. Safety & Stan-
dards Directorate, Railtrack PLC, London.
Goodall, R., Bemment, S., Fujiyama, T., Mei, T., Preston, J., Romanovsky, A., and Roggen-
bach, M. (2013). The future of train control systems. Proceedings of Institution of Rail-
way Signal Engineers, pages 1–12.
Goodall, R. M., Dixon, R., and Dwyer, V. M. (2006). Operational Reliability Calculations
for Critical Systems. In Sixth IFAC Symposium on Fault Detection, Supervision and Safety
of Technical Processes, Tsinghua University, P.R. China, Aug 29 - Sept 1st. © Elsevier.
Goswami, D. Y. (2004). The CRC handbook of mechanical engineering. CRC press.
Goverde, R. M. and Hansen, I. A. (2013). Performance indicators for railway timetables. In
Intelligent Rail Transportation (ICIRT), 2013 IEEE International Conference on, pages
301–306. IEEE.
Hadaway, H. W. (1950). IRSE ‘Green Booklet’ No.5:- Principles of power point control
and detection (British Practice). The Institution of Railway Signal Engineers, London.
Hayter, S. (2000). Railway group standard gi/rt7004: Requirements for the design, opera-
tion and maintenance of points. Safety & Standards Directorate, Railtrack PLC, London.
Hayter, S. (2011). Railway group standard gc/rt5021: Track system requirements. RSSB
(Rail Safety and Standards Board), London.
Head, S. (2013). RHDR Track, Vehicle and Site Descriptions to Support the Repoint
Demonstrator. Technical report.
Hecht, H. (2004). Systems reliability and failure prevention. Artech house.
Hibbeler, R. (2005). Mechanics of materials 6th edition pearson prentice-hall. Upper Saddle
River, NJ.
HS2 Ltd (2011a). HS2 Birmingham to Leeds - Design Trade-Offs for Stations (HS2-ARP-
000-ZZ-RP-RS-00001). Technical report, Ove Arup and Partners Ltd.
HS2 Ltd (2011b). Summary Report on the Capacity and Capability for the High Speed
Network. Technical report, High Speed Two Ltd.
HS2 Ltd (2012). HS2 Project Specification. Technical report, High Speed Two Ltd.
References 206
HSE (2005). Railway safety principles and guidance part 2: Guidance on signalling. Health
and Safety Executive and HM Rail Inspectorate, London.
IAD Rail Systems (2001). High Performance Switch System, powered by the High Perfor-
mance Switch Actuator and the ‘Powerlink’ Backdrive. IAD Rail Systems HPSS specifi-
cations sheet, London.
IEEE (2004). 1474.1-2004 - IEEE Standard for Communications-Based Train Control
(CBTC) Performance and Functional Requirements. Technical report.
IRSE (1993). IRSE Report No. 2: Operational Availability of Railway Control Systems.
Technical report, The Institution of Railway Signal Engineers (IRSE), London, UK.
IRSE (2001). Introduction to Railway Signalling. Fericon, Reading.
IRSE (2011). Institution of Railway Signal Engineers, Minor Railways Sec-
tion: Guidelines On: Glossary of Signalling and Telecommunications Terminology.
http://www.irse.org/minorrailways/publicdocuments/GlossaryV1.pdf, Accessed 30-06-
2012.
Iserman, R. and Balle, P. (1997). Trends in the application of model-based fault detection
and diagnosis of technical processes. Control Engineering Practice, 5(5):709–719.
Isermann, R. (2005). Model-based fault-detection and diagnosis – status and applications.
Annual Reviews in Control, 29(1):71 – 85.
Isermann, R. (2006). Fault-Diagnosis Systems: An Introduction from Fault Detection to
Fault Tolerance. Springer, Berlin.
Isermann, R. and Ballé, P. (1997). Trends in the application of model-based fault detection
and diagnosis of technical processes. Control engineering practice, 5(5):709–719.
Ison, S., Frost, M., and Watson, R. (2012). Uk rail transport: a review of demand and supply.
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers - Transport, 165(3):225–234.
Iwnicki, S. (2014). The academic response to the rail technical strategy 2012. Technical
report, Rail Research UK Association (RRUKA), London, UK.
Jamshidi, M. (2011). System of systems engineering: innovations for the twenty-first cen-
tury, volume 58. John Wiley & Sons.
Jönsson, J., Arasteh Khouy, I., Lundberg, J., Rantatalo, M., and Nissen, A. (2014). Mea-
surement of vertical geometry variations in railway turnouts exposed to different operat-
ing conditions. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal
of Rail and Rapid Transit.
Kollmorgen (2014). AKM Servomotor Selection Guide. Technical report.
Kossiakoff, A., Sweet, W. N., Seymour, S., and Biemer, S. M. (2011). Systems engineering
principles and practice, volume 83. John Wiley & Sons.
Kroon, L. G., Romeijn, H. E., and Zwaneveld, P. J. (1997). Routing trains through railway
stations: complexity issues. European Journal of Operational Research, 98(3):485 – 498.
References 207
Landex, A. (2009). Evaluation of railway networks with single track operation using the uic
406 capacity method. Networks and Spatial Economics, 9(1):7–23.
Landex, A., Kaas, A. H., Schittenhelm, B., and Schneider-Tilli, J. (2006a). Evaluation of
railway capacity. Trafikdage/Trafficdays.
Landex, A., Kaas, A. H., Schittenhelm, B., and Schneider-Tilli, J. (2006b). Practical use
of the uic 406 capacity leaflet by including timetable tools in the investigations. WIT
Transactions on The Built Environment, 88.
Leach, M. (1991). Railway Control Systems. Miscellaneous Series. A & C Black.
Lee, P. A. and Anderson, T. (2012). Fault tolerance: principles and practice, volume 3.
Springer Science & Business Media.
Lew, M.-A. and Heede, J. (2016). Repoint Light Benefits Justification. Technical report.
Liu, R., Whiteing, A., and Koh, A. (2013). Challenging established rules for train control
through a fault tolerance approach: applications at a classic railway junction. Proceedings
of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit,
227(6):685–692.
London Underground (2014). London underground timetables. https://tfl.gov.uk/
travel-information/timetables/. Accessed: 2014-06-02.
Loosemore, J. P. (1958). IRSE ‘Green Booklet’ No.7:- Signal Control Circuits. The Insti-
tution of Railway Signal Engineers, London.
Marks, M. (2000). Railway Group Standard GK/RT0064: Provision of Overlaps, Flank
Protection and Trapping. Safety & Standards Directorate, Railtrack PLC, London.
Marquez, F. G., Roberts, C., and Tobias, A. M. (2010). Railway point mechanisms: condi-
tion monitoring and fault detection. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engi-
neers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit, 224(1):35–44.
Marquez, F. P. G., Lewis, R. W., Tobias, A. M., and Roberts, C. (2008). Life cycle costs
for railway condition monitoring. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Trans-
portation Review, 44(6):1175–1187.
Marquez, F. P. G., Tercero, D. J. P., and Schmid, F. (2007). Unobserved component models
applied to the assessment of wear in railway points: A case study. European Journal of
Operational Research, 176(3):1703 – 1712.
Marshall, N. (1961). IRSE ‘Green Booklet’ No.19:- Principles of relay interlocking and
control panels (British practice). The Institution of Railway Signal Engineers, London.
Mason, R. L. and Young, J. C. (2002). Multivariate statistical process control with industrial
applications, volume 9. Siam.
McNaughton, A. (2007). Intelligent infrastructure - good practice guide. Network Rail,
London.
References 208
McNaughton, A. (2011). Signalling Headways and Maximum Operational Capacity on
High Speed Two London to West Midlands Route. Technical report, HS2 Ltd.
McNulty, S. R. (2011). Realising the potential of gb rail: final independent report of the rail
value for money study. Department for Transport and Office of Rail Regulation, London.
Mitchell, D. L. (1958). IRSE ‘Green Booklet’ No.11:- Railway Signalling Power Supplies
(British Practice). The Institution of Railway Signal Engineers, London.
Modarres, M., Kaminskiy, M. P., and Krivtsov, V. (2009). Reliability engineering and risk
analysis: a practical guide. CRC press.
Morgan, J. C. (2009). British Railway Track 7th Edition, Volume 1, Design Part 2: Switches
and Crossings. The Permanent Way Institution, Derby, UK.
Murphy, T. I. (2014). Thomson linear: Gearhead, true planetary, valuetrue, size 115, 70:1
specifications. https://www.thomsonlinear.com/en/product/27-119360-J341. Ac-
cessed April 4, 2014.
Murthy, D. and Hussain, A. (1995). Warranty and optimal redundancy design. Engineering
Optimization+ A35, 23(4):301–314.
NASA (1995). Fault Tolerant Design (Tech. Report No. PD-ED-1246. Technical report,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Neill, C. J. and Laplante, P. A. (2003). Requirements engineering: the state of the practice.
IEEE software, 20(6):40.
Network Rail (2012). Fixed Assets Team: Data from Intelligent Infrastructure relating to
fault-free POE energy use. By personal communication.
Network Rail (2006). Standard NR/C&TM/TR/BSD 123/9 - Network Rail Training - Basic
Signalling Design (Section 11): Signalling Power Supplies . Technical report.
Network Rail (2008). Progress Report on the Development of the Asset Information Strat-
egy and Asset Register. Technical report.
Network Rail (2010a). NR/L2/TK/2049: Network Rail Level 2 Standard. Track Design
Handbook, Issue 12. Network Rail, London.
Network Rail (2010b). NR/SIG/SG0079: Signalling Responsibilities for S&C Maintenance,
Issue 3. Network Rail Engineering Standard, Network Rail, London.
Network Rail (2011a). Network Rail, London and South East Route Utilisation Strategy.
Network Rail (2011b). NR/L2/SIG/10660: Implementation of Signalling Maintenance
Specifications, Issue 8. Network Rail Engineering Standard, Network Rail, London.
Network Rail (2012a). Performance Modelling Team: Data from asset location database
and FMS (Fault Management System relating to points faults and failures for period 1
april 2008 and 17 september 2011. By personal communication.
References 209
Network Rail (2012b). Standard: NR/L2/TRK/001/MOD14 - Network Rail Standard - In-
spection and Maintenance of Permanent Way: Managing track in hot weather. Technical
report.
Network Rail (2013a). NR/SIG/10661: Signalling Maintenance Task Intervals, Issue 12;.
Network Rail Engineering Standard, Network Rail, London.
Network Rail (2013b). NR/SIG/10663: Signal Maintenance Specifications (SMS), Issue 4.
Network Rail Engineering Standard, Network Rail, London.
Network Rail (2013c). NR/SIG/11231: Signalling Maintenance Testing Handbook
(SMTH), Issue 7. Network Rail Engineering Standard, Network Rail, London.
Network Rail (2015). Discussion with Switches and Crossings Team (2015) on POE types,
populations, preferred installation types and future deployments. By personal communi-
cation.
Network Rail (2016). Briefing document: Analysis on existing point operating equipment.
By personal communication (Proprietary, unpublished).
Nicklisch, D., Kassa, E., Nielsen, J., Ekh, M., and Iwnicki, S. (2010). Geometry and stiff-
ness optimization for switches and crossings, and simulation of material degradation. Pro-
ceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid
Transit, 224(4):279–292.
Odijk, M. A. (1999). Sensitivity analysis of a railway station track layout with respect to a
given timetable. European Journal of Operational Research, 112(3):517 – 530.
ORR (2006). Office for Rail Regulation: The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems
(Safety) Regulations 2006. Technical report, UK Parliament.
ORR (2013). ORR (Office of Rail Regulation) Online Data Portal - Total journey count
reporting. http://dataportal.orr.gov.uk/. Accessed: 2013-10-12.
ORR (2014). The office of rail regulation: Strategy for the regulation of health and safety
risks, chapter 6: Infrastructure asset safety. Office of Rail Regulation, London.
ORR (2015). Performance regime, track access guidance (performance). Office of Rail
Regulation, London.
Palmer, J. (2012). The need for train detection. In IET Conference Proceedings. The Insti-
tution of Engineering & Technology.
Pohl, K. (1994). Fifth international conference on advanced information systems engineer-
ing (caise ’93) the three dimensions of requirements engineering: A framework and its
applications. Information Systems, 19(3):243 – 258.
Pope, R. (1975). IRSE ‘Green Booklet’ No.27:- Signalling the Layout (British Practice).
The Institution of Railway Signal Engineers, London.
Proschan, F. (1996). Mathematical theory of reliability.
References 210
RAIB (2011). Rail Accident Report - Derailment at Grayrigg, 23 February 2007 (Report
20/2008 version 5). Technical report, Rail Accident Investigation Branch, Department
for Transport, The Wharf, Stores Road, Derby, UK, DE21 4BA.
Rail, N. (2009). Meeting the capacity challenge: The case for new lines. Technical report,
Network Rail, New Lines Progamme, Route Planning, Network Rail, Kings Place, 90
York Way, London, N1 9AG.
Rama, D. and Andrews, J. D. (2013). A reliability analysis of railway switches. Proceedings
of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of rail and rapid transit,
227(4):344–363.
Rao, B. (1996). Handbook of condition monitoring. Elsevier.
Rausand, M. and Hoyland, A. (2004). System Reliability Theory: Models, Statistical Meth-
ods and Applications. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, Hoboken, NJ.
Rausand, M. and Vatn, J. (2008). Reliability Centred Maintenance, chapter 4, pages 79–108.
Springer London, London.
Raymond, W. G., Riggs, H. E., and Sadler, W. C. (1937). The Elements of Railroad Engi-
neering. John Wiley & Sons, New York, USA, fifth edition.
Rolt, L. T. C. (1982). Red for Danger: The Classic History of British Railway Disasters.
David & Charles, London, UK, fourth edition.
RSSB (2005). Formal Inquiry: Derailment of train 1T60, 1245 hrs Kings Cross to Kings
Lynn at Potters Bar on 10 May 2002. Technical report, Rail Safety and Standards Board,
Rail Safety and Standards Board, Evergreen House, 160 Euston Road, London, NW1
2DX.
Sarmiento-Carnevali, M., Bemment, S., Harrison, T., Ward, C., Bezin, Y., Neves, S., Kos-
tovasilis, D., and Sichani, M. S. (2017a). Repoint track switch wheel-rail mechanical
interface analysis.
Sarmiento-Carnevali, M., Bemment, S., Harrison, T., Ward, C., Dixon, R., Bezin, Y., Neves,
S., Kostovasilis, D., and Sichani, M. (2017b). Repoint track switch wheel-rail mechanical
interface analysis. In Proceedings of the 25th international symposium on Dynamics of
Vehicles on Roads and Tracks (IAVSD 2017), Volume 2: The Dynamics of Vehicles on
Roads and Tracks, pages 711–717. IAVSD.
Scholz, F. W. (2004). Maximum Likelihood Estimation. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Sharp, H., Finkelstein, A., and Galal, G. (1999). Stakeholder identification in the require-
ments engineering process. In Database and Expert Systems Applications, 1999. Pro-
ceedings. Tenth International Workshop on, pages 387–391. Ieee.
Silmon, J. and Roberts, C. (2010). Improving railway switch system reliability with in-
novative condition monitoring algorithms. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical
Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit, 224(4):293–302.
References 211
Simmons, A. (2001). NR/PS/SIG/2001: Requirements for Powered Point Operating Equip-
ment. Network Rail company standard, London.
Simmons, A. and Ventry, D. (2001). Requirements for Powered Point Operating Equipment
(Formerly RT/SRS/2001). Network Rail Standard, Network Rail, London.
Stanley, P. (2011). ETCS for Engineers. Eurail Press, Hamburg, Germany.
Steel, T. (2014). Rail technical guide (EN). Technical report.
Steffen, T., Schiller, F., Blum, M., and Dixon, R. (2013). Analysing the reliability of actu-
ation elements in series and parallel configurations for high-redundancy actuation. Inter-
national Journal of Systems Science, 44(8):1504–1521.
Stratton, D., of Railway Signal Engineers (Great Britain), I., and Leach, M. (1988). Solid
State Interlocking. "Green" booklet. Institution of Railway Signal Engineers.
Stratton, D. H. (1988). IRSE ‘Green Booklet’ No.29:- Solid State Interlocking (British
Practice). The Institution of Railway Signal Engineers, London.
Such, W. H. (1956). IRSE ‘Green Booklet’ No.2:- Principles of Interlocking (British Prac-
tice). The Institution of Railway Signal Engineers, London.
Sun, Y. Q., Cole, C., and McClanachan, M. (2010). The calculation of wheel impact force
due to the interaction between vehicle and a turnout. Proceedings of the Institution of
Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit, 224(5):391–403.
Systra UK (2011). Operational Concept Study, Technical Note: HS2 Capacity and Relia-
bility. Technical report, High Speed Two Ltd/SYSTRA.
UIC406 (2004). UIC 406(R): Capacity (English Version, 1st edition). International Union
of Railways (UIC), Paris, France.
Vitaly, M., Ludmila, V., and Irina, B. (2016). Analysis of stress distribution in a rail by
electromagnetic-acoustic method. In AIP Conference Proceedings, volume 1785, page
030016. AIP Publishing.
Von Neumann, J. (1956). Probabilistic logics and the synthesis of reliable organisms from
unreliable components. Automata studies, 34:43–98.
Ward, C. P., Mei, T., Hubbard, P. D., and Mirzapour, M. (2014). Railway vehicle optimisa-
tion using the concept of" design for control".
Webb, M. and Tee, J. (2015). IHS Jane’s Urban Transport Systems. IHS.
White, R. V. and Miles, F. M. (1996). Principles of fault tolerance. In Applied Power
Electronics Conference and Exposition, 1996. APEC’96. Conference Proceedings 1996.,
Eleventh Annual, volume 1, pages 18–25. IEEE.
Winter, A. (2006). European Patent: ‘Device for connecting railways’ (EP 1860238 (A2)).
References 212
Wright, N., Bemment, S., Ward, C., and Dixon, R. (2014a). A model of a repoint track
switch for control. In Control (CONTROL), 2014 UKACC International Conference on,
pages 549–554. IEEE.
Wright, N., Bemment, S. D., Ward, C. P., Dixon, R., and Goodall, R. M. (2014b). The
performance and control requirements of a repoint track switch.
Yearout, R. D., Reddy, P., and Grosh, D. L. (1986). Standby redundancy in reliability-a
review. IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 3(35):285–292.
Yianni, S. (2012). Railway Technical Strategy 2012: The future railway, The industry’s rail
technical strategy 2012. Technical report, Technical Strategy Leadership Group, RSSB,
London, UK.
Young, R. R. (2001). Effective requirements practices. Addison-Wesley Longman Publish-
ing Co., Inc.
Zhang, Y. and Jiang, J. (2003). Bibliographical review on reconfigurable fault-tolerant con-
trol systems. 5th IFAC Symposium on fault detection, supervision and safety for technical
processes, pages 265–276.
Appendix A
Journal Publications
This appendix contains verbatim copies of three first-author journal papers published as part
of the work described in this thesis.
Original Article
Rethinking rail track switches for fault
tolerance and enhanced performance
Samuel D Bemment, Emma Ebinger, Roger M Goodall,
Christopher P Ward and Roger Dixon
Abstract
Railway track switches, commonly referred to as ‘turnouts’ or ‘points,’ are a necessary element of any rail network.
However, they often prove to be performance-limiting elements of networks. A novel concept for rail track switching has
been developed as part of a UK research project with substantial industrial input. The concept is currently at the
demonstrator phase, with a scale (384mm) gauge unit operational in a laboratory. Details of the novel arrangement
and concept are provided herein. This concept is considered as an advance on the state of the art. This paper also
presents the work that took place to develop the concept. Novel contributions include the establishment of a formal set
of functional requirements for railway track switching solutions, and a demonstration that the current solutions do not
fully meet these requirements. The novel design meets the set of functional requirements for track switching solutions, in
addition to offering several features that the current designs are unable to offer, in particular to enable multi-channel
actuation and rail locking, and provide a degree of fault tolerance. This paper describes the design and operation of this
switching concept, from requirements capture and solution generation through to the construction of the laboratory
demonstrator. The novel concept is contrasted with the design and operation of the ‘traditional’ switch design.
Conclusions to the work show that the novel concept meets all the functional requirements whilst exceeding the
capabilities of the existing designs in most non-functional requirement areas.
Keywords
Track switch, capacity, reliability, multi-channel redundancy, fault tolerance
Date received: 20 August 2015; accepted: 28 March 2016
Introduction
A novel concept for rail track switching has been
developed as part of a UK research project with
substantial industrial input. The concept is currently
at the demonstrator phase, with a scale (384mm)
gauge unit currently operational in a laboratory – as
depicted in Figure 1, and is covered by published
patents.1,2 The design meets the set of functional
requirements for track switching solutions, in add-
ition to enabling multi-channel actuation and rail
locking, to provide a degree of fault tolerance. The
concept also offers several features that the current
designs are unable to, in particular more than two
routes out of a single switching element. This paper
describes the formation, design and operation of the
novel switching concept, from requirements capture
and solution generation through to the construction
of the laboratory demonstrator.
Track switches (‘turnouts’ or ‘points’) are a neces-
sary element of any rail network. Switches enable
vehicles to take many different routes through the
network. A single switch, or a clustered group of
switches (e.g. at a station throat), is variously
considered a junction, and/or a ‘node.’ It is generally
the nodes which define the capacity and performance
of any transport system, as extensively explored in
literature – for example in the European case by
Abril et al.,3 and by the Transportation Research
Board in the US case.4 Waterloo station throat, one
of the most complex pieces of track work in the
United Kingdom, is responsible for the safe arrival
of just under 108 million passengers per year5 and
features 80 switches within just 500 linear metres of
route. Figure 2 shows the simplest junction element –
a single turnout arrangement, which also forms the
simplest possible node.
However, because of their nodal nature, track
switches represent single points of failure, and their
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failures can prevent use of extensive sections of the
network. It is for this reason that rail network per-
formance is negatively affected by switch failures to a
greater degree than any other asset.5 Due to this,
extensive plans have been put in place to minimise
the impact of switch failures, involving hand-
signallers at each node manually winding points and
flagging trains through, as further explored later.
Switches are expensive and are of complex designs
when compared to the equivalent plain line sections.
Their population is therefore generally optimised at
design time – alongside a known timetable – in
order to minimise initial outlay and substantial
ongoing maintenance costs. The result of this opti-
misation is the availability of few, if any, diversionary
options should a failure occur. This can compound
the negative effects upon network delay performance,
especially during timetable perturbation. Even when
fully operational, switches can introduce capacity
constraints due to the design of physical track com-
ponents and the associated signalling systems for con-
trol and operation.6,7
On the European network, there is an anticipated
move towards universal in-cab signalling.8 With the
gradual removal of other line-side assets related to
signalling and control, the only remaining active
line-side elements will be switches and level crossings.
Switches will thus contribute to an ever-increasing
portion of network delay totals without significant
further work to improve performance. Open-access
statistics5 show UK passenger counts are at their
highest level since re-privatisation in 1993,
with some lines now running at or near operational
vehicular capacity. This fact, when coupled with
cross-industry initiatives such as the ‘24/7 Railway,’9
‘On-time Railway,’ and increasing overnight freight
utilisation as suggested in the recent IMechE Rail
Freight Report,10 further reduces the portion of time
available to take maintenance possessions of infra-
structure. Importantly, it is often not the physical
maintenance act itself which is expensive in monetary
terms, but rather the time the asset is out of use –
whether this be for a planned maintenance intervention
or unanticipated failure. Capacity cost is explored by
Nash et al.11 This monetary cost is associated to a
nodal and, consequently, network-capacity cost.
Existing track switch systems are the result of the
evolution of a single design solution dating to early
mining railways in the 1700 s.12 The operating
Figure 2. Typical traditional switch layout, with sleepers/bearers omitted for clarity. (1) Line-side type electromechanical actuator
featuring integral lock and detection; (2) Drive rod and drive stretcher; (3) Detection rods; (4) Switch rail toes; (5) Stretcher bars; (6)
Switch rails; (7) Stock rails; (8) Common crossing (of given angle); (9) Check rails.
Figure 1. Photographs of the general arrangement of the
novel track switching demonstrator in the laboratory at
Loughborough University, at 384mm gauge. Top: general
arrangement. Bottom: detail of interlocking rail ends.
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parameters of a modern railway system are much
changed from those early days. Other elements of
rail systems have undergone step changes as disrup-
tive technologies have made an impact. Notable
examples are the moves from steam to diesel and elec-
tric traction, the widespread adoption of reinforced
concrete for viaducts and tunnels, and the move to
solid state interlocking (SSI). However, apart from
small incremental changes, for instance to actuation
methods, a modern track switch is of the same design
and operation as those early days despite the require-
ments having changed significantly.
This paper considers the design and operation of
track switches with a view to improving their negative
impact upon network performance. Performance, in
this instance, is considered as maintainability, system
capacity, reliability and cost, though it is accepted
that other measures could be utilised. Existing
systems, their limitations and impact upon perform-
ance are considered in ‘Existing systems’ section. A
requirements capture exercise follows in the
‘Requirements analysis’ section, which sets out the
minimum functional set required of a track switching
solution. The following section, ‘Generation and
evaluation of solutions,’ presents some switching con-
cepts generated from a series of expert focus groups,
and follows the process used to down-select these
options to the most appropriate. The paper then pre-
sents more detail on what has been termed ‘The
Repoint solution,’ including its general arrangement,
feasibility, and the qualitative benefits and drawbacks.
Conclusions to the Repoint study are then presented
alongside the possible future work.
Existing systems
Mechanical design
There are many methods of achieving a solution to
the conflicting issues posed by track switching.
However, all major railway systems throughout the
world utilising the ‘traditional’ arrangement of twin
steel running rails and flanged wheels have adopted a
broadly similar mechanical arrangement, extensively
detailed in both industry publications12 and academic
literature.13,14 This arrangement is shown in Figure 2.
Switch arrangements consist of three distinct elem-
ents, or panels; namely ‘switches,’ ‘crossings’ and
‘closure panels.’
Referring to the numbered elements in Figure 2, a
pair of longitudinally extending switch rails (6) are
free to bend or pivot beyond a given point, and
slide upon supporting plates or chairs, between two
fixed ‘stock’ or ‘running’ rails (7). Actuation power
and transmission is variously provided by humans
and mechanical lever arrangements, pneumatics,
hydraulics or electro-mechanics (1). A mechanical
linkage from the power source links the two switch
rails (2, 5), operating so as to open one rail and close
the other, either synchronously or sequentially.
In most jurisdictions, mainline switches that carry
passenger traffic also feature a locking arrangement,
which prevents the switch rails moving uncom-
manded, or when incorrectly commanded, for
instance under the wheels of a passing train.
However, in spring or ‘train-operated points,’ the
switch rails are free to pivot in order that the wheel-
sets of a train in a trailing move can move the rails to
provide a constantly supported route throughout.
Standard design switches of different lengths and
crossing (8) angles exist to satisfy different turnout
speeds, longer switches generally being more complex
and expensive, but capable of handling traffic turning
out at much higher speeds. There are a range of gen-
eric switch designs approved for use upon British
mainline infrastructure, and their properties differ
depending upon purpose – the main differentiator
being the design speed. Note that, whilst there is a
‘standard set’ of switch designs, in practice each
installation would have its particular layout adapted
for a given location. For example, a turnout placed on
a curve needs differential curves on either route,
meaning a different crossing angle. Designers of
guided transport systems have to consider the trade-
off of space, cost, line speed and capacity in selecting
and locating switches for a given application.15
Switch rails can be of the same cross section as the
running rails, or in some designs, speciality ‘shallow
depth’ rail. Switch rails are reduced in cross section
along their length in a process termed ‘planing,’ in
order that they accurately mate up against the full-
section stock rails when closed, therefore providing a
smooth dynamic transfer of load under a passing
train. However, as the switch rails require a minimum
cross section to support loads, there is some sacrifice
of track alignment along one or both routes to enable
the practical manufacture and wear management of
the switch. Design for specific requirements, and
maintenance thereof, is extensively covered in
Morgan12 and Cope and Ellis.16
At the point where the outer rails of the two diver-
ging routes cross, provision must be made for the
wheel flanges to pass through unhindered. In
common use are built-up and cast crossings, which
have a gap in both running rails to allow this.
As line speeds increase and curve radii become cor-
respondingly larger, crossing angles become finer, and
geometry dictates this gap – where the axle is unsup-
ported or running on the flange – necessarily gets
longer. This has led to the development of the
swing-nose and swing-wing crossing, which have
active components moving synchronously with the
point ends in order to provide a continuously sup-
ported route. This solution has also been applied to
very heavy axle loads where resultant impact forces
on the crossing nose would be unacceptable. A closure
panel then fills in the space between the movable
switch rails and the crossing element, to provide
1050 Proc IMechE Part F: J Rail and Rapid Transit 231(9)
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support and guidance to traversing vehicles through-
out the switch. The switch would generally be
bracketed on all routes by sections of plain line, but
in more complex junctions – especially those where
footprint is restricted – switches may be adjacent or
even overlap.
Signalling and operational rules
Switches remain in position and locked until com-
manded to move via the signalling system. The pos-
ition of the blades, and the integrity of the position
lock, is continually fed back to the interlocking via a
subsystem known as detection. When changing
position, traditional switch designs move through a
state, which can be considered dangerous due to the
inherent derailment risk, when the moveable blades
are between the two set positions. Trains can be
issued a movement authority (either by radio in com-
munication-based signalling systems, or else by a line-
side signal aspect) to pass the switch only once the
movement process is complete. Switches under UK
practice follow a move–lock–detect cycle. This
means, upon command from the interlocking, the
actuator moves the blades to the correct position,
then locks them in place, then detects the position
of both blades and the integrity of the lock before
transmitting this information back. This process nor-
mally takes several seconds; around 8 s is allowed in
British signalling practice. A more detailed discussion
of the British practice of switch control and operation
is provided in ‘Principles of power point control and
detection.’17 Additional time is often required for
remote interlocking processing and transmission of
the authority. As the switch represents a derailment
danger when between positions or unlocked, under no
circumstance can the switch be moved within a previ-
ously issued movement authority. For instance, a
switch actuated within the effective braking distance
of the train, which subsequently fails to fully change
positions, could cause derailment or a potentially dis-
astrous misrouting. As nodes become more complex,
this requirement becomes increasingly restrictive due
to safety rules surrounding actuation of switches on
adjacent lines and around conflicting moves, e.g. flank
protection.18 There is generally an element of the
interlocking responsible for releasing the switch to
be reset some time after a train has passed, for exam-
ple train operated route release (TORR). Crucially,
the signalling system is designed to pass back no
more information on the current state of a switch
than whether it is locked and detected normal or
reverse, or not detected in either position.17
Capacity
These restrictions upon movement lead to a reduction
in the theoretical maximum capacity of a junction
below what could be expected from an equivalent
section of plain line. Additional capacity is lost in
installations where the turnout route has a speed
restriction below that of the straight route; in these
cases some braking or acceleration must take place
upon the mainline, which further consumes the avail-
able capacity. It is not possible to define capacity as an
absolute value, thus it is not possible to calculate, in the
general sense, what this capacity restriction equates to.
Capacity consumption is the method utilised by the
industry, as detailed in various literature,3,4,11 and fur-
ther explored in standard UIC406.19 The value for cap-
acity consumption at a junction is linked to the
proposed service pattern through that junction over a
given time period. Previously published work has
explored and, subsequently, modelled these capacity
constraints and methods to alleviate, both from the
authors of this paper,20,21 and others, for example
Liu et al.22 The application of moving block signalling
schemes will not necessarily alleviate capacity con-
straints at junctions, as the fixed obstruction provided
by a switch causes the signalling operation to revert to
fixed block at this point.23
Reliability
Table 1 shows incident counts and subsequent delay
minute counts for asset failures on the UK infrastruc-
ture between 2007 and 2012.5 A delay minute is a
method of measuring the impact of a failure. One
delay minute is accrued for each minute each train
arrives late at its final destination. Depending upon
the type of incident, ‘knock-on’ delay minutes can out-
number the number of minutes of the directly affected
trains. Catch-up running after an incident can serve to
cancel out some delay minutes. Allocation of delay
minutes is an inexact science, subject to human judge-
ment – all minutes are allocated by teams in relevant
control centres. They should be used as indicative
values only. There are 21,602 switches upon the UK
network, as of 2012.5 With a mean of 5917 failures per
year amongst this population, this equates to a mean
time between service affecting failure (MTBSAF) of
3.65 years network-wide. It is important to note that
the issue is compounded by the fact that switches are
often co-located at nodes, meaning many individual
failures could affect the same node and cause repeated
disruption. Switch failures do, however, cause a lower
average delay minute count than some other failure
types. Despite the nodal location, switches have built-
inmanual overrides to enable response teams to begin to
hand-signal trains past the junction upon arrival, redu-
cing the delay impact. These plans have been put in
place to reduce the impact of commonly occurring
and critically located switch failures. This could not be
matched for some other infrastructure failures, exam-
ples being rail breaks or bridge failures, both of which
have much higher mean delay minute counts. However,
this response plan comes at a substantial monetary cost
as response teams are kept on standby at all times.
Bemment et al. 1051
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The data shows that, for every published year apart
from 2013 to 2014, points failures contribute the highest
total of delay incidents. However, it can also be
observed that points failure incidents, and subsequent
delayminutes incurred, have fallen significantly over the
same period. This is due, in part, to Network Rail’s
Intelligent Infrastructure programme, more details of
which are provided by Silmon and Roberts.14 This pro-
gramme aims to remotely monitor switch installations
in order to detect faults in the period before they develop
into system failures. However, there is a limit to the
projected benefit without the provision of a backup
system to take over if a fault is detected, as the switch
still has to survive in a serviceable state until a mainten-
ance team can attend. Should the fault detection algo-
rithm be too sensitive, the number of false positives may
serve to offset much of the benefit. Isermann24 provides
a comprehensive discussion of the benefits of fault
detection versus fault tolerance.
Human factors
Considering the whole life-cycle of switches and cross-
ings, there are several cases where humans come into
contact with the system. Design, installation and
commissioning, and end-of-life decommissioning are
of consideration. Choices regarding the type of
machine and location, and the practicalities and prac-
tices at installation are known to have a significant
effect upon the performance of the switch. These
will not be discussed further in this paper as the
issues would affect all designs and there is much
ongoing research into this field.25 The primary
human contact through the working life of the
switch installation is via signallers, who operate (but
may be remote from) the switch, and the maintainers,
who visit regularly to perform inspections, mainten-
ance and adjustments, but are generally unable to
operate the switch locally. A systems context diagram
of existing track switch solutions is shown in Figure 3.
It identifies the main actors in the lifetime of a switch
installation, and with which subsystems they primar-
ily interact.
The signaller. In mechanical signal boxes, the signaller
manually sets a route through a junction by operating
levers. Levers are connected to points and signals,
some of which may be out of sight of the signaller.
If the switch was blocked, for instance, the signaller
would receive feedback through the lever as he/she
Table 1. Incident count and subsequent delay minutes incurred for infrastructure asset failures between 2008–2014 upon UK
mainline network, for top 18 incident categories by total count.
Incident count Delay minutes (‘000s)
Mean
min/
incident08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 Mean 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14
Track 7750 6665 5879 5519 5346 5997 6193 957 764 763 804 855 931 137
Speed restrictions 1428 1278 932 717 685 747 965 204 147 107 78 71 100 122
Track faults 6322 5387 4947 4802 4661 5250 5228 753 617 655 726 784 831 139
Non-track 32,001 30,109 27,157 25,767 25,121 25,491 27,608 2829 2596 2612 2609 2673 2700 97
Points 8022 7118 5803 5162 5021 4376 5917 752 663 646 597 577 514 106
Level crossings 2261 2162 2003 1932 1857 1936 2025 101 96 101 93 100 104 49
OLE/Third rail 1458 1241 1281 1276 1265 1259 1297 238 245 251 227 325 309 205
Signals 6559 6202 5116 5018 4449 4278 5270 313 256 216 240 235 258 48
Track circuits 5381 5145 4567 4243 3902 3729 4495 585 517 550 605 534 515 123
Axle counters 1096 913 648 683 706 799 808 122 107 67 72 86 114 117
Signalling/Power 3750 4016 4422 4202 4494 4684 4261 442 419 517 486 517 545 114
Other signalling 1495 1430 1513 1505 1300 1338 1430 64 56 60 60 53 60 41
Telecoms 1406 1352 1252 1176 1513 2406 1518 70 70 53 56 73 95 46
Cables 573 530 552 570 614 686 588 142 167 150 172 173 187 281
Other 12,633 9303 9084 9212 9289 10,753 10,046 779 601 639 654 795 977 74
Structures 397 436 385 279 444 574 419 80 79 62 60 161 194 253
Other infra. 5478 3772 3455 3774 3612 4739 4138 251 204 213 253 297 318 62
Track patrols 3362 2565 2269 1949 2213 2075 2406 68 34 33 30 34 34 16
Mishaps 1839 1183 1493 1838 1836 2009 1700 191 108 133 145 147 228 93
Fires 197 221 250 257 116 218 210 17 32 34 22 13 64 145
Bridge strikes 1360 1126 1232 1115 1068 1138 1173 172 144 163 144 144 139 129
Total 52,384 46,077 42,120 40,498 39,756 42,241 43,846 4565 3961 4013 4066 4323 4608 97
Source: ORR Data Portal.5
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would be unable to complete the movement. The
length of the mechanical rodding used to transmit
the motion has a practical limit of around 200m, so
in the event of any issues the signaller may be able to
inspect the site to establish the problem. In a more
modern control centre, the signaller’s interaction with
a switch is several levels removed. The signaller
commands a route to be set by telling a computer or
control panel the entry and exit points, and the con-
trol system then commands switches to move to cor-
respond to this. The panel indicates the route is in the
process of being set, generally with a flashing light,
until the route is set at which point the lights change
colour. If any of the switches fail to move to the com-
manded position, the lights continue to flash, and
there is little the signaller can do apart from retry
the route set command or contact the maintenance
organisation. In the latest systems, automatic route
setting (ARS) abstracts the signaller one layer further,
in that human intervention is expected only when
there is a failure or unresolvable conflict of traffic.
Thus, no matter what the signalling installation
type, the signaller is the daily user of the switch but
acts at a level abstracted from its actual operation.
The level of abstraction increases the more modern
the signalling system, and this can compound issues
when there is a switch failure.26
The maintainer. Switches require a level of inspection
and maintenance in excess of plain line due to add-
itional moving parts.16,27 Failures of individual sub-
components almost inevitably lead to whole-system
failures as there is minimal, if any, designed-in fault
tolerance. Hence, switches are subject to careful
inspection and maintenance regimes. UK switches
undergo a rigorous and highly prescribed maintenance
schedule to ensure all safety critical components are in
good order. This involves two independent teams –
Signalling and Permanent Way Departments – visiting
each switch; the latter at a frequency of once per week.
The maintenance organisations are not able to move
the switch locally; instead they contact the signaller to
effect this for them. In addition to time-interval main-
tenance, the maintenance organisation has a rapid
response unit, which is responsible for attending any
asset failures, including switches. These teams may
have a large area to cover and, if several incidents
occur at once, response times can be over 1 h. To
reduce this impact, recent literature shows extensive
research has been conducted into condition-based
maintenance of existing designs,13 and Network Rail,
the UK infrastructure custodian, is currently rolling
out condition monitoring equipment across its active
assets. However, even condition-based switch main-
tenance requires a possession of the line and human
intervention which is not always possible. With the
drive in the United Kingdom towards a 24-7 railway,
any planned maintenance requiring an exclusive track
possession must occur in ever shrinking time windows.
In any case, it is unlikely that regular inspections can
be reduced to zero, due to the design of switches
having several safety concerns for which regular
inspection is the mitigation. This includes, but is not
limited to, stretcher bar to switch blade mountings (see
(5) in Figure 2), which when loosened are almost guar-
anteed to cause a facing move derailment.
For any switch redesign to be successful, concern
must therefore be given to maintainability. It would
be of specific benefit for any proposed design to:
1. Enable the continued and safe functioning of the
switch despite a given number of known faults in
subsystems.
2. Communicate known faults to a control centre
such that repair work can be managed and sched-
uled appropriately.
3. Enable as many maintenance operations as pos-
sible to be conducted without maintenance
possession.
4. Enable as many maintenance operations as pos-
sible to be mechanised or conducted off-track to
minimise risk to personnel, improve output and
reduce costs.
5. Use a minimum, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
component set such that spares can be carried with-
out needingadapting to specific switch installations.
Requirements analysis
Overview
The requirements of the system reduce to a simple set of
key technical requirements. Those requirements are a
combination of those for a track system, those for a
safety-critical asset, and those for a mission-critical
asset. The track system function is to support and
guide vehicles. The active element has two functions:
to direct vehicles along the correct path; and to confirm
the route to the interlocking, or provide information
that the switch is unsafe. This operation must be per-
formed within a given timeframe. Traditionally, these
have been the only requirements of a switching solu-
tion. However, given the high performance standards
of a modern railway and the criticality of switch avail-
ability, another necessary requirement could be
included, namely to communicate back tomaintenance
resources the current ability of the switch to perform its
task, and the requirement for any immediate interven-
tion. The following requirements set is proposed.
Essential requirements of a track-switching solution
1. The switch shall adequately support and guide all
passing vehicles (from relevant track standards28).
(a) It shall be strong enough for the required static
loading.
(b) It shall be strong enough for the required
dynamic loading.
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(c) It shall guide the wheelsets with maximum
deviations as specified for the given track
quality.
(d) It shall manage the wear and degradation of
support and guidance elements to allowable
levels.
2. The switch shall direct vehicles along the path spe-
cified by the interlocking.7,17
(a) When commanded to, and not otherwise, it
shall align any movable elements so as to
direct the wheelset of a vehicle along the speci-
fied route.
(b) When commanded to, it shall align any mov-
able elements for the requested route within a
specified timeframe.
(c) It shall ensure all wheelsets of a passing vehicle
are directed along the same route.
3. The switch shall confirm to the interlocking the
route vehicles will be directed along, and that all
active elements are safe for the vehicle to pass.7,17
(a) It shall provide feedback to the interlocking
that the requested route is set.
(b) It shall provide feedback to the interlocking if
the requested route is unable to be set.
(c) It shall provide feedback to the interlocking on
(3a) and (3b) within a given timeframe.
4. The switch system shall provide information
to maintenance organisations regarding the
future projected ability to perform requirements
(1), (2) and (3).
(a) It shall monitor wear of wear-susceptible parts
and adjustment of adjustable parts.
(b) It shall communicate current state of wear and
adjustment to maintenance organisations.
(c) It shall calculate and communicate the remain-
ing time of useful operation of the asset with-
out maintenance intervention.
(d) It shall achieve a given level of reliability com-
mensurate with the operations at the node.
(e) It shall minimise the amount of time the node
is unavailable due to maintenance activity, and
the amount of time maintainers must spend
trackside.
How do traditional switches perform these
functions?
Referring to the functions specified above, traditional
switches have evolved a particular design and oper-
ation in order to meet given requirements.
Requirement (1) is generally achieved by designing
the track elements of the switch to be of equivalent
rating to the surrounding plain line and traffic
requirements. However, in order to meet (1c), in
some cases this has meant relaxing the standards, not-
ably around the switch toes, in order to prevent
having infinitely thin blades at the point of intersec-
tion of routes.28
For requirement (2), routing of vehicles is currently
achieved by the combination of an actuator and two
moveable switch rails, as detailed in the ‘Existing sys-
tems’ section. The actuator acts to close one switch
rail against the corresponding stock rail, and open the
opposite to create a flange-way. The same actuator,
by means of a mechanical arrangement, then provides
a locking function to prevent uncommanded move-
ment of the rails. However, the use of a single actu-
ator without any level of redundancy means that
component failures may easily prevent the actuation
elements performing this requirement on demand,
even with appropriate maintenance as per (4).
Requirement (3) is provided through the detection
elements of existing designs. Components essentially
forming limit switches indicate that the two movable
switch rails are in the correct position, and that the
lock preventing movement to fulfil requirement (2c) is
engaged. This signal is then passed back to the inter-
locking. If the switch is unable to be set for a particu-
lar route, then not all of the limit switches can be
engaged, thus no detection signal is transmitted, and
after a given timeframe as allowed for in (2b), the
signaller would deduce there was a problem with
the switch. Note that switches do not, in the signal
to the interlocking, differentiate between ‘currently
moving to desired position’ and ‘unable to move to
desired position,’ as both states appear the same to
the available set of limit switches.
Requirement (4) is perhaps the requirement subset
which is most lacking in existing switch designs, as the
requirement itself has only evolved with the enhanced
performance requirements of a modern railway
system. There has been a drive in the United
Kingdom, over the preceding few years, to retro-fit
condition monitoring equipment to better meet (4a)
and (4b).9 However, despite this, the safety-critical
monitoring element is still achieved by sending
teams out to complete regular inspections (as high a
frequency as once per week), though this clearly
clashes with requirement (4e). Requirements (4c)
and (4d) are currently not catered for; however,
work in the field seeks to improve these aspects, as
discussed above.14
Non-functional requirements
There are further requirements which need to be
established, but can be considered non-functional.
Whilst all switching solutions need to satisfy the full
set of functional requirements, non-functional
requirements form a set of trade-offs. For instance,
UK and European infrastructure owners have goals
to reduce the hours teams must spend working
line-side with live traffic for safety reasons. There
are political pressures to reduce the monetary costs
of building and maintaining infrastructure.29
In some locations, space is at a premium, and the
alignment of track, or capacity, is sacrificed as there
1054 Proc IMechE Part F: J Rail and Rapid Transit 231(9)
220
is not the space to fit a switch of the ideal specifica-
tion. These elements form trade-offs, which are
unique to each location. Non-functional requirements
were considered and the most significant listed:
. Degree of fault tolerance: How susceptible is the
design to a single fault/failure rendering the switch
unusable? How long could the switch survive in a
usable state until such a time as repair can be
performed?
. Design adaptability: Switches must handle many
types of traffic at many speeds. Whilst it could be
argued many different designs could fulfil these dif-
ferent purposes, a single, adaptable design is
preferable.
. Cost: Monetary cost of the solution, estimated
using engineering judgement.
. Space utilisation: Physical footprint of the solution.
. Energy requirements: Any actuation must require a
level of energy which a reasonable existing power
supply installation is capable of providing
. Ease of manufacture: Able to be mass-manufac-
tured using existing techniques and processes.
. Likelihood of acceptance: The rail industry has
strict process and standards regarding the design
of products for use upon the network.
. Switching speed: The faster the switch can change
positions, the better.
. Maintainability: There are pressures to reduce the
amount of time personnel spend performing main-
tenance tasks trackside. Does the design help to
achieve these ambitions?
. Standardisation: Can the design maximise the use
of COTS components, or minimise custom
components?
. Human factors: Maintenance teams and tres-
passers may be exposed to movable elements of
the switch. How big is the risk posed compared
to that currently present?
In order to evaluate potential solutions, it is neces-
sary to assign weightings that represent the relative
importance of the non-functional requirements. The
method and outcome is shown in Table 2. The highest
total represents the most important non-functional
requirement. Each requirement is then given a
weight, w, representing its importance, which is used
as a multiplier. The values in this table are used in
Section 0.0.2. The table shows that the three most
important requirements are judged to be the likeli-
hood of acceptance, the degree of fault tolerance,
and the adaptability of the design.
Generation and evaluation of solutions
Solution generation
A cross-industry focus group was assembled on three
occasions through 2011–2012, to generate candidate T
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track switching solutions. The panel was UK-focussed,
due to the funding arrangements, but with substantial
international experience. Membership comprised per-
sonnel from rolling stock and infrastructure
backgrounds (Track and Permanent Way), across:
design; maintenance; operations; ‘head office’ (model-
ling and performance) functions; and regulatory bodies.
Further to these sessions, a series of remote and face-to-
face meetings was conducted with other stakeholders
within UK infrastructure custodians – namely
Network Rail and London Underground. Academics
with a background in reliability engineering and fault-
tolerant design were also invited to contribute.
These sessions resulted in just under 420 individual
ideas related to improvements to switches and cross-
ings, covering their physical design, signalling and
operation and maintenance activities.
Initial filtering and down selection
Thefirstfilter fordown-selectionwas toexcludeany ideas
which were mechanically implausible. Construction/
operation of some ideas will not be possible, and these
ideas must necessarily be rejected at an early stage.
Secondly, any ideas which would require wholesale
modification of the entire rolling stock fleet were
excluded. These included, for example, the removal
of all wheel flanges or steerable bogies. It is generally
accepted that one option, ‘vehicle-based switching’
(VBS) may deliver higher levels of performance than
track based switching; primarily as system failures are
generally limited to a single vehicle.30 However, the
panel felt the development of such a solution in the
United Kingdom would be prevented by the frag-
mented nature of rolling stock and related interface
standards ownership.
Thirdly, any ideas which would require more than
20 years estimated ‘time to market’ were excluded.
For example, novel vehicle control solutions which
require European Rail Traffic Management System
ERTMS Level 3/4 or higher.23 The academic team
were advised by regulatory bodies that the rail indus-
try would be very unlikely to adopt such solutions due
to the cyclic nature of development funding in the
sector.
This left around 60 solution options to be investi-
gated and ranked.
Ranking solutions
A selection of the highest scoring remaining solutions
is briefly presented here.
. A: ‘The Track Substitution Switch’: A whole section
of track is lifted out of place and replaced with
another section
. B: ‘The Single Flange Controlled Switch’: Only one
flange of the wheelset is controlled through the
switch, the other free.
. C: ‘The Wheel-face Switch’: Rails move into place
which act upon the face of the wheel to select a route
. D: ‘Interlocking Rails’: A specially crafted rail end
design locks itself in place when under the mass of a
train
. E: ‘The Stub Switch’: Reverses the components in a
traditional switch, and has stub ends which bend or
move between positions to select route
. F: ‘The Over-Running Rail Switch’: Uses a remov-
able ramp to lift one wheel over the corresponding
running rail
. G: ‘Raising and Lowering the Switch Rails’:
Existing switch rails move laterally, but it is possible
to raise and lower them into position instead.
. H: ‘The Swing-nose Switch’: A moveable element
similar to that in a swing nose crossing acts to
select a route for the flange to follow.
. I: ‘The Hopping Switch’: Switch rails move verti-
cally between positions such that when at rest they
have dropped into a groove preventing them from
moving.
. J: ‘The Spring Switch’: A passive design which
always directs facing traffic in one direction, but
allows trailing moves from both by allowing the
switch rails to spring out of the way.
. K: ‘Hopping Stub Switch’ (D, E and I Combined):
These concepts could be combined to provide the
potential benefits of all three.
Each design was then scored out of 10 in each area
of the non-functional requirements, using engineering
judgement. The results of this scoring are shown in
Table 3. It can be seen that concept K scores most
highly. Concept J also scores highly, especially in the
areas of energy consumption (zero) and switching
speed (instant). This is to be expected for a passive
solution, though it is clear spring switches could not
be used in every location. However, the weighted
matrix places less emphasis upon those areas.
Concepts D and E also score highly. Concept K is a
combination of concepts D, E and I, where each offers
a unique set of benefits, but are complementary as
none of the features of the individual concepts prevent
them being used together. It is this combination of
designs which was therefore selected for further inves-
tigation. This concept is now termed the ‘Repoint’
concept and is discussed in further detail in the fol-
lowing section.
The ‘Repoint’ solution
General mechanical arrangement
The design is based around an arrangement known as
a stub switch. The stub switch reverses the elements in
a traditional switch, and replaces the long, planed
down switch rails shown in Figure 2 with short,
stub-ends formed of full section rail which are able
to move between positions. Figure 4 shows the general
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Table 3. Results of the weighted scoring exercise, including concept rankings.
Traditional Concept
Requirement w Now Max A B C D E F G H I J K
Degree of fault
tolerance
0.12 5 5 3 3 6 5 3 8 5 3 8 9 9
Design adaptability 0.11 5 5 3 5 7 7 9 3 5 5 7 1 9
Unit cost 0.09 5 7 2 8 7 8 5 7 7 9 5 6 6
Space utilisation 0.10 5 5 1 7 5 7 10 5 5 7 5 5 10
Energy requirements 0.03 5 6 2 7 7 7 4 7 5 8 3 10 7
Ease of manufacture 0.05 5 7 2 7 6 5 8 4 5 6 6 8 6
Likelihood of
acceptance
0.18 10 10 8 8 5 8 7 2 3 5 8 10 8
Switching speed 0.05 5 6 3 6 7 7 5 4 4 8 4 10 8
Maintainability 0.09 5 5 2 6 8 5 8 6 3 3 5 8 7
Standardisation 0.10 5 6 5 5 5 8 5 3 5 8 8 6 7
Human factors 0.08 5 5 3 5 3 8 7 3 5 9 3 8 3
Weighted sum 5.91 6.37 3.65 6.08 5.83 6.93 6.64 4.45 4.59 6.05 6.21 7.18 7.51
rank 11 6 8 3 4 10 9 7 5 2 1
Figure 3. Systems context diagram for Railway Track Switching. Interactions between the switching subsystems and external sys-
tems are shown. The most relevant interactions between systems entirely outside the system boundary are also indicated, though
these interactions are not exhaustive.
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arrangement of a ‘Repoint’ stub switch, with an
optional second turnout route shown. A bank of actu-
ators is responsible for moving the full-section switch
rails between each position. The actuators bend the
rail between each position, from a stationary point,
beyond which the track can be considered plain line.
There is no hinge. To ensure the correct bending pro-
file, it may be necessary to alter the cross section of
the rail around the stationary point, and an estab-
lished method such as flange relief could be applied
to achieve this. Where the open, moving rail ends
interact with the static rails in the track panel, a
novel design of interlocking rail end is necessary.
This is to allow the expansion and contraction (with
temperature variation) of all rails in the assembly,
whilst still providing support and guidance for wheel-
sets. The general arrangement of this rail end is shown
in Figure 5. As the rail ends interlock to provide a
consistent track alignment, when moving them
between positions the required actuation path
involves lifting them out of register.
Actuation is provided by a multi-channel actuation
bank, with the actuation elements contained within
bearers near the movable rail ends. Each actuator is
capable of moving the switch alone. Triplex redun-
dancy is shown in Figure 4; however, the exact
number of actuators required could be tailored to
the particular requirements of each location on the
basis of an operational reliability figure. A line-side
processing and condition monitoring unit, abstracted
from the interlocking, provides control of the elem-
ents. It is also responsible for isolation of suspected
faulty elements, and may feature controls for main-
tenance teams to do the same. The moveable rail is
supported upon said actuator-bearers, which transmit
the static and dynamic loading from vehicles to the
track substructure. These bearers have a movable top
surface, termed a ‘shuttle,’ to which the rails are
attached using appropriate traditional rail clips. The
lower casing of the actuator-bearer is embedded in bal-
last, or affixed to concrete in the case of a slab track
installation. Vehicle load is transmitted from the rails,
through the shuttle and then locking blocks to the
bearer casing, where it distributed to and through the
substructure in the usual way. Additional support may
be required at the rail ends, and the support conditions
here are the subject of further study.
Multi channel actuation is provided through an
arrangement which has been termed ‘passive locking.’
The theory of passive locking is that when the rail is in
one of its stationary, lowered positions, it is unable to
move in any direction apart from directly upwards.
There are no significant uplift forces present com-
pared to other axes, and a significant net downward
force when the mass of a train is present. It is a
requirement to lift the interlocking rail ends to disen-
gage them. When the track is lifted, it is free to move
laterally, but not longitudinally. Thus, the rail hops
between adjacent positions. If an actuator is isolated
for whatever reason, the adjacent unit(s) can still actu-
ate the switch, as the lifting action will unlock the
isolated unit. It is this feature which enables redun-
dant actuation to be provided as part of the ‘Repoint’
concept, something not possible with the conventional
switch. There are many ways to provide drive inside
the actuator units, and one simple method utilising a
rack, two cams and followers is shown in Figure 6(a).
This is the method chosen for the laboratory
Figure 4. Repoint stub switch general arrangement with electro-mechanical in-bearer type actuators, with most sleepers/bearers
omitted for clarity. Numbered elements as follows: (1) In-bearer type electromechanical actuators featuring integral passive locking
elements with detection system; (2) Bearer featuring integral passive locking elements; (3) Bendable, full-section switch rails; (4)
Interlocking rail ends; (5) Line-side processing and condition monitoring cabinet; (6) Power, position and monitoring signal cables; (7)
Stationary point of curve; (8) Common crossings (of given angles); (9) Check rails.
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Figure 6. Cross sections of each actuator-bearer. (a) shows internal elements related to the actuation system chosen for the
demonstrator system, though other arrangements to provide the necessary lift-move-drop curve would suffice. A motor and sealed
gearbox drive a toothed rod, which acts upon two cams; a 180 rotation of the cams causes the shuttle to move between adjacent
routes. (b) shows the associated locking elements, which would be present inside each bearer alongside (a).
Figure 5. Interlocking rail ends. Holes are shown for possible bolted mounting, but units could be welded in place. The chamfer in
the horizontal plane locates the rails laterally, meaning the moveable rails require lifting to disengage this chamfer before they can be
moved laterally. The concept allows for some longitudinal movement in the rails in the same way an expansion switch operates, with
the chamfer in the vertical plane giving a smooth transfer of load from one rail to the other.
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demonstrator described in the later section. The actu-
ators are enclosed in sealed, line-replaceable units. The
motor and gearbox arrangement is back-drivable, in
order that should a failure occur between positions, the
mass and spring force of the lifted rail will cause the
switch to drop back into one of the safe, lowered and
locked positions. Modelling has been conducted,
detailed in other papers, e.g. Ebinger and Wright31 and
Wright et al.,32 to verify that the approach is mechanic-
ally feasible.
Satisfying the requirements
Referring to the functional requirements specified in the
‘Requirements analysis’ section, we can postulate that
the Repoint solution can meet all requirements and,
therefore, exceed the extent to which existing systems
meet the requirements with regards several elements:
1. Adequately support and guide all passing vehicles:
(a) The solution is constructed of the same, full
section rail as surrounding plain line.
(b) Dynamic loading is reduced due to the track
alignment through the switch being of full-sec-
tion rails.
(c) The solution has full-section rail throughout,
accurately aligned at each sleeper/bearer,
exactly as for plain-line.
(d) (1b) means that wear could be reduced. The
wear element is now the interchangeable and
standardised chamfered rail end, rather than
long switch rails. Wear will be easier to
manage and the rail ends are replaceable as a
relatively short pair.
2. Direct vehicles along the path specified by the
interlocking:
(a) The switch can move to a new route when com-
manded; however, it can unambiguously form
a route when commanded due to the multipli-
city of actuators.
(b) The concept can switch at a faster rate as the
actuators do not have to be sized to overcome
the variable friction on plates, and instead
store energy in a spring (the rails) which can
be used to assist in the motion for the second
half of the throw.
(c) The locking elements of each bearer ensure the
switch remains locked on a single route for
traffic until commanded otherwise. The switch
is even less likely to move under the mass of a
train, as the mass acts downwards and thus
further locks the switch. The mechanism eradi-
cates the ambiguous failure state between
routes, for facing moves.
3. Confirm to the interlocking the route vehicles will
be directed along, and that all active elements are
safe for the vehicle to pass:
(a) Limit switches can provide confirmation to
the interlocking that each bearer is in a
given lowered position, and therefore which
route is set.
(b) The local condition monitoring processor can
determine if there is an issue preventing a route
being set through comparing signals, and indi-
cate such to the operator. The incidence of
‘unable to set’ would fall due to the parallel-
channel actuation and reduced chance of
blockages.
4. Provide information to maintenance organisations
regarding the future projected ability to perform
requirements (2) and (3):
(a) In-built condition monitoring, for the function
of the multiply-redundant actuation, monitors
wear points.
(b) Line-side processing can communicate switch
prognosis through existing channels.
(c) See (4b).
(d) The redundant elements enable a higher level
of operational reliability to be achieved; add-
itionally this level can be tailored to the par-
ticular location by selecting the number of
actuator-bearers used according to operational
requirements.
(e) Redundant channels mean the active elements
of the switch are fault tolerant, improving
operational availability. They also allow any
maintenance to be carried out in existing
downtime, for example overnight. Line-
replaceable units mean that maintenance
tasks performed trackside are reduced in
length.
Development of a laboratory-based demonstrator
A scale demonstrator of the concepts has been con-
structed in a laboratory at Loughborough University
(Figure 1). The demonstration actuator/bearer fea-
tures all components which would be required in a
full-size design – controller, motor, gearbox, drive
arrangement, roller-cams and passive locking elem-
ents. These components are mounted at the correct
spacing in a substantial Dexion frame. There are
three routes – one straight ahead, and two turnout.
The demonstrator is at 384mm gauge but all actu-
ation components are sized for CEN-60 type rail, at
the most common size of switch upon the UK infra-
structure, termed a ‘C’ switch. Note that extensive
associated dynamic modelling work was undertaken
in MATLAB/Simulink, in order to demonstrate the
viability of the full scale design.21,31,33 The demonstra-
tor is a hardware-in-the-loop implementation of a full
Repoint track switch. A single, physically constructed
active actuator/bearer exists in the laboratory, in par-
allel with two virtual bearers simulated within a real-
time software environment (utilising MATLAB/
Simulink and D-Space). As the physical demonstrator
is switched between positions, the software model
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co-simulates this motion for the other two bearers in
the alignment. The modelling work presented in pre-
vious publications has been used to inform the design
of the co-simulation. The demonstrator is equipped
with a graphical front-end which can either simulate
a maintenance control panel, showing traces of key
operational parameters, or a signallers control
console.
Critical to the operation of such a proposed switch
arrangement is the ability for the three switch
Figure 7. Data plots for a series of actuations on the laboratory Repoint rig. Data is plotted for the physical actuator/bearer only.
Top: Plot of command signal, detection signal, and lateral (drivetrain) position feedback. Position feedback has been filtered in software
to provide a more easily interpreted signal. Actuation time is that between command signal changing, and detection being obtained,
which is indicated by a loss of detection (i.e. detection is equal to 1). Bottom: Inferred horizontal and vertical displacement of rail
ends, used to calculate and simulate load due to rail bending.
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machines to operate in unison and in-phase whilst
coupled to a traditional interlocking arrangement.
By extension, also critical is the ability of two
machines to operate in unison should a single machine
be isolated when faulty or for maintenance. As only
one machine is present, the first step of work towards
development of a full-scale installation has been to
validate the software models of the actuator bearers
in order that a suitable control algorithm, and
associated detection logic laws, can be designed to
enable this motion. The validation of these models
is also important to ensure the viability of the actu-
ation, locking and detection elements of a full-scale
design. In the physical implementation, detection is
obtained when the shuttle element triggers one of
three representative micro-switches when lowered
and locked. In the software implementation, position
detection is inferred from the coordinate position of
Figure 8. Plots from Repoint model validation process, for same set of runs as Figure 7. Top: Motor speed and modelled motor
speed vs time. The modelled motor speed is also used as a command signal to the physical motor. Bottom: Modelled motor current,
actual motor current and residual error, with moving average. There is a considerable level of noise on the signal, but residual error
during periods of motion is around 10–15%.
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the shuttle. A representative and validated model is
also important for model-based condition monitoring
algorithms, which are vital to fulfilling requirement
(4).
The scale rig has been run at a range of speeds and
with a range of loadings in order to validate the soft-
ware models, and to tune the parameters within.
Figure 7 shows a trace of position versus time for
the physical actuator bearer, operating in the
unloaded case. This includes the position commanded
by the interlocking, and the detection signal returned
to the interlocking. Note that whilst a traditional
command or detection signal would be ‘Normal’ or
‘Reverse,’ with a three-position switch, we have
adopted ‘0’, ‘1’ and ‘2’ to represent the three possible
positions, with ‘1’ being centre. A detection signal of
‘1’ indicates that no detection is currently made. For
this plot, rig operation is governed by a script which,
upon detection being made, selects a subsequent pos-
ition at random, at a random time interval, in order to
quickly and automatically collect large amounts of
data; a 40 s time window is shown here for illustra-
tion. Switching time can be measured by examining
the time for which the detection state is at 1, which
indicates the time between detection being broken by
the interlocking and the time detection is made in cor-
respondence with the command signal. It can be noted
from the plot that the switch machine can cycle
between adjacent positions in just under 0.9 s. This
is comparable to, and in many cases better than, con-
temporary machines. Additionally, the machine can
move from extreme positions in around 1.7 s. The
lower plot shows the vertical and horizontal displace-
ment of the shuttle element. In a full implementation,
the rail is attached to the shuttle and, therefore, in the
co-simulation these displacements can be used to cal-
culate the load upon the actuator which results from
bending the full-section rail, at any point in the oper-
ation cycle.
Figure 8 illustrates the comparison between the
software model and rig over time, for the same
sample of switch operations. It can be observed that
the tuned software models presented in previous lit-
erature,32 are a reasonable fit to the real-world data.
Motor speed closely follows the simulated speed. This
is to be expected as the simulated speed is also used as
a basis for a speed profile to which all three motors
are driven. There is a more significant error, however,
in the motor current modelling. This is most notice-
able in the period between rig operation, and comes
from the inner current control loop amplifying sensor
noise for the command signal. Sensor noise is not part
of the software model, therefore the ‘at rest’ signal
appears much cleaner. During periods of motion,
the typical error is just over 200 mA on a 1.5 A com-
mand signal, equating to a mean model error of
around 14% for the unloaded case. There is also sig-
nificant error during the motor inrush period, though
the inrush is to be eradicated in future
implementations with a soft-start controller.
Parameters have been built into the software model
such that an actuator bank at full-scale and under a
range of load cases can be simulated, as presented in
Ebinger and Wright.31 This will also be used in future
work developing a full-scale implementation.
Conclusion
This paper has presented the background and context
to railway track switching, including how track
switches can limit the performance of rail networks.
These limitations come about as track switch designs
have evolved over time to fulfil a particular purpose,
meaning they may not be optimised to provide the
kind of performance a modern railway network
requires. Specifically, the paper has established the
formal requirements of track switching solutions,
and presented the argument that traditional solutions
do not meet all of these requirements. A shortlist of
possible design options was generated alongside a
non-exhaustive range of design options generated by
a cross-industry panel. These options were then
reviewed and ranked, with several of the options
being combined to create a novel solution to the
track switching problem. This novel solution, pre-
sented in academic literature for the first time, has
been termed the ‘Repoint’ solution, and is described
in mechanical detail, including how it satisfies the
functional requirements. A scale demonstrator imple-
mentation of this solution has been constructed in a
laboratory as a first step towards deployment.
Future work
The design has now been taken to a concept demon-
strator phase, therefore the most obvious piece of
follow-on work is to build a prototype upon a func-
tioning railway and test – both the operation of the
switch, and with the passage of traffic. Suggested, but
non-exhaustive, areas of related research are as
follows:
. Further modelling of the capacity improvements
brought about by a Repoint installation in real-
world scenarios.
. Further investigation into, and modelling of, the
reliability and maintainability improvements
brought about by Repoint installations, singly or
across a network.
. A full, formal fault tree analysis (FTA) of any pro-
posed design.
. Investigation into wear and fatigue of the bending
rails and part-section rail ends with a range of use
cases.
. Investigation into other promising ideas from the
concept down-selection phase, including ideas
which were rejected for political or standards rea-
sons, such as VBS.
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Improving the reliability and availability
of railway track switching by analysing
historical failure data and introducing
functionally redundant subsystems
Samuel D Bemment, Roger M Goodall, Roger Dixon
and Christopher P Ward
Abstract
Track switches are safety critical assets that not only provide flexibility to rail networks but also present single points of
failure. Switch failures within dense-traffic passenger rail systems cause a disproportionate level of delay. Subsystem
redundancy is one of a number of approaches, which can be used to ensure an appropriate safety integrity and/or
operational reliability level, successfully adopted by, for example, the aeronautical and nuclear industries. This paper
models the adoption of a functional redundancy approach to the functional subsystems of traditional railway track
switching arrangements in order to evaluate the potential increase in the reliability and availability of switches. The
paper makes three main contributions. First, 2P-Weibull failure distributions for each functional subsystem of each
common category of points operating equipment are established using a timeline and iterative maximum likelihood
estimation approach, based on almost 40,000 sampled failure events over 74,800 years of continuous operation. Second,
these results are used as baselines in a reliability block diagram approach to model engineering fault tolerance, through
subsystem redundancy, into existing switching systems. Third, the reliability block diagrams are used with a Monte-Carlo
simulation approach in order to model the availability of redundantly engineered track switches over expected asset
lifetimes. Results show a significant improvement in the reliability and availability of switches; unscheduled downtime
reduces by an order of magnitude across all powered switch types, whilst significant increases in the whole-system
reliability are demonstrated. Hence, switch designs utilising a functional redundancy approach are well worth further
investigation. However, it is also established that as equipment failures are engineered out, switch reliability/availability
can be seen to plateau as the dominant contributor to unreliability becomes human error.
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Railways, track switch, points, reliability, availability, asset management, system failure
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Introduction
This paper demonstrates the possible reliability bene-
fits from the adoption of functionally redundant sub-
systems in railway track switching, using baseline
data from a modern, high-performance rail network.
A background in the existing track switch design and
practice is first established. The reliability perform-
ance of existing installations is examined by using a
dataset provided by the UK infrastructure owner,
Network Rail. These data are analysed to provide
failure distributions of switch installations, and indi-
vidual subsystems thereof, in the section titled
‘Establishing Failure Rates and Distributions’. An
RBD (reliability block diagram) modelling approach
is used to establish the analytical reliability (static)
and availability (dynamic) benefit of applying a
multi-channel architecture to track switch designs,
to provide a degree of redundancy. The results are
presented and examined in the ‘Analysis’ section
and show that the approach can deliver track switch-
ing with operational reliability much enhanced when
compared to existing installations.
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Background
Rail networks requiring more than a single
vehicle upon a single line are dependent upon the abil-
ity to provide multiple routes for traffic. Switches
(UK: Points) serve this purpose, allowing the
track to merge and diverge. The standard switch
design, in use throughout the world, consists of two
‘switch blades’ upon a suitable supporting structure,
which are able to slide laterally between two ‘stock
rails’. Whilst recognising that switch actuation has
evolved over time – from mechanical rods and levers
to more modern electro-mechanical or electro-
hydraulic designs – the basic mechanical arrangement
of switches has remained identical since the first rail-
ways were envisioned. An extensive description of
switch design is provided by Morgan.1
Despite their necessity, switch failures can rapidly
cripple rail operations. Unlike road transportation,
where vehicles can simply steer around failed vehicles
or roadway, in a guided transport system the vehicles
are reliant upon switches in order to change direction.
This means that a switch failure renders all vehicles
upon direct approach unable to move until it is
repaired. This disruption is magnified where no wider
diversionary route is available, and the consequent
‘knock-on delays’ increase rapidly. Ison et al.2 list
some UK routes now running at over 90% capacity,
and similar situations exist upon major commuter rail-
ways in continental Europe. In such situations, the
effects of switch failures are profound. Literature
explores optimisation options for managing perturbed
traffic to reduce these knock-on delays, for instance the
work of Pellegrini et al.3 Eliminating the cause of
delays and perturbations by preventing switch failures
is another approach explored in literature, for instance
by Garcı´a et al.,4 and Silmon and Roberts5 – both
papers exploring condition monitoring algorithms
and architectures with the goal of reducing failures.
Garcı´a et al.6 also explore a move to reliability-centred
maintenance, rather than the periodic maintenance
regime currently in place. However, these approaches
do not render the system truly ‘fault tolerant’ and are
instead aimed at reducing the incidence of failure
through predicting when failures are likely to occur.
In addition, with a single-point-of-failure system and
limited time/budget to cope with false positives, these
strategies may have a diminishing return when looking
to enhance system availability, a problem which is dis-
cussed by Bemment et al.7
Fault tolerance
A fault tolerant system is able to prevent faults
developing into failures through design, as described
by Blanke and Schro¨der.8 This design can include:
. Systems which isolate or compensate for faulty
components
. Functional design providing a level of capability
without given components
. Parallel channels which can each perform a given
set of requirements alone
In most cases, the first two options cost less in
monetary terms, but some safety critical systems are
forced to follow the third principle, despite cost/
weight penalties, to achieve the level of reliability/
integrity deemed necessary for the safe operation
of the system. Fault tolerance is important in safety-
critical engineering, such as in aircraft, bridges,
cars and nuclear power. Without fault tolerance,
many designs could not function to the standard
required by their regulatory environment. A prime
example is aircraft flight control surfaces, which
would typically have triplex or quadruplex sensor, con-
trol and actuation systems to ensure control of the air-
craft in the case of concurrent failure of several
actuation systems. Literature explores options
for fault tolerance at rail junctions, for instance
by Ursani et al.9 However, this approach is related to
tolerance of faults in the optimum scheduling of traffic
by reconfiguring the signalling, and not the tolerance of
asset failures.
Other applications involving safety-critical systems
have utilised redundancy as a method of achieving
high-availability and/or fault-tolerant operation,
as described in Hecht10 and Isermann.11 Redundant
systems have seen use in the rail sphere, a success-
ful and internationally adopted example being the
architecture of solid state interlocking.12 This has pro-
vision for both fault detection and tolerance; triplex
individual processing units vote and any singular dis-
agreement in output is discarded, with the whole
system continuing to function at a degraded level.
This approach has not yet, however, been adopted
for physical elements of the track switching system.
Current practice
Physical arrangement
Figure 1 shows the diagram of a typical UK installa-
tion, consisting of two stock rails, two switch rails and
a common crossing, fastened by clips, bolts and/or
chairs to supporting bearers of wood or concrete,
themselves supported upon a bed of ballast or con-
crete slab. The stock rails are securely fixed to prevent
movement, whilst the ends of the switch rails are free
to slide upon supporting cast iron chairs, their move-
ment restricted by the attached stretcher bars and the
lock and drive arrangement provided by the POE
(points operating equipment).
There are several different designs of POE (see
‘Subsystem Identification’ section) which are located
variously in between the running rails, at the line side
or a combination of both. Detection rods and/or
switches provide feedback that the blades have
2 Proc IMechE Part F: J Rail and Rapid Transit 0(0)
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reached an acceptable position (and are locked) to the
POE, and subsequently the interlocking system.
Higher line speeds necessitate shallower divergence
angles due to limitations on lateral acceleration and
cant deficiency at the common crossing. This in turn
requires longer switches. Longer designs require mul-
tiple actuation points upon the switch blades to ensure
the entire moveable blade length (up to around 40m in
some designs) is positioned correctly for the passage of
traffic. This actuation is provided either by a power
take-off from the main actuator or additional actuators
situated along the length of the movable portion –
though crucially, not in a redundant configuration
because all actuators must be operating correctly.
The principles of power point operation were
established in the early 20th century as the power
point machines and electric signalling became wide-
spread. The operating principles are extensively
described by Hadaway.14 The principles have more
recently been combined into an industry standard,
in GKRT0062.15 For the UK case, the turnout is com-
manded to be in either of two positions – labelled
‘normal’ or ‘reverse’ – at all times by the interlocking.
If the required position changes, the command signal
from the interlocking will change over, triggering a
sequence of events in the line-side control circuitry
and POE which is referred to as the ‘move-lock-
detect’ cycle, which occurs as follows:
1. Detection of the current position is broken, allow-
ing the actuator to move.
2. The actuator begins movement, first unlocking the
switch blades, allowing them to move freely.
3. The actuator moves both switch blades simultan-
eously to their commanded position.
4. The blades reach their commanded position, and
the actuator ceases to move them.
5. The actuator re-engages the locking mechanism.
6. Detection is made for both switch blades and the
lock, automatically shutting down and isolating
the actuator.
Most POE designs offer combined actuation, lock-
ing of both switch rails and full detection through
single combined motion mechanisms. The turnout is
considered unsafe without a detected position, even
though both switch rails may be locked in the correct
position. Without detection, the interlocking cannot
clear the route, and trains are prevented from passing
the switch. This has the effect that, even for functional
switches, signals on the approach must show restrict-
ive aspects when the switch is moving, representing a
capacity constraint explored by Bemment et al.16 and
in a report by the Transportation Research Board.17
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a
detailed discussion of switch design and operation;
this is extensively covered in literature. Full details
of switch design and operation are presented by
Morgan1 and Cope and Ellis.18 Bemment et al.7 pro-
vide a list of the functional requirements of track
switching solutions.
Asset reliability: The magnitude of the problem
Data are published by the United Kingdom’s ORR
(Office of Road and Rail19) pertaining to the reliabil-
ity of the existing switch installations. An excerpt of
these data is reproduced in Table 1 to illustrate the
magnitude of the issue of switch reliability facing the
GB mainline. This table includes a breakdown of
the number of failure incidents over financial years
(FY) 07/08–11/12. The delay minute total is the sum
of all delays, to all trains, caused as a direct result of
an asset failure. The cost data are calculated as the
sum of the total of delay minute compensation,
Figure 1. Typical switch arrangement, taken from Bemment
et al.13 1: stock rails; 2: moveable switch rails; 3: stretcher bars;
4: common crossing; 5: check rails; 6: straight route; 7: turnout
route; 8: POE (points operating equipment), line-side type
shown; 9: drive bar and drive stretcher; 10: detector rods.
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essentially the compensation paid by the network cus-
todian to the train operators for unscheduled down-
time. This figure does not allow for the subsequent
economic impact of any such failure. It can be
observed that track switch failures are the second big-
gest contributor – both financially and in time – after
track faults, at around £26m/FY.
Baseline data
Mainline failure logging
Network Rail keeps records of all known asset failure
events in a database called ‘FMS’ (Fault Management
System). This database contains many fields which are
relevant to this study. The database records both
faults and failures, identifying the difference between
the two with a ‘criticality index’ between 1 and 4.
Criticality indices 1 to 3 represent failures requiring
immediate rectification. Index 4 is a known fault,
which will need rectifying when possible, but one
which has not yet developed to a system failure.
The data held by FMS do not include the number
of delay minutes incurred (or subsequent monetary
cost) for individual failure events; these data are
held in a separate database called TRUST, without
historical cross-referencing. Data are entered by
human operators, often line-side and in difficult con-
ditions, and as such there is a significant portion of
records which may be incomplete or considered cor-
rupt. Data accuracy improves considerably after 2009
when free-text entry was replaced by option selection
in several fields.
Dataset for this study
For this study, Network Rail provided a dataset
extracted directly from FMS. This consisted of a
database query for all entries pertaining to Points
for dates between 1 April 2008 and 17 September
2011. This resulted in 39,339 fault/failure records,
which were supplied in CSV format. The popula-
tion of switches on the UK mainline was 21,602
in 2011,20 but has stayed broadly constant during
the period, and populations will be considered
constant throughout this analysis. These data cor-
respond to a cumulative operating time of 74,800
years.
Cleansing the dataset
Since the data were directly extracted from the data-
base, extensive processing was required before use.
Of the obtained fields, several fields contain duplicate
information, but not every field was populated for
every record; therefore, identifying these duplicates
was important for data cleansing. First, a script was
created which back-populated missing fields based on
the contents of populated entries, in order to give a
more complete dataset. Certain switch types were then
excluded from the data due to specialist applications,
for example, those with very small populations or
obsolete technology already being phased out (e.g.
pneumatic machines). Hydraulic derailers, identified
as switches in the database, were also discounted.
Table 2 shows the number of records discounted for
each reason.
Table 2. General statistics showing size of pre- and post-
cleansing dataset obtained from Network Rail for the period
1 April 2008 and 17 September 2011.
Total records obtained/analysed 39,339
Minus
Blank/insufficient data/corrupted/irrelevant 966
Pneumatic machines 1,519
GRS Type 5 machines 253
Remaining useable data records 36,601
Of which:
Criticality 1–3 (service affecting failure) 17,603
Criticality 4 (non-service affecting) 18,998
Within the useable data
Unique Switch assets identified 12,042
(from an analysed population of) 19,915
Switches without a failure event in the period 9,560
Showing only a single failure event 4,756
Showing two failure events 2,516
Showing three failure events 1,567
Showing four or more failure events 3,203
Table 1. Cost and delay minute incursion for various asset
types.
Cost Delay minutes
Asset type (MGBP) % (1,000 s) %
Track 131.9 19.2 3,977 18.8
Switches 121.1 17.6 3,874 18.3
Track circuits 99.5 14.5 3,208 15.2
Signalling system 95.2 13.9 2,727 12.9
Electrification 75.4 11.0 1,529 7.2
Signals 40.2 5.9 1,428 6.8
Cabling 37.4 5.4 1,013 4.8
Track TSRs 34.5 5.0 1,630 7.7
Axle counters 18.5 2.7 495 2.3
Level crossings 13.2 1.9 521 2.5
Other signalling 11.6 1.7 363 1.7
Telecoms 9.1 1.3 363 1.7
Totals 687.8 21,128
Values are totals for period FY07–08 and FY11–12. Public domain
obtained from Office of Road and Rail.16
MGBP: Great Britain Pounds; TSR: Temporary Speed Restriction.
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Subsystem identification and event assignment
Understanding the design and operation of switches
allows their decomposition into a number of func-
tional subsystems for further analysis. The division
of functionality into subsystems is in some cases, how-
ever, an exercise of engineering judgement, as some
components in switch designs can be seen to cross the
established subsystem boundaries. The subsystem div-
isions used for the modelling presented herein were
established as part of a series of workshops held in
2011–2013, with representatives from across the GB
rail industry, detailed in Bemment et al.7 The follow-
ing functional subsystems are identified; a shorthand
identifying letter is adopted for each, and the relation-
ship between these subsystems is shown in Figure 2:
. (A) Actuation: Elements for moving the track
between positions and actuating the locking mech-
anism: actuator/gearing, transfer of power/motion,
including backdrive arrangements.
. (C) Control/Power: Elements which locally control
the other subsystems and provide power: signalling
relays, transformers, back-up supplies.
. (D)Detection: Elements which sense and transmit the
position of the switch rails and lock back to the con-
trol system: microswitches, contacts, Linear Variable
Differential Transformer(LVDT).
. (H) Human: Humans responsible for the design,
maintenance and operation of the switch, including
fault finding and repairs.
. (L) Locking: Elements which prevent the un-com-
manded movement of one or both switch blades:
lock bodies, lock dogs, associated mechanisms.
. (P) Permanent Way: Elements which support and
guide vehicles, maintain the gauge and alignment
of the track: stretcher bars, track clips, slide
chairs.
Several designs of POE are analysed. ‘Mechanical’
refers to those switches driven by rod from signalbox
levers or ground frame, and subsystem interactions
therefore differ slightly from Figure 2. HW and W63
designs are both electromechanical in nature. They
are from different suppliers and have different internal
designs and components. The source data do not
explicitly distinguish between them, thus they remain
grouped herein. For the same reason, Clamplock
designs are grouped with Hydrive designs. Both
Clamplock and Hydrive are hydraulic POE designs
with a separate power pack and hoses linked to
rams between the running rails. The HPSS (high-
performance switch system) machines are the newest
design on Network Rail infrastructure and use a screw
jack actuator.
By comparing the switch type, assembly type and
component type identified in each dataset record, each
failure event can be assigned to a particular subsys-
tem, for a given POE type. The total number of rec-
ords in each assignment is shown in Table 3.
Note that it is not possible to separate the Locking
and Actuation functions in the HPSS machine, as the
locking is carried out by the same screw jack mechan-
ism within the actuation element; all failures have thus
been grouped under the Actuation category. Failure
counts for ‘Control/Power’ upon mechanical switches
are unrealistically low. This does not indicate a much
Figure 2. System context diagram showing relationship between functional subsystems, and where appropriate, their relationship
with the wider railway environment.
POE: points operating equipment.
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higher reliability, but instead that not every mechan-
ical switch is fitted with electronic interlocking; at the
time of analysis, data were not available on the por-
tion of the population with/without this feature.
Establishing failure rates and
distributions
Operational reliability – Definition
It is necessary to distinguish between unsafe failures
(i.e. resulting in a system in an unsafe state), oper-
ational failures and faults when discussing the reliabil-
ity of safety critical systems. Literature on the topic
can cause confusion by representing any and all by the
terms Mean Time Between/To Failure, abbreviated
‘MTBF’ or ‘MTTF’. The time between unsafe failures
is not considered any further herein, but these are
essentially undetected failures which make the switch
dangerous to traffic. These would be included in oper-
ational failures, but are comparatively so rare as not
to affect the analysis.
. MTTSAF – Mean Time to Service Affecting
Failure, describes how often the system can be
expected to suffer a failure which is service affecting
(operational reliability).
. MTTFRI – Mean Time to Fault Requiring
Intervention, describes the frequency that mainten-
ance crews must visit the asset to rectify faults and
failures.
. MTTR – Mean Time to Repair – the mean time
from notification of a failed asset (or subsystem
thereof) to returning that asset or subsystem to
an as-good-as-new state.
MTTSAF and MTTFRI figures are included here
as they are used as a de-facto measure within industry;
however, when comparing skewed distributions, the
50% survivor function, or B50, provides a better indi-
cator. Unless otherwise stated, the B50 refers to service
affecting failures. B50 indicates the time at which half
the population is expected to have failed, i.e. the
median.
MTTR is difficult to quantify as the actual repair
time for operational failures (i.e. the time the switch is
unavailable following a failure in use) is not recorded
by the infrastructure operator. For this modelling
exercise, the mean number of ‘delay minutes’ per inci-
dent will be used – 106min. The calculation, and attri-
bution, of delay minutes to particular faults is not
through a particular scientific process, but values pro-
vided in Table 1 are used herein to provide a first
estimate of MTTR of the correct order of magnitude.
More accurate knowledge of the distribution of
MTTR figures would be of significant benefit to
such a study, especially in the case of different subsys-
tems having very different repair times. However, with
the absence of further information, the influence of
this figure upon the results has been mitigated by
assuming a constant throughout.
Constant failure rates
Assuming a constant failure rate, the well-known equa-
tions (equations (1) to (3)) presented by Hecht10 can be
used to calculate MTTSAF and MTTFRI figures for
each subsystem and assembly using the data in Table 3.
Equation (1) expresses the sum of the operational time
between events (TTF) and observational suspensions
(TTS) for each failure event (NFT) in the total (NSAF
or NFRI) and observational suspension event (NST),
divided by the number of observed failure events (NF).
An observational suspension, sometimes referred to as a
censored lifetime, is a subsystem reaching the end of the
observation window in a functional or repaired state;
the asset is known not to have failed in that period, but
its exact point of failure subsequent to the observation
period is unknown. In the case of a fixed observation
window across all assets, as here, this can be simplified
to equations (2) and (3), including the known popula-
tion (P) and observation time window (T). For a con-
stant failure rate, the rate can be expressed as the
reciprocal of the mean, as per equations (4) and (5).
MTTF ¼
PNFT
i¼1 TTFi þ
PNST
j¼1 TTSj
NF
ð1Þ
Table 3. Switch populations and fault/failure incidence count for each subsystem classification within each switch type, for the period
1 April 2008 and 17 September 2011.
POE type (Pop)
All recorded fault/failure incidents (FRI) Service affecting failures only (SAF)
A C D H L P Total A C D H L P Total
Clamplock/
Hydrive
6,852 5,412 1,780 2,358 256 5,129 885 15,821 2,494 921 1,120 115 2,235 346 7,231
HPSS 599 345 548 872 32 – 20 1,817 175 328 601 17 – 13 1,134
HW/W63 9,153 5,799 2,607 2,681 349 1,483 1,687 14,606 2,874 1,466 1,327 178 778 655 7,278
Mechanical 3,311 2,102 52 1,251 50 837 66 4,357 656 23 494 21 320 18 1,533
Total 19,915 13,658 4,987 7,162 687 7,449 2,658 36,601 6,200 2,738 3,542 331 3,332 1,033 17,176
POE: points operating equipment.
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MTTSAF ¼ P T
NSAF
ð2Þ
MTTFRI ¼ P T
NFRI
ð3Þ
lSAF ¼ 1
MTTSAF
ð4Þ
lFRI ¼ 1
MTTFRI
ð5Þ
SAFB50 ¼ ln 2lSAF ð6Þ
FRIB50 ¼ ln 2lFRI ð7Þ
The results of these calculations are tabulated in
Table 4. Mean times calculated in this way are indi-
cative only of the relative unreliability contribution of
each subsystem to the whole system and of the relative
reliability of the different POE designs. To provide
baseline values for comparison with variable-
frequency analysis later in the paper, the B50 values
of the same assets are shown in Table 5. The B50
values in Table 5 have been derived from equations
(6) and (7), which are valid under the assumption of
constant failure rates only. All B50 values calculated
as part of the later, variable failure rate analysis
are established as part of the Monte-Carlo modelling
process.
Lifetime distribution selection
A range of suitable variable failure rate models
were evaluated upon the data, including 2P- and 3P-
Weibull, Gamma, Normal and 1P- and 2P-
Exponential, using a correlation coefficient test and
the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) approach
described below. For each subset of data, the 2P- or
3P-Weibull distribution proved the best fit for the data.
The Weibull distribution is a general purpose reli-
ability distribution used to model times-to-failure of
electronic and mechanical components, equipment or
systems. The 2P-Weibull distribution, described by
Hecht,10 has two parameters, the shape factor b and
the characteristic life, or scale parameter, . Equations
(8) and (9) show the relationship between the failure
frequency and failure rate and the distribution param-
eters at given time, t. b indicates whether a subsystem
has a tendency towards early-life, ‘infant mortality’
failures (5 1), constant failure rate (b¼ 1) or late-
life, ‘wear-out’ failures 4 1.  indicates the scale of
the probability density function in time, a larger 
indicating a longer time to failure; though noting
that  values are not directly comparable, as they
Table 4. MTTFRI and MTTSAF figures for functional subsystems of different POE types upon the GB mainline network, calculated
using data sampled between 1 April 2008 and 17 September 2011.
MTTFRI (years) MTTSAF (years)
A C D H L P All A C D H L P All
Clamplock/Hydrive 4.4 13.3 10.1 92.7 4.6 26.8 1.5 9.5 25.8 21.2 206.1 10.6 68.5 3.3
HPSS 6.0 3.8 2.4 65.0 n/a 102.2 1.1 11.8 6.3 3.5 121.1 n/a 157.4 1.8
HW/W63 5.5 12.1 11.8 90.6 21.4 18.8 2.2 11.0 21.6 23.9 178.4 40.7 48.3 4.4
Mechanical 5.5 219.9 9.2 230.9 13.7 174.3 2.6 17.5 490.6 23.2 548.3 35.8 621.4 7.5
All 5.0 13.8 9.6 100.3 9.3 25.9 1.9 11.1 25.2 19.5 208.4 20.7 66.7 4.0
MTTSAF: mean time to service affecting failure, describes how often the system can be expected to suffer a failure which is service affecting (operational
reliability); MTTFRI: mean time to fault requiring intervention, describes the frequency that maintenance crews must visit the asset to rectify faults and
failures.
Table 5. B50 figures corresponding to the MTTSAF and MTTFRI figures presented in Table 4.
FRIB50 (years) SAFB50 (years)
A C D H L P All A C D H L P All
Clamplock/Hydrive 3.0 9.2 7.0 64.3 3.2 18.6 1.0 6.6 17.9 14.7 142.8 7.4 47.4 2.3
HPSS 4.2 2.6 1.6 45.1 n/a 70.8 0.8 8.2 4.4 2.4 83.9 n/a 109.1 1.3
HW/W63 3.8 8.4 8.2 62.8 14.8 13.0 1.5 7.6 15.0 16.5 123.6 28.2 33.5 3.0
Mechanical 3.8 152.4 6.4 160.0 9.5 120.8 1.8 12.1 340.0 16.1 380.0 24.8 430.7 5.2
All 3.5 9.6 6.7 69.6 6.4 18.0 1.3 7.7 17.4 13.5 144.5 14.3 46.2 2.8
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depend upon the corresponding b value. The
3P-Weibull distribution also requires , which repre-
sents an offset in time for the origin of the curve.
In the analysed cases where the 3P-Weibull distri-
bution proved most suitable, it did so with an offset
parameter which was insignificantly small; therefore,
the 2P-Weibull was selected as the most suitable dis-
tribution for this modelling exercise. Published work
by Rama and Andrews21 obtains a similar though
more targeted dataset from the same source and fits
distributions to the grouped data. The work also
establishes that the Weibull distribution is the most
appropriate distribution to model switch component
lifetimes and also selects the two-parameter model
over the three-parameter model for the same reasons.
One drawback of the Weibull function is that it is
not capable of exhibiting non-monotonic shapes in
the hazard function. This means the bathtub curve,
typically observed over a whole component and popu-
lation lifetime, cannot be replicated. However, this
drawback is offset by the sample period being across
a range of component ages, and the use of confidence
intervals to give an indication of the goodness-of-fit of
the distributions identified.
Rama and Andrews21 also list a number of
assumptions which need to be made when modelling
lifetime distributions in this way, namely:
1. Each failure is rectified by repairing or replacing
the failed component.
2. Equipment can either be in a good (operational)
or bad (failed) state.
3. Repair/replacement returns components to the as-
good-as-new state.
4. Times to failure of individual components are
independent of each other.
5. Time duration of the component in the failed
state is insignificant in comparison to the function-
ing period.
f ðtÞ ¼ 

t

 1
eð
t
Þ ð8Þ
lðtÞ ¼ 

t

 1
ð9Þ
B50 ¼ ðlnð2ÞÞ1 ð10Þ
MTTSAFWeibull ¼ SAF 1þ 1
SAF
  
ð11Þ
Distribution fitting process
First, records were grouped by each unique asset and
then placed upon failure event timelines. The output
from this process is, for each established subsystem/
switch type group, an array of ‘time to event’ figures,
where the event is either a failure or suspension of
test. This process was automated using an iterative
script; however, due to historical changes in data
entry methods, significant manual intervention was
also required. Figure 3 shows a histogram of the
time-to-failure data for all Clamplock/Hydrive fail-
ures. Figure 4 shows the cumulative proportion of
observed failures over time; as the gradient of the
Figure 3. Histogram of all Clamplock/Hydrive failure intervals.
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plot is shallower with time, it indicates that the failure
pattern tends towards infant mortality.
The output arrays can be used as the input to an
MLE algorithm. MLE is an estimator technique suit-
able for data that have a relatively high portion of
observational suspensions; the proportion of observa-
tional suspensions in these data prevents the use of
other techniques, e.g. rank regression. MLE works by
developing a likelihood function based on sampling the
data and by finding the values of parameter estimates
that maximise this likelihood function. It is an iterative
method. The process is well established and docu-
mented, for example by Scholz.22 b and  values were
established (for service affecting failures only) in each
of the subsystems in each switch classification, and the
computed values are tabulated in Table 6. Values of
the parameters at the extremes of a 90% confidence
interval are also provided to indicate the goodness of
fit. Table 6 also lists the computed B50 values for each
subsystem, and (for the sake of compatibility with
existing practice only) the computed MTTSAF
values, also with 90% confidence intervals. The calcu-
lation of these values for a given 2P-Weibull distribu-
tion uses equations (10) and (11), where  represents
the Gamma function. An example of a fitted exponen-
tial model for failure distributions, for the Actuation
subsystem of an HW/W63 machine type, is plotted in
Figure 5. Figure 6 is a plot of the same failure data,
with a fitted 2P-Weibull distribution. These two plots
illustrate the relative unsuitability of the constant fail-
ure rate model with these data.
Analysis of fitted distributions
. The distributions reveal HPSS – the most modern
POE type – to be the least reliable solution, and
mechanical points, the oldest approach, to be
the most reliable. The low reliability of HPSS
may be due to the observation window coinciding
with the roll out of HPSS, and the subsequent final
development and testing period with live traffic.
A more recent observation window would be
required to confirm this.
. The models established in Table 6 can be compared
to those independently established by Rama and
Andrews.21 Notably, the shape parameter 5 1
indicates a high infant mortality rate. There are
some differences between the B50 values in the con-
stant and variable failure rate models.
. Comparing the values presented in Table 5 with
those in Table 6 indicates that assuming a constant
failure rate when modelling switch failures is not an
ideal approach, as in all cases the whole-system b
values are significantly less than 1 – a conclusion
which further agrees with those of Rama and
Andrews.21 This indicates that the accuracy of
many predict-and-prevent models used by industry
could be significantly improved with the use of
variable failure rates.
. Comparing the values presented in Table 5 with
those in Table 6 further highlights the weakness
of the industry-standard MTTSAF measure – the
MTTSAF for mechanical switches at almost
50 years, for instance, would be a misleading
value for an asset manager, when considering the
B50 is nearer to 10 years.
. Most elements show a tendency towards 5 1, indi-
cating a higher incidence of early life failures. This is
not what is expected of an electromechanical device,
which would typically be seen to wear out in use.
Permanent way elements, with b approximately 1,
have a broadly constant failure rate.
Figure 4. Cumulative portion of all Clamplock/Hydrive failure events over observed time.
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Table 6. Calculated values of b, , B50 and MTTSAF, including 90% confidence intervals, tabulated by POE type and subsystem type.
Service affecting failures only
A C D H L P All
Clamplock/Hydrive blower 0.716 0.750 0.674 1.268 0.709 0.809 0.636
b 0.738 0.789 0.707 1.477 0.732 0.882 0.647
bupper 0.760 0.829 0.740 1.707 0.755 0.959 0.658
lower 4,639 12,822 13,920 13,267 5,329 26,688 1,332
 (days) 4,940 14,739 15,941 19,418 5,713 35,548 1,374
upper 5,276 17,104 18,434 30,914 6,144 49,022 1,417
B50,lower 7.8 22.5 23.2 29.3 8.9 49.8 2.1
B50 (years) 8.2 25.4 26.0 41.5 9.5 64.3 2.1
B50,upper 8.7 28.8 29.4 63.5 10.1 85.6 2.2
MTTSAFlower 15.3 40.0 47.4 33.3 17.7 77.5 5.0
MTTSAF (years) 16.3 46.2 54.8 48.1 19.0 103.7 5.2
MTTSAFupper 17.5 54.0 64.0 75.4 20.6 143.7 5.3
HPSS blower 0.594 0.519 0.599 0.641 n/a 0.809 0.545
b 0.671 0.564 0.637 0.967 n/a 1.253 0.569
bupper 0.754 0.612 0.676 1.389 n/a 1.836 0.593
lower 6,481 3,496 1,492 15,058 n/a 8,756 644
 (days) 8,641 4,243 1,671 47,391 n/a 22,730 701
upper 12,130 5,267 1,887 326,420 n/a 119,097 766
B50,lower 22.9 5.1 2.3 31.5 n/a 19.6 0.9
B50 (years) 31.2 6.1 2.6 88.9 n/a 46.5 1.0
B50,upper 45.2 7.3 2.9 509.1 n/a 208.7 1.1
MTTSAFlower 10.8 15.3 5.7 41.7 n/a 22.8 2.8
MTTSAF (years) 13.7 19.1 6.4 131.7 n/a 58.0 3.1
MTTSAFupper 18.2 24.4 7.3 914.0 n/a 292.4 3.4
HW/W63 blower 0.643 0.771 0.622 1.454 0.594 1.199 0.600
b 0.662 0.804 0.650 1.652 0.629 1.275 0.611
bupper 0.682 0.838 0.679 1.866 0.667 1.354 0.622
lower 7,388 11,327 22,576 10,515 51,175 8,277 2,211
 (days) 7,953 12,645 26,253 13,991 65,123 9,405 2,293
upper 8,592 14,207 30,800 19,611 84,455 10,805 2,378
B50,lower 11.8 20.0 35.9 23.7 80.7 17.3 3.3
B50 (years) 12.5 22.0 40.9 30.7 99.7 19.3 3.4
B50,upper 13.4 24.3 46.9 41.8 125.2 21.8 3.6
MTTSAFlower 26.9 34.9 83.5 26.1 195.2 21.1 8.9
MTTSAF (years) 29.2 39.1 98.3 34.3 252.9 23.9 9.2
MTTSAFupper 31.7 44.1 116.8 47.3 334.5 27.3 9.6
Mechanical blower 0.512 0.690 0.649 1.151 0.554 0.910 0.474
b 0.544 1.011 0.698 1.641 0.608 1.360 0.494
bupper 0.578 1.417 0.751 2.253 0.665 1.938 0.513
lower 20,682 43,684 16,604 11,066 43,218 17,734 6,706
 (days) 25,687 188,915 20,797 25,454 62,510 56,200 7,531
upper 32,496 2,022,138 26,696 93,985 94,833 381,088 8,505
B50,lower 29.9 92.2 27.8 25.7 67.9 40.2 8.9
B50 (years) 35.9 360.2 33.7 55.8 93.7 117.6 9.8
B50,upper 43.8 3,269.6 41.8 187.6 134.9 699.8 10.9
MTTSAFlower 95.3 119.3 56.9 27.9 169.7 45.7 36.9
MTTSAF (years) 121.8 515.3 72.3 62.4 253.3 141.0 42.3
MTTSAFupper 158.9 5,504.0 94.3 219.9 398.0 916.2 48.8
(continued)
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. An electro-mechanical or electro-hydraulic element
showing high infant mortality is an indication of
three main possible failure contributors. First, that
insufficient burn-in testing is being completed.
Second, that there are negative human factors
with regard to installation and adjustment, which
lead to the components operating outside a design
envelope. Third, that the components have not
been designed for the correct operating environ-
ment. Further analysis would be required to estab-
lish which particular cause (or combination
thereof) was prevalent.
Table 6. Continued
Service affecting failures only
A C D H L P All
All blower 0.641 0.729 0.626 1.443 0.661 1.021 0.595
b 0.654 0.751 0.643 1.576 0.679 1.073 0.601
bupper 0.667 0.774 0.660 1.717 0.698 1.127 0.608
lower 11,035 16,225 17,562 13,109 15,862 16,625 1,962
 (days) 11,675 17,767 19,115 16,281 17,225 19,090 2,008
upper 12,364 19,520 20,882 20,770 18,770 22,139 2,055
B50,lower 17.4 27.6 27.5 29.0 25.6 32.9 2.9
B50 (years) 18.3 29.9 29.6 35.3 27.5 37.2 3.0
B50,upper 19.2 32.4 31.9 44.2 29.6 42.4 3.1
MTTSAFlower 40.8 52.6 66.1 32.5 56.3 44.4 8.0
MTTSAF (years) 43.4 57.9 72.4 40.0 61.5 50.9 8.3
MTTSAFupper 46.2 63.9 79.8 50.6 67.5 58.9 8.5
Figure 5. Best-fit line for exponential failure distribution (i.e. constant failure rate) of Actuation subsystem of HW/W63 machine
class, showing a considerable deviation from observed data.
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. ‘Human error’ failures – that is, failures directly
attributable to human error rather than those
manifesting themselves through the failure of a
component – have a relatively high beta.
However, the confidence bands of these values
are very wide, as there are relatively few failures
attributable to this cause. As there is no obvious
reason the likelihood of human error should
increase with time, it may prove a better approach
in future work to fit a constant failure rate model
to this element.
. Note that values in the ‘all’ column are calculated
using all data points for a given machine to con-
struct a distribution, which because of the mix of b
values discovered is not an accurate method, a
better method being the mixed-Weibull, which is
used for the baseline models in the next section.
These subsystem models can now be used to evalu-
ate the benefits of a redundant approach.
Fault tolerance through redundancy
Modelling approach
With the b and  values established in the previous
section, conceptual designs featuring redundancy of
subsystems can now be modelled. This modelling
takes an RBD approach. An RBD represents a
system by a series of blocks; each block can be in a
‘functional’ or ‘failed’ state. The system is considered
to be in a functional state if a path can be created
from start (left) to end (right) which encompasses
only blocks in the functional state. The modelling
considered here is purely analytical, that is it is
assumed that no repair of failed subsystems takes
place. Three examples of RBDs are provided graph-
ically in this paper; other combinations are repre-
sented in shorthand only. This shorthand notation
is adopted for brevity, whereby a number (represent-
ing number of channels) or fraction (representing
x-out-of-y redundancy) is followed by the abbrevi-
ation adopted for each subsystem as used in the
source data analysis. Figure 7 shows the baseline
example. This has a single instance of each subsystem
and would be termed A C D H L P in shorthand. As
all subsystems are connected in series, a failure of any
one will cause a system failure. Another arrangement
is shown in Figure 8, which has duplicate, triplicate
and 2-out-of-3 elements. The shorthand for this
implementation is 2/3A 2/3D 3L C 2P H.
Scenarios and strategy
. Actuation elements can be combined in parallel-
channel redundancy. A range of actuation options
Figure 6. 2-P Weibull failure distribution ( ¼ 0:662,  ¼ 7953) and 90% confidence interval of Actuation subsystem of HW/W63
machine class, showing a much closer correlation to the observed data than Figure 5.
12 Proc IMechE Part F: J Rail and Rapid Transit 0(0)
243
can be examined. Singular (i.e. current practice),
duplicate, triplicate (including 2-out-of-3) are con-
sidered here. However, actuators are also relatively
expensive. Cost is not calculated in this paper, but
2-out-of-3 may enable smaller/cheaper units to be
utilised.
. Control/Power elements could be paralleled in a
number of ways; however, it is anticipated that
x-out-of-y approaches would not be suitable due
to the complexity of the control signalling.
Therefore, the options examined are singular,
duplicate and triplicate.
. Detection elements can easily be paralleled.
However, the sole purpose of detection is to sense
the system state, so a problem exists in a duplicate
system showing two differing positions, which
would likely still be regarded as a failure. Options
considered are therefore singular, and the voting
systems 2-out-of-3 and 3-out-of-4. The processing
element is considered perfect.
. Human failures caused by human error must neces-
sarily form part of the system analysis. However, a
full analysis of the human factor elements of track
switch design, operation, maintenance and repair is
not part of this work (see ‘Future Work’ section).
The human element is therefore considered consist-
ent with existing practice.
. Locking elements can be paralleled. As the funda-
mental purpose of the lock means a failure could
lead to it preventing movement of the switch, it
could be deduced that paralleling this subsystem
may in fact reduce the overall system reliability.
However, in practice, nearly all lock failures
result from a lock failing to engage. For this
analysis, it is assumed there is an engineering
solution to this which enables locks to function
as separate units.7
. Permanent Way elements could be duplicated or
triplicated, but no voting approaches could apply
as these elements are entirely passive.
Another approach to be considered (for the power
operated points only) is the duplication, triplication
and 2-out-of-3 voting for several identical point
machines fitted to a single end. This would parallel
detection, actuation and locking channels grouped
together, in a larger framework of voting and process-
ing, again considered perfect. An example of this
approach is shown in Figure 9, the shorthand for
which is 3(ADL) C P H. These grouped elements
would each have an associated permanent way, con-
trol/power and human elements, which could take the
form of the strategies above. It is also not possible to
apply each of these strategies to each points type,
exceptions are:
. Actuation upon the mechanical points type consists
of rodding and cable runs from a lever frame to the
points. Therefore, a redundancy of actuators
would not be practicable.
. Control/Power elements upon mechanical points
type are rare, yet the failure distribution listed is
Figure 8. An example RBD showing replication of individual subsystems, with 2-out-of-3 voting (for actuation and detection),
triplication (locking) and duplication (permanent way).
Figure 7. An example RBD showing the baseline case, with a single subsystem of each category. As all subsystems are connected in
series, a failure of any one will cause a system failure.
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very low as it is for the whole population analysed.
This has therefore been left as a singular item.
. Locking elements upon HPSS points type are com-
bined with actuation as established earlier.
When all possible approaches listed above are com-
bined, there are approximately 350 possible permuta-
tions per machine type. For brevity, therefore, this
paper will present a baseline machine and several con-
cepts for each machine type, demonstrating the most
reliable scenarios in each case. Many architectures are
evaluated as each will incur a different monetary cost;
evaluating relative cost is the subject of further work.
The scenarios were selected by way of a sensitivity
analysis of each subsystem, which iteratively exam-
ined the static contribution to unreliability of each
subsystem. The process for creating the distributions
is based on the Monte-Carlo approach. The com-
pleted RBDs are used, with random inputs, to predict
first failure times of the system. This process is
repeated until a dataset of 500 simulated failure
points is created, for each combination. This dataset
can then be subject to the same MLE process detailed
earlier, in order to calculate the b and  parameters,
and B50 values. For completeness, MTTSAF figures
are also calculated. Note that this is a different
method to that used to calculate the ‘All’ column in
Table 4, which was to fit a single 2P-Weibull distribu-
tion to a dataset which was known to be a mix of
different distributions. The results of the two pro-
cesses are therefore expected to be marginally differ-
ent. Table 4 can be used to validate the Monte-Carlo
approach.
Static versus dynamic analysis
One of the benefits of a multi-channel approach is
that the system continues to function until such a
time as a repair has been effected, unless all channels
fail simultaneously. Whilst a static analysis can reveal
the expected system reliability, a more relevant meas-
ure can be obtained from a dynamic simulation –
using the same RBD and Monte-Carlo approach –
to establish the availability. To establish availability,
the benchmark MTTR is used as the time to fix any
failed subcomponent. As the failure distributions are
significantly time-variant, the dynamic simulations
are run over an observation window of 25 years (a typ-
ical asset lifetime for a switch installation) and the
mean unavailability per annum, in minutes, taken as
a measure for comparison. Note that this availability
figure relates to unscheduled downtime only and does
not allow for scheduled maintenance downtime,
which is considered part of the system.
Analysis
The results of the static modelling are presented in
Table 7. The results of the dynamic modelling are
presented in the right-hand column of Table 7.
The B50 figures show that redundancy can provide a
considerable improvement over baseline for every
POE type. The mean annual downtime for each
redundantly engineered solution is an order of mag-
nitude lower than the baseline scenario. The following
further points are of note:
. Industry practice is to use mean-times as a meas-
ure of reliability. However, with highly skewed dis-
tributions, as calculated here, this measure can
be significantly misleading. This paper suggests
use of the B50 value as a more representative meas-
ure, whether or not failure rates are considered
constant.
. In all cases, parallel redundancy of functional sub-
systems acts to improve overall system reliability.
. For HPSS, fitting three machines in a parallel
configuration results in a fivefold improvement in
B50 value.
Figure 9. An example RBD showing parallel replication of whole POE units, wherein each unit has actuation, locking and detection
elements.
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. For the HW/W63 electromechanical machines, up
to 12.5 year B50 values are achievable, a fivefold
improvement.
. For Clamplock/Hydrive types, B50 can also exceed
10 years, also a fivefold improvement.
. As expected, different architectures have different
effects upon whole system reliability. To select a
suitable architecture for a given situation, cost con-
straints must also be taken into account, alongside
the maintenance and repair policy.
. Figure 10 shows the relative reliability importance
of each subsystem type, for the HW/W63 baseline
example. Reliability importance is calculated as the
subsystem reliability divided by system reliability
and gives an indication of how likely a failure of
that subsystem is to cause a system failure. It can
be seen that for the series case, the failure of any
block is of similar likelihood to cause a system fail-
ure at any point in the observation window. This
result is to be expected for a series system.
Table 7. b, , MTTSAF and B50 values for a selection of redundantly engineered switch solutions based upon existing POE types.
Machine type
Concept
structure
Static Dynamic
b  MTTSAF B50 Mean Unavailibility
(days) (years) (years) (min per annum)
Clamplock/Hydrive A C D H L P (Baseline) 0.750 1,136 3.7 1.9 24.1
2/3A 3C 2/3D H 2L 2P 1.253 2,587 6.7 5.1 1.3
2/3A 3C 2/3D H 3L 2P 1.276 2,861 7.4 5.7 1.3
2/3A 3C 3/4D H 2L 2P 1.252 2,345 6.1 4.7 1.3
2/3A 3C 3/4D H 3L 2P 1.270 2,572 6.6 5.2 1.3
3A 3C 2/3D H 2L 2P 1.353 4,181 10.6 8.6 1.3
3A 3C 2/3D H 3L 2P 1.468 4,802 12.1 10.0 1.3
3A 3C 3/4D H 2L 2P 1.319 3,603 9.2 7.3 1.3
3A 3C 3/4D H 3L 2P 1.393 4,088 10.3 8.5 1.3
2/3(ADL) 3C H 2P 1.152 1,319 3.6 2.5 1.3
3(ADL) 3C H 2P 1.431 3,610 7.3 9.3 1.3
HPSS A C D H P (Baseline) 0.623 555 2.1 0.9 36.2
2/3A 3C 2/3D H 2P 1.055 1,104 2.1 3.1 0.9
2/3A 3C 3/4D H 2P 1.037 710 2.0 1.3 0.9
3A 3C 2/3D H 2P 1.033 1,261 3.5 2.3 0.8
3A 3C 3/4D H 3P 1.020 770 2.2 1.4 0.9
2/3(AD) 3C H 2P 1.026 863 2.5 1.6 0.9
3(AD) 3C H 2P 1.256 2,531 6.7 4.9 0.9
HW/W63 A C D H L P (Baseline) 0.716 1,568 5.0 2.7 18.9
2/3A 3C 2/3D H 2L 2P 1.036 3,618 9.5 7.1 1.8
2/3A 3C 2/3D H 3L 2P 1.035 3,682 9.7 7.3 1.8
2/3A 3C 3/4D H 2L 2P 1.037 3,251 8.6 6.4 1.9
2/3A 3C 3/4D H 3L 2P 1.036 3,303 8.8 6.5 1.9
3A 3C 2/3D H 2L 2P 1.114 5,845 14.7 12.2 1.7
3A 3C 2/3D H 3L 2P 1.119 5,995 15.0 12.5 1.7
3A 3C 3/4D H 2L 3P 1.086 5,025 12.8 10.3 1.9
3A 3C 3/4D H 3L 2P 1.078 5,143 13.1 10.6 1.8
2/3(ADL) 3C H 2P 0.989 2,398 6.6 4.5 1.9
3(ADL) 3C H 2P 1.155 5,603 14.1 11.6 1.8
Mechanical A C D H L P (Baseline) 0.621 3,357 12.5 5.3 8.1
A C 2/3D H 2L 2P 0.685 5,193 16.6 9.0 3.7
A C 2/3D H 3L 2P 0.680 5,412 17.3 9.4 3.6
A C 3/4D H 2L 2P 0.716 4,148 12.8 7.3 3.9
A C 3/4D H 3L 2P 0.713 4,282 13.3 7.5 3.7
A 2/3(DL) C H 2P 0.713 3,967 12.5 6.9 3.8
A 3(DL) 3C H 2P 0.648 7,090 23.1 12.4 3.8
MTTSAF: mean time to service affecting failure, describes how often the system can be expected to suffer a failure which is service affecting (operational
reliability).
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. Figure 11 shows the relative reliability importance
for a sample case, 3A 3C 2/3D H 3L 2P of the
HW/W63 POE type. The importance of all phys-
ical subsystems has been considerably reduced,
indicating a good fault tolerance. However, the
human element is now of dominant importance
throughout the observation window. The same is
true for all evaluated architectures, as it is not pos-
sible to add redundancy to the human element in the
same way. There is also the possibility that the
Human element would be less reliable with a
multi-channel system, as the extra complexity may
lead to additional human error. Adding additional
redundancy beyond that explored herein does not
significantly further improve system reliability, as
the Human element becomes the limiting factor.
This result is important in indicating that when
implementing functionally redundant track switch-
ing solutions, human factors elements are important
in gaining the full reliability benefits. Any neglect of
human factors in this instance may mean that there
may be no reliability improvement at all.
. The results of the dynamic modelling show that an
order of magnitude reduction in unscheduled
downtime is possible across all asset types, when
a functionally redundant design approach is taken.
. The dynamic modelling also shows that the par-
ticular architecture has a relatively insignificant
effect upon the unscheduled downtime for each
switch type. This is because the likelihood of par-
allel channels failing concurrently, within the com-
paratively short MTTR, is diminishingly small.
. The main contributor to the unscheduled down-
time in each scenario is errors directly attributable
to humans. This is further highlighted in Figure 11.
HPSS performs better than the other drive types in
the mean unavailability per annum due to the fact
the eta value for human-induced failures is much
higher – there is less likelihood of error as the
machine has built-in monitoring and diagnostics.
. As theMTTR is insignificantly small when compared
with the MTTSAF, there may be some scope in a
multi-channel architecture to respond to subsystem
failures in a much longer time frame – perhaps weeks
or months – without having a significant detrimental
effect upon availability. Further modelling work will
be necessary to establish this relationship.
. This modelling has not considered the practical
limitations to implementation. Of note is the
fact that providing redundancy in locking with
existing designs may not be possible. A novel
design of locking system allowing multiple
Figure 10. Reliability Importance of each subsystem type for baseline case of HW/W63 machine type, over 20 years of operation.
As it is a series system, all elements contribute similar levels of unreliability at each point in time.
16 Proc IMechE Part F: J Rail and Rapid Transit 0(0)
247
channels would therefore be required. The pro-
posed ‘REPOINT’ design, first presented in
Bemment et al.,7 is one option which enables a
redundancy of locking systems.
Conclusions
This paper has established that adopting a fault tol-
erant approach to railway track switching is able to
bring considerable gains in reliability and availability.
Reliability of track switches is a problem on the UK
mainline, causing much delay to trains and with an
associated cost to the infrastructure manager. This
paper has analysed failure data from the UK mainline
infrastructure custodian, covering 74,800 years of
operation, in order to establish failure distribution
parameters and reliability figures for different switch
machine types when decomposed into their functional
subsystems. These parameters have then been used as
inputs to a range of RBD models which establish ana-
lytically the increase to reliability possible when
taking a parallel-subsystem approach to fault toler-
ance. The results show that considerable gains in
whole-system reliability are demonstrated in a range
of possible implementations; typical time to failures
can be more than five times that of existing solutions,
and unscheduled downtime reduced by an order of
magnitude. However, as equipment failures are engin-
eered out, switch reliability can be seen to plateau.
This is due to the dominant contributor to unreliabil-
ity becoming human error, which cannot be designed
out in the same manner. As considerable reliability
gains are demonstrated, this paper makes a strong
case for developing track switch designs utilising func-
tional redundancy. The potential impact of such
designs on reliability and availability is significant.
Future work
Future work investigating fault tolerant track switch-
ing will centre around three main areas:
. Dynamic reliability modelling of suggested archi-
tectures for fault tolerant track switching solutions.
The work contained herein is analytical only, and
clearly one of the main benefits to the implementa-
tion of parallel-channel redundancy is the exten-
sion of the window where repair/replacement can
occur. This work will require extensive modelling
but build directly upon the failure distributions
established in this paper.
Figure 11. Reliability Importance of each subsystem type for 3A 3C 2/3D H 3L 2P case of HW/W63 machine type, over 20 years of
operation. System reliability is dominated by human error over the entire time period.
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. A more detailed engineering appraisal of the phys-
ical constraints of fault tolerant track switching
needs to be carried out. This paper does not con-
sider for example the space, cost or time constraints
within which the track switching solutions must per-
form, or indeed whether engineering a physical
embodiment of the proposed redundant architec-
tures is possible.
. Seek a greater understanding of the human factors
elements of track switch installation, maintenance
and repair. In any future implementation, minimis-
ing the human contribution to failures will be just
as important as engineering out service affecting
failures, as demonstrated by this paper.
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Extending emergency repair response
times for railway track switches
through multi-channel redundancy of
functional subsystems
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Abstract
A novel track switch concept has been developed at Loughborough University, which
allows parallel-channel, fault-tolerant functions for the first time. This paper demon-
strates, through mathematical modelling, real-world data and conservative assump-
tions, that using a multi-channel, fault-tolerant switching concept can allow an in-
crease in switch availability over baseline scenarios. Performance of four existing
switch types is analysed for baseline performance using field data. Multi-channel
architectures are then analysed across a range of reactionary maintenance regimes.
Availability measures are obtained which show the range of possible switch availabil-
ity against maintenance response times. The most significant improvements occur
when maintenance practice is also revised, the novel system offering the option to run
to subsystem failure and remain functional. Results indicate that for multi-channel
installations, gains in system availability are possible even when emergency response
times are set orders of magnitude longer than currently achieved, indicating a signifi-
cant reduction in ongoing maintenance commitment. The work also demonstrates that
the particular choice of subsystem architecture is of low significance.
Keywords: Track Switch, Capacity, Reliability, Multi-channel Redundancy, Fault
Tolerance, Maintenance
1 Introduction
Industries with safety critical or performance critical systems often replicate key com-
ponents in order to increase whole-system satety and availability and reduce system
failure rates [1]. To date, though literature explores the option of making the junction
control fault tolerant [2, 3], railway track switch designs have used only a single-
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channel architecture, without fault tolerance. A project called Repoint has devised a
novel arrangement for railway track switching. It is described in GB Patents [4,5] and
extensively in [6–8]. The new architecture enables multi-channel actuation, locking
and detection to be used to provide improved switch performance in ways that are
not possible with conventional designs. Performance refers to increased availability
and reliability, and improved maintainability, possibly leading to reduced whole-life
cost. When taken alongside signalling changes which allow a turnout to be treated
more like plain line, it may allow for more capacity through existing junction lay-
outs [9]. A condition monitoring scheme, designed to automatically reconfigure the
control algorithm to isolate suspected faulty subsystems, enables the ongoing use of
the switch with minimal performance degradation until such a time as repair becomes
feasible. The concept features LRU’s (line-replaceable units) in order to minimise
maintenance team time trackside and system downtime. General arrangements of a
traditional switch [10], and a contrasting Repoint arrangement are shown in Figure 1,
described later.
Replicating critical elements of a system generally improves theoretical reliability.
However, achieving the same in practice requires consideration of human and eco-
nomic factors. The fitment of a Repoint switch is envisioned as part of an industry
wide trend towards ‘predict and prevent’ eliminating the need for regular human in-
tervention or inspection [6]. With replication of elements, the asset manager has more
freedom to select the target reliability of the asset given available resources. One vari-
able to aid in this decision is τ , which represents the target time in which maintenance
teams must have replaced any failed components. With a single channel system, τ is
equivalent to the emergency response time, thus a very high (and consequently expen-
sive) labour commitment is necessary. However, with fault tolerance, τ can potentially
be relaxed whilst still providing the necessary availability. No attempt is made herein
to quantify τ in monetary terms, as this value would be unique to the particular staffing
arrangements at each specific locality (See Future Work section).
This paper demonstrates, through mathematical modelling based upon field-data of
historical points failures, that an increase in switch availability is possible alongside a
corresponding decrease in ongoing maintenance intensity using a fault tolerant (multi-
channel functional redundancy) approach. The paper firstly analyses four benchmark
existing switch types for baseline performance, using data from real-world scenarios
and a Monte-Carlo RBD (Reliability Block Diagram) approach. Several architectures
of multi-channel switch are then analysed using the same method and data - with re-
dundant actuation, sensing and control channels as an example, across varying levels
of implementation of reactionary maintenance regimes. Availability measures are ob-
tained, including as functions of τ , which show the range of possible switch availabil-
ity against maintenance response times, with a given set of conservative assumptions.
The results show that for a multi-channel installation, gains in whole-system avail-
ability are possible even when maintenance response times are set many times longer
than current standards, indicating a significant reduction in ongoing maintenance cost
2
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Figure 1: Traditional (A) and REPOINT (B) switch arrangements. 1 Stock Rails;
2 Moveable Switch Rails; 3 Stretcher Bars; 4 Common Crossing; 5 Check Rails;
6 Straight Route; 7 Turnout Route; 8 POE (Points Operating Equipment), line-side
type shown; 9 Drive Bar and Drive Stretcher ; 10 Detection Rods, 11 Supplementary
Position (Detection) Sensor.
is achievable in parallel with an increase in availability and reduction in unscheduled
downtime.
This paper is based upon the work presented in the earlier paper ‘Extending main-
tenance intervals of track switches utilising multi-channel redundancy of actuation
and sensing’, [11], delivered at STECH2015 in Chiba, Japan. It has been extended
and modified to include data obtained from analysis of real-world switch performance
obtained from [12] and [13], in order to more accurately quantify the original con-
clusions. The original contributions of this paper are to establish the magnitude of
availability and maintainability improvements possible from using the fault tolerant
approach, and to compare this to the baseline scenarios calculated from the cited field-
data.
3
252
2 Existing track switching solutions
UK track switching practice is discussed in literature relating to the design [10], op-
eration [14], and maintenance [15] of switches. Switches are actuated remotely by
electro-mechanical devices ‘point machines’, of various designs, which are responsi-
ble for the setting and locking of the switch blades, and the communication of that
position back to the control system. A arrangement of device and moving rails is
shown in Fig. 1. In this paper, 3 types of powered point actuation will be considered,
with non-powered points included in the baseline analysis for comparison:
• Classic Electro-Mechanical: for instance HW and W63 designs which use an
electric motor and gearbox with cam arrangement, generally with bang-bang
control and an integral point lock.
• Electro-Hydraulic: for instance Clamplock and Hydrive designs which use an
external power pack with actuation provided by hydraulic rams. An arrange-
ment of lever elements, or external mechanical module, provides lock.
• Modern Electro-Mechanical: primarily the HPSS design which uses an elec-
tric motor and gearbox, with more modern sensing and control elements. Lock-
ing is provided by means of a screw jack mechanism in the drive.
• Mechanical: Arrangements without power operation, where the blades are
moved and locked by the provision of rodding runs to levers in a signal box.
Point Machines can be situated many miles from available emergency response
teams. Any system failure, whilst not necessarily a safety risk due to the inbuilt con-
trols and associated operational procedure, causes much disruption to the network
whilst a team is despatched to repair the system. This disruption is magnified where
there is no diversionary route around the failed switch, a common occurrence as switch
population is minimised by infrastructure owners in order to cut costs.
To reduce failures, switches undergo a labour-intensive maintenance programme.
A typical set of maintenance interventions is shown in Table 2. Recent UK improve-
ments include an extensive fitment of remote condition monitoring equipment since
2009 with much academic input into algorithm design [16–19]. This effort has, in
part, been responsible for a downward trend of switch failures, which can be observed
in Table 1. However, this downward trend does not necessarily correspond to a down-
ward trend in maintenance costs, because the switches are now subject to both periodic
and condition based maintenance. This is primarily as the condition monitoring tech-
nology used is not capable of monitoring the state of all safety-critical elements of the
switch, necessitating the continuation of regular human inspection. For a conventional
switch, all significant failures create an unsafe condition and are therefore accommo-
dated at a system level by the signalling system, i.e. an operational failure because
functional redundancy in the switch itself is not possible.
4
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Infrastructure Incident Count Ic Delay mins per
Element 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 (Mean) Incident (Mean)
Points 8022 7118 5803 5162 5021 4376 5917 106
Signals 6559 6202 5116 5018 4449 4278 5270 48
Track Faults 6322 5387 4947 4802 4661 5250 5228 139
Track Circuits 5381 5145 4567 4243 3902 3729 4495 123
Signalling/Power 3750 4016 4422 4202 4494 4684 4261 114
Other Infra. 5478 3772 3455 3774 3612 4739 4138 62
Track Patrols 3362 2565 2269 1949 2213 2075 2406 16
Level Crossings 2261 2162 2003 1932 1857 1936 2025 49
Mishaps 1839 1183 1493 1838 1836 2009 1700 93
Telecoms 1406 1352 1252 1176 1513 2406 1518 46
Other Signalling 1495 1430 1513 1505 1300 1338 1430 41
OLE/Third Rail 1458 1241 1281 1276 1265 1259 1297 205
Bridge Strikes 1360 1126 1232 1115 1068 1138 1173 129
Speed Restrictions 1428 1278 932 717 685 747 965 122
Axle Counters 1096 913 648 683 706 799 808 117
Cables 573 530 552 570 614 686 588 281
Structures (Civils) 397 436 385 279 444 574 419 253
Fires 197 221 250 257 116 218 210 145
Total 52384 46077 42120 40498 39756 42241 43846
Table 1: Incident count for infrastructure assets between 2008-2014 upon UK main-
line, for top 18 incident categories (by count), including mean number of delay min-
utes incurred per incident. Note that Points have the highest mean failure count over
the period. Source: Office of Rail Regulation [20]
ID Intervention Type Event Frequency Intervention Time Possession Intervention
fm (per Year) tm hours Requirement Class
1 Track Visual Inspection 52 0.1 No Inspection
2 Track Gauging/Component Inspection 13 0.5 Yes Inspection
3 Track Element Renewals 0.1 10 Yes Maintenance
4 Signalling A Service 13 0.25 Yes Inspection
5 Signalling B service 4 0.5 Yes Maintenance
6 Signalling C Service 1 2 Yes Maintenance
7 Location Case Inspection 4 0.5 No Inspection
Table 2: Typical scheduled interventions for UK switch installations, including to-
tal labour time. Note labour time does not include travel to site. Source: Network
Rail/Interview.
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Figure 2: View of the 384mm gauge Repoint demonstrator in the Control Systems
Group laboratory at Loughborough University.
3 Multi-channel redundancy of track switching elements
- the Repoint approach
An ongoing project at Loughborough University, called Repoint, has devised a novel
architecture of track switch which allows multi-channel actuation of the movable track
elements. Full detail of this design is provided in literature [4–8]. The key enabler of
the multi-channel architecture is that the locking function is provided passively, such
that each actuator can operate the switch alone, and with no performance degradation,
with other channels isolated. The rails are actuated in a semi-circular motion, rather
than laterally. In each at-rest position, switch rails are positively located in a locking
recess, unable to move in any direction but directly upwards. The actuator lifts the rails
out of this recess, before bending them over to another set position and dropping them
in another, equivalent recess for a different route. Each actuator is capable of lifting the
rail alone, enabling any of a bank of actuators to unlock all others through the simple
mechanical arrangement. Each individual actuator is designed to have a standardised,
line replaceable active element which can be exchanged in the order of 2 minutes.
These features open up the possibility of a truly condition-based maintenance regime.
A demonstrator of the concept has been created in the laboratory at Loughborough
University. The demonstrator consists of a 384mm gauge actuator bearer, which has
been physically assembled. This is coupled to two software simulated bearers and a
rail bending co-simulation in a hardware-in-the-loop environment. The rail bending is
co-simulated in real-time on D-Space processing hardware [21]. The same processing
hardware allows simulated faults to be injected into the software bearers, in addition
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to fault cases which can be caused through physical means on the hardware bearer.
The demonstrator has a 1-out-of-3 architecture, though it is possible that in practice
the number of channels could be adjusted for the requirements of a particular junction
or route. Condition monitoring of each bearer is able to isolate any single unit in the
event of a suspected fault. This monitoring is currently functional at a basic level with
more advanced algorithms the subject of further investigation. The demonstrator is
able to switch between routes on a constant cycle at user-selectable service intensity.
The physical element of the demonstrator is shown in Fig. 2.
4 Operational availability and τ
4.1 Operational Availability
It is necessary to distinguish between the mean time between unsafe failures (i.e. sys-
tem in an unsafe state), and the mean time between operational failures. Literature,
especially industrially-focussed documents, can cause confusion by representing ei-
ther by the term MTBF or MTTF (Meant Time Between/To Failure). The distinction
is made here between MTBF, the mean time between unsafe failures, and MTBOF
(Mean Time Between Operational Failures), which describes how often the system
can be expected to suffer a failure which interrupts operations. The latter would gen-
erally be expected to be substantially lower, and reflects the service quality that the
system must provide. This concept is explored in [22], with further mathematical
modelling work on the reliability of k-out-of-N systems discussed in [23].
To make the distinction defined in [22] for railway track switching systems specifi-
cally, the MTBF would be required to be of a level of a modern high-integrity system,
around SIL-4 (108− 109 hours) - i.e. not normally expected to occur within the work-
ing life of the entire population (see Standard BS:EN61508 for a further discussion of
SIL levels and their calculation). However, the MTBOF - the mean time to a switch
failure causing network disruption - is much lower, and of the order of 104−105 hours,
as can be observed from Table 1. In practice, if a single fault can directly cause an un-
safe condition in any system then some level of functional replication or redundancy
is necessary. This will usually ensure a satisfactory level of safety, whilst compromis-
ing reliability in some manner. The classic formula MTBF/(MTBF + MTTR) takes
account of repair time to indicate availability, but this differs from operational avail-
ability because operation continues while the repair is being effected in a fault-tolerant
system with redundancy. The functional elements in the Repoint track switching sys-
tem are Line Replaceable Units (LRUs). These will not be repaired; instead there will
be a stock of functioning units that maintenance technicians can use to replace the
faulty or failed unit. The unit may subsequently be repaired in the background.
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4.2 Emergency Response time - τ
Accepting that the MTBF cannot be relaxed for safety reasons, there is still scope to
provide an improved availability by improving the track switching system and its asso-
ciated maintenance practices. This may, or may not, come at additional financial cost.
Mathematical modelling can be used to provide an indication of the potential change
in MTBOF and availability for a given set of maintenance regimes. Traditional relia-
bility modelling of a system may deliver results which are somewhat abstracted from
the realities of the day-to-day operation of a railway. The modelling herein takes a
railway asset management perspective, in that the primary controlled variable is one
which can be directly affected by the asset manager to bring about the level of avail-
ability required of the asset. This variable is τ , which describes the target time period
in which a failed (or isolated as identified faulty) unit must be replaced by a mainte-
nance team to deliver a given system MTBOF.
4.3 Operational Deployment Levels
The internal drive arrangements of the multi-channel concept could take any of the
mechanical approaches listed in section 2. This analysis will therefore examine each
drive-line approach to evaluate the performance available. The multi-channel con-
cept could be implemented alone, under existing maintenance regimes, or alongside
condition-based maintenance to better exploit its potential. Several levels of mainte-
nance change have therefore been examined, which are identified as follows:
• Level 0: This represents the benchmark case, as currently implemented.
• Level 1: Triplex redundancy, with no change to the maintenance or inspection
regime.
• Level 2a: Triplex redundancy, with no change to the maintenance regime, but
with the system self-inspecting and adjusting.
• Level 2b: Triplex redundancy, with maintenance performed by LRU (2 minute
replacement), but no change to the inspection regime.
• Level 3: Triplex redundancy, with maintenance performed by LRU (2 minute
replacement), and the system self-inspecting and adjusting.
For each implementation level, there is a choice of architecture to the implementa-
tion of the functional redundancy, namely series or parallel. Figure 4 shows the series
case, whereby each LRU contains the functionality of a point machine or trackside
supply/command unit. When an LRU is replaced (maintenance or failure), the entire
unit is replaced as a whole. This is the equivalent of, for example, fitting three whole
point machines to a single track switch. Figure 5 shows the alternative case, whereby
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each functional subsystem forms an LRU, and is replaced individually, without affect-
ing functional units of a different class. Evaluating both arrangements, at 4 different
implementation levels and for 3 different actuation types gives a total of 24 possible
scenarios.
5 Modelling approach, data and benchmarking exist-
ing switches
Previous publications have analysed historical failure data from the GB Infrastructure
owner/operator, Network Rail, to establish the performance of switches in the field. It
is established in [12] that the 2P-Weibull distribution is the most appropriate model
for switch failure analysis, the paper also compares the frequency of switch failures to
actuation frequency and traffic intensity. [13] extends this work, analysing 40,000 fail-
ure events over 74,800 years of continuous operation to establish 2P-Weibull failure
distributions of each of the principle subsystems of each switch type. These distribu-
tions will be used as a baseline within this work. As the distributions are significantly
time-variant, all calculations herein will be on the basis of a 25-year time window
from the moment of installation in an ‘as-new’ state.
The availability of a switch can be affected by both scheduled and unscheduled
maintenance downtime. The availability for a given observation window can be es-
tablished using RBD (Reliability Block Diagrams) and the Monte-Carlo approach.
An RBD of each switch arrangement is first created, with elements representing the
arrangement of the multiple channels of each functional subsystem. The subsystem
division is established in [13]. An example baseline RBD is shown in Figure 3. Each
block in the RBD has a 2P-Weibull reliability model describing failure frequency. The
parameters for the failure rate models were calculated in earlier work [13], and are re-
produced in Table 3. Of note is that all elements have been modelled with 2-parameter
Weibull distribution, though the failures attributable to the ‘Human’ element have been
taken as a constant failure rate (i.e. β = 1). This element is unique in that it essen-
tially represents the likelihood the design and installation of the switching system is
incorrect, and not human error related to the individual component elements, which is
already catered for in the respective distributions; it is therefore unsuitable to represent
this with a time-variant distribution. The functional blocks also have periodic sched-
uled maintenance downtime assigned, as per table 2, during which time the blocks are
considered unavailable and non-functional.
With an RBD approach, the system is considered functional if a path can be found
from start to end, through functional blocks only. When a block fails, the single chan-
nel arrangement means the system is instantly unavailable. After a prescribed time, the
block is repaired as-good-as-new, and the system functional again. In this way, failure
rates of individual subsystems do not affect other subsystems. The simulation is exe-
cuted for 25 years with a random seed, and the total downtime noted. This is repeated
9
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Figure 3: Example RBD representing an Electro-Hydraulic Switch installation. The
switch is considered functioning for all time there is a path from Start to End which
passes through functional blocks only. Each element is single-channel. The perfor-
mance of each block, for each switch type, is described by a unique failure distribution
from Table 3.
Figure 4: Example of functional redundancy by connecting elements in series, for
instance in multiple point machines.
for 5,000 iterations, and a mean taken to establish the unscheduled availability of that
system. Table 4 indicates the baseline availability of each existing, single-channel
switching solution as currently maintained.
6 Evaluating multi-channel track switching
6.1 Results
The simulation results are presented in 3 tables. Table 5 shows the output of the
simulation for each of the listed cases, giving availability values at each level of im-
plementation, where the value of τ has been fixed to 106 minutes. Table 6 shows the
extent to which the τ values can be relaxed, working under the assumption that the
availability must be the equivalent to existing installations. Table 7 imagines a hybrid
scenario in which the τ value is relaxed to one week, and lists the availability achiev-
Figure 5: Example of functional redundancy by connecting elements in parallel, for
instance with redundant units inside a single point machine.
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ID Element Classic Modern
Electro-Mechanical Electro-Hydraulic Electro-Mechanical Mechanical
β η β η β η β η
(Days) (Days) (Days) (Days)
A Actuation 0.662 7953 0.738 4940 0.671 8641 0.544 25687
C Control/ Power 0.804 12645 0.789 14739 0.564 4243 1.011 188915
D Detection 0.650 26253 0.707 15941 0.637 1671 0.698 20797
H Human 1.000 67317 1.000 71634 1.000 42096 1.000 174517
L Locking 0.629 65123 0.732 5713 n/a n/a 0.608 62510
P Permanent Way 1.275 9405 0.882 35548 1.253 22730 1.360 56200
Table 3: 2P-Weibull parameters used in the RBD Monte-Carlo modelling of switch un-
scheduled unavailability. Note that Modern Electro-Mechanical devices do not specify
a separate model for Actuation and Locking as these functions are combined; in this
case the ‘Actuation’ model accounts for both.
For 25-year Window Classic Modern
Electro-Mech. Electro-Hydraul. Electro-Mech. Mechanical
Unavailability (Sched.) hours per year 14.75 14.75 14.75 14.75
Unavailability (Sched.) hours, total 369 369 369 369
Unavailability (Sched.) 0.0016826 0.0016826 0.0016826 0.0016826
Unavailability (Unsched.) mean hours per year 0.2893 0.3945 0.6136 0.1227
Unavailability (Unsched.) hours, total 7.23 9.86 15.34 3.07
Unavailability (Unsched.) 0.000033 0.000045 0.000070 0.000014
Availability 0.998284 0.998272 0.998247 0.998303
τ hours 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.77
Table 4: Unavailability contributions, and Availability, of each switch type based upon
analysis of historical data and current maintenance practices.
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Classic
Electro-Mechanical Electro-Hydraulic Modern Electro-Mechanical
Availability
Annual Unavail.
(Hours) Availability
Annual Unavail.
(Hours) Availability
Annual Unavail.
(Hours)
Level 0 (Baseline) 0.99828440 15.0 0.99827240 15.1 0.99824710 15.4
Series Redundancy Architecture
Level 1 0.99708547 25.5 0.99709032 25.5 0.99708846 25.5
Level 2a 0.99893966 9.3 0.99894428 9.3 0.99894329 9.3
Level 2b 0.99808313 16.8 0.99808782 16.8 0.99808607 16.8
Level 3 0.99993738 0.5 0.99994158 0.5 0.99994106 0.5
Parallel Redundancy Architecture
Level 1 0.99708547 25.5 0.99709032 25.5 0.99708846 25.5
Level 2a 0.99893966 9.3 0.99894428 9.3 0.99894329 9.3
Level 2b 0.99808313 16.8 0.99808782 16.8 0.99808607 16.8
Level 3 0.99993738 0.5 0.99994158 0.5 0.99994106 0.5
Table 5: Simulation Results: Availabilities of parallel and series architectures at each
implementation level with τ fixed at 106 minutes.
able in each scenario.
To further illustrate the relationship between τ and availability, three plots are pro-
vided. Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between availability and τ for each imple-
mentation level. Figure 7 is a simple bar chart which illustrates the relative contribu-
tion of scheduled and unscheduled availability, for each deployment level. Figure 8
illustrates the unvailability of each implementation level where τ is fixed to 1 week.
7 Analysis and Interpretation
7.1 Baseline Results
• Baseline availablities are at levels to be expected when consulting published
data (e.g. [12]).
• The majority of unavailability in the baseline case (369 Hours vs 3-15 Hours
per lifetime, depending upon switch type) comes from scheduled maintenance
downtime.
• The ratio of cost between scheduled and unscheduled downtime is not currently
known, but will be evaluated in future work. However, in the UK, the current
push towards a 24/7 railway will mean that both elements of downtime will need
to be reduced.
• The modern electromechanical design is the least reliable, with 5x the unsched-
uled unavailability of an unpowered, mechanical solution. [13] established this
is due to the unreliability of the detection and control/power elements, which
12
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Classic Modern
Electro-Mechanical Electro-Hydraulic Electro-Mechanical
Level 0
(Baseline) 1.77 1.77 1.77
Series Redundancy Architecture
Level 1 n/a n/a n/a
Level 2a 117 283 272
Level 2b n/a n/a n/a
Level 3 323 768 623
Parallel Redundancy Architecture
Level 1 n/a n/a n/a
Level 2a 118 292 275
Level 2b n/a n/a n/a
Level 3 327 772 625
Table 6: The maximum value τ (Hours) can be relaxed to whilst achieving baseline
availability levels
Classic Electro-Mechanical Electro-Hydraulic Modern Electro-Mechanical
Availability Annual Unavail. (Hrs) Availability Annual Unavail. (Hrs) Availability Annual Unavail. (Hrs)
Level 0
(Baseline) 0.99541389 40.2 0.99442105 48.9 0.99175345 72.3
Series Redundancy Architecture
Level 1 0.99633465 32.1 0.99676096 28.4 0.99668535 29.1
Level 2a 0.99818434 15.9 0.99860429 12.2 0.99858454 12.4
Level 2b 0.99731799 23.5 0.99777751 19.5 0.99777718 19.5
Level 3 0.99913906 7.5 0.99961458 3.4 0.9995266 4.1
Parallel Redundancy Architecture
Level 1 0.99632192 32.2 0.99675727 28.4 0.99678579 28.2
Level 2a 0.99818434 15.9 0.99860429 12.2 0.99856542 12.6
Level 2b 0.99737159 23.0 0.99777747 19.5 0.99777816 19.5
Level 3 0.99918206 7.2 0.99961458 3.4 0.9995266 4.1
Table 7: Simulation Results: Availabilities of parallel and series architectures at each
implementation level with τ fixed at 10800 minutes (1 week).
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Figure 6: Plots showing variation in asset availability vs Tau figures for range of pos-
sible implementation levels using classic electro-mechanical baseline data in a series
configuration.
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Figure 7: Bar chart indicating the relative contribution to unavailability from sched-
uled and unscheduled maintenance at various levels of deployment, for the classic
electro-mechanical case with τ fixed at 1.77 hours.
Figure 8: Bar chart indicating annual unavailability (hours) for each implementation
level, where τ is fixed at 1 week, for the classic electro-mechanical case.
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have η values significantly lower than the other powered solutions. The me-
chanical solution performs best, perhaps due to it’s simplicity, but the same
simplicity prevents it being used in high-density situations or far from signal
boxes.
• All switch types attain an availability in the ‘two-nines’ region, which is not
a particularly high value when compared to those attained by mission-critical
assets in other industries, e.g. Nuclear. However, this is deemed acceptable due
to the time currently available for maintenance.
• In the baseline case, τ is equal to the emergency response time, therefore in-
creasing τ has an immediate, significant and detrimental effect upon availability
(See table 7). In reality this approach could not be taken by infrastrructure own-
ers with existing systems.
7.2 Redundantly Engineered Solutions
• Not all levels of implementation demonstrate increased availability. Table 5
shows that Level 1 and 2b solutions reduce availability due to the additional
maintenance downtime, and the proportionally large contribution of scheduled
maintenance to total downtime. It is important to note, however, that in both
these cases the unscheduled availability is reduced almost to insignificance, as
illustrated in Figure 7.
• Level 2a and 3 implementations both show a significant decrease in scheduled
and unscheduled downtime across all point machine types, leading to substan-
tially increased availability (Table 5). Level 3, in particular, reduces downtime
to around 0.5 hours per year, from over 15 hours at benchmark, for every switch
type.
• Table 5 shows that ‘four-nines’ availability is achievable with all switching types
when a level 3 implementation.
• Table 6 illustrates the extent to which τ can be relaxed, in each case, whilst
maintaining the availability provided by the benchmark system. For each de-
ployment level this is possible, and across all switch types, the emergency re-
sponse time can be relaxed by 2-3 orders of magnitude.
• Table 6 illustrates that the emergency response times of the classic electro-
mechanical design cannot be relaxed to the same extent as the other two ac-
tuation methods. This is due to the larger contribution to unreliability of the
Permanent Way element in this case, with a significantly lower η value. This is
a known weakness of the classic design (the stretcher bar and mountings in par-
ticular), and it is not possible to add a multi-channel approach to this element.
However, this could offset by having separate target response times for different
subsystems. It is of note that the Repoint design does not feature stretcher bars,
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therefore the P-way reliability model should be closer to that of the modern
electro-mechanical system.
• Figure 6 indicates the availability achievable for each implementation level as τ
is relaxed. Of note is that the level 3 implementation outperforms the baseline
throughout. At τ > 10000 minutes, all redundantly engineered solutions out-
perform the baseline. Below this, the baseline outperforms level 1 and level 2b
solutions. This is due to the additional maintenance requirements.
• Figure 6 indicates that a level 3 deployment can not only outperform the baseline
in availability terms, but it can do this with τ > 30000 minutes; 300 times longer
than benchmark practice. Similarly, the level 2a deployment can outperform the
baseline with τ > 10000 minutes - two orders of magnitude longer than existing
practice.
• Figure 8 and Table 7 show that when τ is extended to 1 week, all solutions
outperform the baseline in availability terms.
• There is little difference in availability (in each circumstance) between the par-
allel and series architecture Figure 8 and Table 7 illustrate the case of a fixed τ
of 1 week. In this case, the difference is primarily revealed in the level 2b and
3 implementations, with the parallel case performing marginally better in each.
The architectures are not a dominating factor in availability until τ reaches very
high levels, which is to be expected. A series architecture may perform slightly
worse, but it is likely that line-replaceable units containing all functions will
simplify maintenance and therefore reduce human-attributable errors; they may
therefore prove more reliable in practice.
The headline observation from the modelling exercise is that it is possible to boost
the availability of track switching solutions - whether electro-hydraulic or electro-
mechanical, through the use of a fault-tolerant, multi-channel architecture. However,
downtime due to failures is only a small fraction of the total downtime, and a larger
improvement arises when the approach to maintenance is revised to take full advantage
of the new architecture. If a full ‘level 3’ approach is embraced, it is possible to boost
switch availability and reliability at the same time as relaxing τ by several orders of
magnitude.
8 Conclusions
A concept for a novel track switch arrangement has been developed at Loughbor-
ough University, which, through a novel locking arrangement, allows parallel, multi-
channel actuation and locking functions for the first time. This paper has demon-
strated, through mathematical modelling and conservative assumptions, that using a
multi-channel, fault-tolerant switching concept allows an increase in switch availabil-
ity over the baseline. For a railway which does not operate overnight, or at weekends,
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the baseline availability figures may be satisfactory. However, on the GB network in
particular, there is much pressure to begin to use these traditional maintenance win-
dows for additional traffic. The most significant availability increase comes when the
maintenance practice is also changed due to the ability of a multi-channel system to
run to subsystem failure and remain functional. This can be alongside a correspond-
ing extension of emergency response times. The results show that for a multi-channel
installation, gains in system availability are possible even when emergency response
times are set orders of magnitude longer than currently achieved, indicating a signif-
icant reduction in ongoing maintenance cost. The work also demonstrates that the
particular choice of subsystem architecture is an insignificant variable.
9 Future Work
The work presented herein regards the operational performance of a fault-tolerant
track switching installation in terms of availability and emergency response times.
Future extensions to this work will involve weighting scheduled vs unscheduled down-
time, in a cost function in order to establish the best operational balance. The work
will also be extended to assigning monetary costs to assets, maintenance interventions
and downtime, in order to calculate the lifetime cost of a fault tolerant, LRU-based
multi-channel approach vs baseline scenario.
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Appendix B
Patents
Description
This appendix contains verbatim copies of three patents which were filed as a result of the
research work presented in this thesis.
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